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The Waters of the Jordan

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The Middle East *Journal*

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CULTURAL FACTORS IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN THE NEAR EAST

E. A. Speiser

IN THE MYTHOLOGY of the early twentieth century no motif was more commonly accepted than that of the Immutable East. Now, at the mid-century junction, that same East faces the reality of epochal change. The facts of today show up the error of yesterday's appraisal. Yet the earlier myth owed its acceptance to a few strands of fact that had been woven into it. There is similarly an admixture of fiction in the pattern of facts of the present. Each instance is, in part, a result of faulty evaluation which can be traced to insufficient perspective; in each, the approach has been lacking in depth. This is true of the Orient in general, but is nowhere more sharply in evidence in the particular than in the Near East.

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This article is based on two of the author's papers, one presented in October, 1952, at the Princeton Conference of the Near and Middle East Committee of the Social Science Research Council, and the other read in April, 1953, at the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society, held in Washington, D. C.

No apology should be needed for relating social dynamics in the Near East to the pertinent cultural background. Yet all signs would seem to point to the conclusion that the connection between the observable level of a given society and its subsurface forces is not fully appreciated. It is one of the tenets of modern pragmatism that things are not important unless their usefulness is immediately apparent. This belief, which often amounts to an article of faith, can be seen reflected everywhere around us. In education it has led to a doctrinaire hostility towards most things past. More than one social science has little use in practice for works antedating the present century. The statesmen who strive to prepare for tomorrow help to impart a nightmarish quality to our todays because of their obtuse refusal to take our yesterdays into account.

Social processes are three-dimensional. Any cross-section through the present has but two dimensions. It is flat, and so is the extreme pragmatic approach. Only a cultist kind of pragmatism can affirm that the present should cut itself loose from all tradition in order to make a success of the twentieth century.¹

The process of social change is three-dimensional by definition. It involves a stratified medium, for such change moves from one level to the next. The question is how far down one must reach beneath a given stratum to arrive at the origin and gain an understanding of what is being transformed at long last. The answer will depend on the length and tenacity of historic tradition that is still a living force in the area involved. Because the Near East started the world on its historic course, no other part of the globe has been watched over by history to a comparable degree. Nor has tradition held anything like the same sway in any other region. The Near East, for instance, is the home of the old Eastern Churches of Christendom, which still function there, through direct survivals and various offshoots, their role as a political factor having persisted in some cases to this day. There, too, one can find remnants of pre-Christian Judaism among the Aramaic-speaking Jews of Kurdistan. The superficial Christianity of the Mandaeans and the undisguised paganism of the

¹ J. Glenn Gray, "Is Progressive Education a Failure?" *Commentary*, XIV (May 1952), p. 110.

Yazidis lead back still farther. To be sure, not all of these groups are representative of the main stream of living tradition. Nor does that tradition operate exclusively through religious bodies, although it is most prominent in Islam, the dominant religion of the area. The present, in any case, has deep roots in the Near East and these must be traced through countless paths and bypaths. The region, in short, is much like a multiple palimpsest. There may be concern only with the latest inscription; but the key to its interpretation might well be hidden in the legend at the very bottom.

To carry this comparison a step farther, the immediate task is to dig down and decipher the record of the past only insofar as this can contribute to the elucidation of the present. This is not a question of recapitulating the entire cultural history of the Near East. It is on this specific issue that is found what is perhaps the major area of friction between the humanist and the social scientist. The humanist cannot give up the notion that everything which his special discipline has unearthed is vital to the total picture. The social scientist sees in the data furnished by the humanities much that is not germane to his purpose, and he proceeds thence to the erroneous conclusion that nothing of importance can be derived from that quarter. The fact of the matter would seem to be that society, which is the ultimate focus of all such studies, is not cut up into humanistic and functional segments. It is an integral body at which the respective disciplines may nibble, but which they cannot hope to fathom unless all the disciplines are brought to bear on it in harmonious cooperation. All should be means to the sole end of recapturing human progress in its totality. Yet such is obviously not the case, least of all where the Near East is concerned. Your student of the contemporary history of the area does not normally have a workable understanding of the dominant Islamic culture. The Islamist stays aloof, as a rule, from modern developments — except perhaps as a political partisan — and pays only lip service to the pre-Islamic background. And the student of the ancient Near East, while conceding that life went on after Hammurabi or Moses, will positively refuse to become involved in it after the age of Alexander. What is thus lost in this parochial

fragmentation is the sense of essential continuity between the latest manifestation of the Near Eastern experience of mankind and its meaningful explanation in the remote past.

* * *

But how can it be ascertained what cultural features of the stratified past have helped to shape a contemporary socio-political entity? It is plainly an interdisciplinary task since no single discipline has anything resembling it among its stated objectives. The social sciences are not geared to research in depth and the humanities are likely to underestimate the social and political factors. What is called for is a socio-cultural analysis of a whole region, strategically important and wedded to tradition, in the process of radical change; thus it might be possible to obtain a sense of the direction to which the changes are pointing. Yet it is not clear what is the nature of the basic social organism whose component parts are to be analyzed. What is the fundamental unit which has to be considered?

That unit cannot be the Near East as a whole, for that region soon proves to consist of a number of various units distinct from one another. To be sure, the Near East is the joint product of geography and history. It is articulated by people who at this particular juncture in time are responding in one way or another to a variety of social, economic, and political pressures. Because environment has given the region a vital strategic role, its peoples and its resources are the concern not only of the local states but also of the world outside. But this formulation is merely another way of describing a two-dimensional approach. It ignores the past and manages to obscure the future. Yet the geopolitical approach is about as far as diplomacy is prepared and equipped to go, and it comes close to exhausting the capabilities of political science.

Before long, however, one is bound to discover that the three states of Turkey, Iran, and Israel differ significantly among themselves, and that each is in substantial contrast with the neighboring Arab states. Evidently, therefore, the unit which must be isolated is not the same thing as a region. The reasons for the difference are just as plainly bound up with history. The distinguishing feature in each instance is the added dimension of

time. To do justice to such manifestations in depth requires the services of history and anthropology.

Does this mean that it is the individual state on which the cooperating disciplines must focus? The example of the Arab world shows that the state cannot be the answer to our question. Surely, more than one Arab state has to all intents and purposes the same cultural setting. On the other hand, the concept of nation, as in "the Arab nation," will not serve either. For on closer examination the Arab states as a group fail to function as an integral unit. There are here instead several distinctive subdivisions. Looking, moreover, at "the Kurdish nation," one finds that body partitioned among Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. In none of these states are the Kurds the dominant ethnic element, and they have no independent status on the international scene. Thus neither state nor nation can be the answer.

Nor is the concept of society as synonymous with civilization really suitable for the purposes. Toynbee's Western Christendom would be roughly comparable to the Islamic Near East. It has been suggested, however — and the suggestion will be supported presently — that Turkey cannot be bracketed with Iran, that the two cannot be equated with the Arab states, and that the Arab states break up into several subdivisions. What is lacking, therefore, is a practical focus of interdisciplinary research when it comes to analyzing political entities in their significant cultural setting.

What are, then, the main characteristics of this elusive unit of socio-cultural inquiry? In common with the state this is a politically significant organism of recognized international standing. Turkey or Iran, for example, fulfills these requirements. Yet each presents also other features that are not germane to the present context. To give an obvious illustration, the Kurds constitute sizable minorities in both instances, yet they have no decisive bearing on the domestic situation in either state and their voice is scarcely audible in external matters. In other words, the Kurds do not enter to any substantial degree into the group personality that makes Turkey distinct from Iran, and each in turn distinct from any other state. Those group features, however, that prove to be distinctive have been often a long time in form-

ing. Islam played a major role in shaping Turkey on the one hand and Iran on the other, but the reason that the two can be contrasted, nevertheless, is that each had already been molded in its own particular fashion long before the advent of Islam. To understand each country, therefore, and to chart its future potential, it may be necessary to recede as far back into the past as the continuous thread of distinctive group personality will carry.

In going back, however, it is important to distinguish between the essential and the incidental, the enduring and the ephemeral. The complex in question is indeed a socio-political organism as the end product of its total cultural career. Still, that career has been a cumulative and selective process. Over its entire course it may have involved all sorts of major changes and modifications: in religion and outlook on life, in law and government — even in language and ethnic composition. That is precisely why it cannot be readily apprehended in terms of state, nation, culture, or society as such. Each of these concepts is at once too broad for some of the present purposes and too shallow for others. What matters is the effective core within each complex under discussion; the irreducible minimum of productive features without which one such organism might not be clearly distinguished from the next in the long perspective. In short, it is not simply a question of the cultural history of Turkey, Iran, or any other state; rather it is a question of that blend of the living past and the deep-rooted present which enables each state to function in its own distinctive way. It happens that the Near East, by reason of its total history and the singular effect of its immemorial traditions, is of all the regions of the world the one best suited for such a study. It also appears to be the region that is most urgently in need of such an investigation.

The task will be greatly simplified if a term can be supplied for the concept that has just been described. The name that suggests itself is *ethneme*, on the analogy of "phoneme,"² which in linguistics represents the minimum significant unit of sound. Just so, the ethneme would stand for the minimum distinctive politi-

² A better parallel in this instance would be "glosseme," or the smallest meaningful unit of linguistic communication, but "phoneme" is slightly more familiar. The important thing is that abstractions of this kind can prove instrumental in the progress of a discipline. They have clearly done so in linguistics.

cal organism in its socio-cultural setting. Each ethneme has its own combination of features, some constant and others variable. Environment, for instance, would have to be regarded as a constant ethnemic feature. Language is a distinctive feature in many cases, but not necessarily in all; one need only call attention to modern Switzerland or to the several linguistic strata in Asia Minor within one and the same ethnemic body. In its long historic career the Near East has been the cradle of many ethnemes. Some of these have long been extinct, e.g., the Sumerians and the Hittites. Others have been dormant for an incalculable period, notably the Kurds. In Israel, there is an instance of an ethneme that is again operative after nineteen centuries of dormancy. In any event, those ethnemes in the Near East that are now functioning reach far back into the past. Whether any new ethnemes are in the process of formation at this time there is no means of judging. For one of the ethneme's most prominent aspects is its extent in depth, and that can be appreciated only in retrospect.

Two incidental observations may be made in passing. One of these pertains to the emergent discipline of "national character" around which there has grown up a considerable body of literature within the past few years. The foregoing emphasis on cumulative group personality might have given rise to the assumption that the proposed concept of ethneme is but another name for national character. In reality, these two concepts have certain features in common, but they differ also significantly in a number of ways. The main difference would seem to be that the psychological factor, which is dominant in the idea of national character, is only a minor feature in the ethneme. On the other hand, the accent on the formative past applies in the case of the ethneme to the historic group as a whole and not primarily to the sum of its individual members. If the ethneme turns out to be a valuable tool, it may well prove helpful in the study of national character in an incidental way.

The other observation is in the nature of a warning. It cannot be stressed too strongly that what has been said about the ethneme so far, and what will be said presently, should be construed only as program notes. The whole thing is merely stuff for transforming. The entire concept must be refined, tested, and perfected.

For the present it is no more than an experiment which carries with it the promise of worthwhile results.

* * *

If the ethnemic concept is to justify itself as a useful tool of interdisciplinary inquiry, one must see how it can be applied to the present subject. What is back of the ferment with which the Near East is now astir?

The logical approach to this question is through the medium of the local states. State and ethneme are often roughly comparable at first glance. It is only upon further probing that the two are found to diverge as the criterion of background is applied. For once the factor of time has been taken into account, a single ethneme may prove to have progressed through a stratified succession of states. The ideal objective would be to retrace these steps, starting with the uppermost level. In practice, however, the task is not at all simple, perhaps even out of reach. But there is a good chance that it may be possible to get down deep enough for an adequate perspective before some slip obliterates the proper course. It can be said at any rate that the Near East has left more footholds, and has spaced them over a longer stretch, than is the case with any other area.

If the Near East is viewed as a group of states, their outstanding characteristic is soon seen to be a pervasive weakness, both in internal and external matters. On the surface this weakness appears to derive primarily from external causes: the colonialism of the recent past which kept the area under outside domination in one form or another; the strategic and economic imperialism of still more recent date whereby the great natural resources of the Near East have been made the target of foreign exploitation; or, in the judgment of others, the blend of cultural and social factors that have been channeled through Zionism.

There can be little doubt that various outside forces have had an adverse effect locally. Colonialism and the Suez Canal, oil and the Palestine conflict—all these have acted as powerful irritants. Yet, they are relatively superficial manifestations, symptoms rather than causes. However, for one reason or another, the diplomats' analysis of the problems of the Near East has rarely advanced beyond the notice of such extraneous factors. In fact,

their diagnosis has often stopped with but one of these: Palestine, or oil, or the Suez. This is not to suggest that a more penetrating analysis would have served to obviate the present crisis altogether. Since the fundamental causes of the region's weaknesses do not stem from the outside, they have to be internal. The cure must come, therefore, from within. But a keener diagnosis might have left the outside world in a better position to know what to expect and guard against. As it is, the lid now threatens to be blown to pieces—and this in an area whose stability is essential to the world's equilibrium.

Once it is realized that the basic troubles of the Near East are rooted in the native soil, the immediate cause is not far to seek. It is the familiar chain reaction of extreme and chronic poverty on a mass scale, with the usual concomitants of malnutrition, disease, and illiteracy. Since the area is overwhelmingly agricultural, and mass poverty is a cancerous affliction, land holdings have passed in course of time from the indigent many to the successful few.⁸ The vast majority of the population are consequently landless. Progress and reform are not in the immediate interest of the landlords and the landlords have a very substantial voice in the government. The governments are weak because their mandate is from the few and for the few. They can be neither honest nor representative. Eventually the need becomes urgent to divert the attention of the long-suffering masses from the ills within to some convenient target outside. Because of the abiding importance of the Near East, interested outsiders have always been ready to hand. They have been made to shoulder most of the blame, sometimes with good reason, but often also as mere scapegoats. In a climate such as this, it is primarily as instruments of diversion that xenophobia and obsessive nationalism spring up and prosper.

To be sure, this type of chain reaction is not restricted to the Near East any more than mass poverty itself. It is perhaps more pronounced here than elsewhere but it is certainly not unique. A drastic economic imbalance, moreover, is itself a symptom of something deeper. The fact has often been stressed that economic

⁸ Sa'id B. Himadeh, "Economic Factors Underlying Social Problems in the Arab Middle East," *The Middle East Journal*, V (Summer 1951), pp. 269 ff.

problems cannot be divorced from the total context of the given civilization. The crisis brought about by mass poverty is seriously aggravated, if not induced, by underlying social and cultural conditions. The recent history of the whole of Asia bears this out.⁴ But whereas the rest of Asia has been suffering from social and cultural disintegration for a few generations, the Islamic world has been the victim of the same malady for centuries. And the Near East is overwhelmingly Islamic.

Now Islam was destined from the very beginning to become a dominant ethnemic feature, far more so than any other major religion. For it was Muhammad's conviction that his mission included the task of founding a community which should be a State as well as a Church. Numerous tenets of Islam reflect the intimate blending of the spiritual and the temporal.⁵ But while spiritual values often prove to be enduring, temporal policies, as the name implies, presently become outdated. By now, Islam as a spiritual experience has stood the test of time for some thirteen centuries. But it is also the state religion in a number of countries within the Muslim world. To the extent to which Islam is a State as much as a Church, the effect of the system on social and political progress has been negative for a long time.

It is neither feasible nor necessary to trace here in detail the inhibitive aspects of traditional Islam in the socio-political life of its community through the centuries. The long-term results in general have proved harmful in precisely those fields that affect the vitality of the society as a whole. Thus the Muslim laws of succession and the institution of the Waqf, or Pious Foundations, have jointly contributed to the progressive fragmentation of land holdings and the critical inequality of land ownership.⁶ Education in a theocratic state is of necessity slanted, limited, and reactionary. Social practices remain stagnant. And international relations are hampered by numerous injunctions that were anachronisms a thousand years ago.

The pervasive weakness of Islamic society, therefore, is due in large measure to the dominant temporal features of the under-

⁴ C. F. Hudson, "Why Asians Hate the West," *Commentary*, XIII (May 1952), p. 414.

⁵ Arthur Jeffery, "The Political Importance of Islam," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, I (1942), pp. 383 ff.

⁶ Himadeh, *loc. cit.*, 272 ff.

lying system. The obvious answer to the problem would be a resolute separation of Church and State. This is by no means a novel conclusion. It is implicit, for instance, in the statement of a distinguished Syrian educator and statesman, Costi K. Zurayk, who has written as follows: "When, however, it [Islam] became reduced to a set of doctrines to be taken on credence, and a code of laws and morals to be applied rigidly and blindly it turned out to be, as other religions in the same state, a burden rather than an inspiration, a paralysing shackle instead of a liberating force, the letter that killeth all real endeavor and progress."⁷ A courageous Egyptian Muslim, Khalid Muhammad Khalid, refers to the same conditions in terms of witchcraft rather than religion.⁸ Yet the logical step of divorcing State from Church has so far been taken by only one of the countries involved, namely, Turkey. And it is surely no mere coincidence that Turkey today is once again a progressive and dynamic state. But the rest of the Islamic community in the Near East has yet to reverse its downward trend.

It is thus apparent that the roots of the present crisis in the Near East reach deep down into the past. The surface weaknesses in the economic, political, and social fields are largely symptoms of underlying cultural ills. No lasting cure can be hoped for until the basic troubles have been attacked. Superficial reforms could achieve only ephemeral results. The best native thought in the Near East is well aware of this, in welcome contrast to outside analysis which seldom penetrates beyond the surface manifestations. But there are formidable obstacles to the kind of reform that is urgently needed. For the opposition comes not only from the thin layer of the landlords who control the economy and have a powerful voice in the government. Resistance to reform is even greater in the religious quarters which have arrogated unto themselves the authority over the region's cultural heritage. They can afford to be outspoken where the landlords cannot. Because they purport and are believed to have a monopoly on truth, their voice is the voice of blind fanaticism. In the much-filtered atmosphere of the Near East that voice

⁷ "The Essence of Arab Civilization," *The Middle East Journal*, III (April 1949), p. 127.

⁸ See the review of his book *Min huna nabda'* by Nicola A. Ziadeh, *The Middle East Journal*, V (Autumn 1951), pp. 506-508.

carries far and wide, drowning out other tones. The *Ikhwan al-Muslimun* ("Muslim Brotherhood") of Egypt and other Arab lands, and the *Fida'iyan* ("Devotees") of Iran may be extreme instances; yet such groups have a traditional hold on the rank and file, and their witchdoctor influence in recent developments is much too pronounced and tragic to be underestimated. The formula of the religious medicine men is particularly dangerous in that it compounds socio-political half-truths with age-old spiritual tenets. It is virulently anti-foreign, obsessively nationalistic, and fiercely reactionary. The hopeless masses are all too ready to embrace a cure-all that bears the stamp of inspired authority. In such a climate an effective change would have to be of elemental proportions.

It follows, at any rate, that Islam is a dominant ethnemic feature in the Near East. The name itself implies submission to divine authority and the entire history of the Islamic community points up the system as an overriding cultural factor. Accordingly, different conditions may be looked for where the influence of Islam is either negligible or has been measurably reduced. Such indeed is the case in three Near Eastern states. Israel has but a small Muslim minority, hence her socio-political status is markedly different from that of her neighbors. Lebanon is half Christian, with a consequent reduction in the social imbalance from which a Syria or a Jordan is suffering. And while Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim, her progressive career in recent years dates back exactly to the time when religion was removed officially from the socio-political sphere. But if this could happen in Muslim Turkey, why have not the other Muslim states of the Near East followed suit?

The question is a logical one. The answer is bound up with the further features of the various ethnemes which contribute to those differences in national group personalities that are reflected in the several states of the region. To put it differently, the Arab states and Iran have not followed the example of Turkey — at least not so far — because the circumstances have not been the same in each instance. This is, of course, a plain fact. But it is scarcely valid to account for that fact with the invariable cliché that Turkey has had its Mustafa Kemal Atatürk whereas the

other states have not. The personal equation is important but it will not bear much probing in this context. A man may help to change the course of a nation only when the nation is ready for the process. Otherwise, the change would prove superficial and short-lived at best. Much that is not apparent on the surface went into the making of the Turkey of Atatürk. And since that formative background has led to results which serve to distinguish modern Turkey from other Muslim states, the factors in question would have to be either pre-Islamic or extra-Islamic. Thus ethnemic analysis, after noting the effects of Islam on the various ethnemes involved, now obliges us to go beyond the Islamic stage.

Let us dwell briefly on Iran, as distinct from both Turkey and the Arab states. Apart from geography, the outstanding differences are linguistic. Iranian has no family relationship with either Turkish or Arabic. The country has retained its pre-Islamic language, unlike Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, all of which have become arabized. It might be argued that arabization succeeded where the process involved only the displacement of related Semitic languages, say Aramaic for Arabic; hence Iran was spared. Yet similar conditions obtained in Egypt, which adopted Arabic none the less. The linguistic aspect, in other words, must itself be a symptom instead of a cause. Language would seem to constitute a major ethnemic feature only when it is a vehicle for a distinctive culture.

That the distinctiveness of Iran extends indeed far beyond language is evidenced perhaps most clearly by the kind of Islam which that country has made its own. For Shi'ism, which is the sectarian stamp of Iran, shows significant differences from Orthodox Sunnism along lines that are by no means restricted to doctrinal issues. The schism, then, is basically cultural, and its roots would seem to be pre-Islamic. In other words, the distinction in this case is ethnemic. It sets Iran apart from the other Muslim states of the Near East, including Turkey, which are mainly Sunni. Backward Yemen happens to be Shi'i to be sure, but that country is scarcely articulate enough to have yielded sufficient data for ethnemic analysis. There is, furthermore, a narrow Shi'i majority in Iraq although the leading groups there are Sunni. This may well be one of the reasons why Iraq is still ambivalent in terms of a modern state.

In pursuing significant ethnemic characteristics in the Near East it becomes evident that the period of the introduction of Islam was a very important juncture. For as a cultural influence in a political framework Islam is unmatched by any other major religion. It is a singularly powerful factor for unity and solidarity among its constituent societies. Nevertheless, the rise of Islam apparently is too late a period for the starting point of the present inquiry. For by then there had already emerged certain basic features of several societies which were to survive in a number of modern states. Those features must ultimately be the key to today's problems and tomorrow's prospects. The impact of Islam served to level them in most instances but it could not suppress them altogether. In a region of immemorial traditions it may be necessary, it would seem, to trace the living past to its source if the mainsprings of the present are to be seen in the proper focus.

It goes without saying that Western diplomacy has not shown, and could hardly be expected to show, the least awareness of the truth of the foregoing statement. Western scholarship, however, should know better but it has shown little evidence that it does. Local elements are not quite as agnostic. Beyond the constant reminders of the past in social customs and institutions, there have been in the Near East conscious efforts to link the remote past with the present. Atatürk sought to do so by tracing the contemporary Turks first to the ancient Sumerians and later to the Hittites, with results that were far from academic so far as the effect on his country was concerned. A stridently vocal group in Iran is bent on reviving old Persian usages. Much of this activity is questionable as to soundness and purpose, yet it does reflect an inkling of a truth dimly perceived.

The Iranians behave today as they do because in some part they were conditioned that way long before the advent of Islam. The same is true of the dominant elements in Turkey, although there it is difficult to tell at this time how much of that behavior was motivated in ancient Anatolia and how much originated with the intrusive Turks. The means for making such nice distinctions are seldom available in adequate measure. If they were, it should be possible to arrive ultimately at a picture of an ethnemic personality that would bear no resemblance whatever

to the facile sketches by some anthropologists — happily not representative of their discipline — who are prepared to develop a picture of the composite Japanese, American, or whatever the case may be, as readily as a composite photograph can be produced. What is known is that, say, Turkey and Iran have each responded differently to similar impulses. Whether that difference is one of kind or merely one of tempo remains to be seen. Going back to a particular juncture in their respective careers, up to the advent of Islam, their courses are roughly similar. Beyond that juncture, however, and farther back into the past, their paths draw apart. It appears that this divergence is ultimately related to the disparate contemporary behavior of these two ethnic groups, enough so to make of these groups two distinctive ethnemes.

Now when one recedes as far as the age prior to the rise of Islam, hope fails for more than the long perspective in which most details are blurred and only the broad contours are discernible. In other words, with such remoteness all that may reasonably be expected to be recovered are certain enduring features of the given civilization. These features, however, add up to that specific society's own way of life, a cumulative solution of the larger issues of existence and destiny which enabled the group to leave its mark on history. For present purposes, moreover, this has to be a solution which was not to be wholly discarded by the succeeding societies down to our own day. Interest, at this point, would attach to the Hittites only to the extent to which they may help to shed light on modern Turkey; to the Achaemenians as a possible clue to contemporary Iran; and so on.

Two principal sources of information are open in this connection. One is the concept of state which represents a solution in terms of the individual's relation to society. The other is religion which reflects both the individual's and society's integration with nature. The reason why Islam has proved to be an outstanding ethnemic feature is precisely that the system embodies the two vital aspects of Church and State. This combination, however, is itself a legacy of earlier times, for the farther back one moves in the history of the Near East the harder it becomes to separate the two institutions.

In other words, Islam is a milestone in the Near East's career but in nowise the starting point of its historic traditions. By the time of its rise the people of the region had been experimenting with basic values for a very long time, singling out the time-tested solutions and arranging them into varying patterns. Islam was largely a restatement and a special arrangement of some of these solutions. The system was successful in the main because it had long been familiar in its essentials. But where the new pattern departed sharply from the old, Islam met with proportionate resistance and required more effort to impose. A measure of uniformity was thus achieved at length, not so sweeping, however, as to obliterate all traces of the underlying differences. These differences are still apparent throughout the area in countless intimate details. An ethnemic inquiry can safely disregard most such manifestations. But it cannot ignore any evidence concerning the oldest established concepts of state. For such concepts enter intimately into each society's way of life. They are experiences that are not readily given up. In the final analysis they turn out to be the very core of the individual ethneme.

This is obviously neither the time nor the place to develop the theme.⁹ It is a relatively new theme and a vast amount of work remains to be done on it. In briefest outline, the ancient Near East bequeathed to the world two sharply contrasted systems regarding the relation of the individual to society, each embodied in its own logical concept of state. One of these was arrived at in Mesopotamia. It proceeds from certain inalienable rights of the individual, which are safeguarded by the law and protected by the ruler who is himself the humble servant of the law. The king's authority is further limited by the assembly which must approve all major decisions. This rule by assembly marks a substantial start towards representative government and democracy. The other solution was evolved and perfected in Egypt. Central to it is the assumption that the king is a god, beyond the reach of his subjects and a law unto himself. The resulting government is pervasively totalitarian. It is symbolized

⁹ A fuller statement will be found in "The Ancient Near East and Modern Philosophies of History," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, XCV (December 1951), pp. 583-588.

early and with singular force by the monumental fact of the pyramids.

These two solutions constitute opposing and mutually incompatible ways of life. There could be no genuine compromise between them. The rest of the Near East usually had to be either in the one camp or the other. Contrary to popular assumption and the teaching of history books, there is here a complete dichotomy. Egypt remained in virtual isolation, but the Mesopotamian way found many ardent adherents. Among these was Anatolia, whose laws and general culture in Hittite times point unmistakably to Babylonia. Syria and Palestine, likewise, owed much to Mesopotamian inspiration, although their own contributions to the distinctive civilization that was thus emerging are in no danger of being overlooked. The inherent democratic tradition was to play a vital part in the ultimate development of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Only Iran fails to show a decided trend. Though long the cultural associate of Mesopotamia, Iran came to evolve a concept of state that did not configurate strictly either with that of her neighbor or with Egypt's.

One result in particular needs stressing in this connection. On the basic issue of a way of life, Egypt diverged sharply from the rest of the Near East throughout her long pre-Islamic history. In all the centuries since the advent of Islam Egypt has not been able to submerge altogether this ethnemic characteristic. Her traditional apartness and her recurring stress on the unity of the Nile Valley are two of the features that cut down beneath the Islamic stratum. The relatively greater immunity of the ruler in Egypt has been another such feature. This does not mean, of course, that Egypt subsists entirely on her pre-Hellenistic legacy. The long Islamic period has been a great equalizer. Hence, the pull towards Arab unity, and hence, too, the recent moves which put an end, at long last, to the abuses of which the royal house had been guilty. But the pull in the other direction is still a factor.

Another result of this examination is the distinction which it has brought out between the ethnic and the ethnemic complexes. Ethnically the Egyptians are Arabs. But by the ethnemic cri-

terior of the traditional concept of state, Egypt requires independent listing, apart from other Arab states. On the other had, no such differences separate Syria, Jordan, and the Sunni Arab portion of Iraq. Since these three political entities also share other major ethnemic features — language, religion, geographic environment — they properly make up a single ethneme. Turkey shares with the Fertile Crescent the inherited feature of the concept of state, but differs from that area on other ethnemic grounds. Iran's distinctiveness expresses itself, among other ways, through Shi'ism, which proves to be a separate ethnemic feature within the larger complex of Islam.

* * *

In conclusion, it may not be amiss to apply, as a practical but strictly tentative test, the over-all results of the foregoing discussion to selected problems of the contemporary Near East.

The most revealing case by far is that of Turkey. To begin with, due regard to the cultural factor makes it necessary to center on religion as a prime ethnemic element in the region. By reason of its anachronistic tenets in the socio-political sphere, traditional Islam must be viewed as the underlying cause of the present ills of the Near East. Turkey has furnished support for this conclusion in that her return to a progressive course dates back to her separation of Church from State under the determined leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

It would seem to follow that the other Muslim states cannot expect a comparable improvement until each has instituted similar reforms. It is logical, therefore, to ask why they have not done so to date, profiting from the example of Muslim Turkey. This question was posed earlier in the present discussion, but no direct attempt to answer it has as yet been made. Nor is a clear-cut answer possible at this time in view of the complex nature of the problem. Some tentative suggestions, nevertheless, may be hazarded.

It is self-evident that a number of major features enter into the composition of any given ethneme. Their respective force varies from instance to instance so that the ultimate pattern is never the same. That is why each composite ethneme is a unit unto itself. In the case of Turkey, the religious factor — although far from

negligible—is evidently not as pronounced as in the neighboring Muslim states, whereas other ethnemic features would appear to be correspondingly stronger. A detailed inquiry might well yield more precise results along these lines. But certain general indications are available even now.

Islam is native to the Arab world but intrusive in Turkey. Its roots are necessarily deeper and firmer in the area of its origin. Any serious interference with the system would be bound to run up against greater obstacles in the Arab states than in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey is heir to a democratic tradition that reaches back to remote pre-Islamic times. The reforms of Atatürk, however, were carried out, as was inevitable in the circumstances, by authoritarian methods. It is significant, therefore, that inside of a generation Turkey has taken steps to correct these conditions. Have these successive changes been due to surface factors alone, or should the result be ascribed to the collective group personality that represents the Turkish ethneme? This last possibility, at any rate, should not be discarded offhand.

By the same token, the oft-voiced wish for an "Arab Atatürk" should be assessed in the light of what may be known about Arab group personality. Would Arabs respond as readily as did the Turks to the aims and methods of an Atatürk? Obviously major reforms in the system of traditional Islam can be expected to encounter considerably greater difficulties among the Arabs. As for authoritarian methods, would these, once instituted, prove more congenial to the Arab world, or less so, when compared with Turkey? It should not be forgotten that the submission which is implicit in Islam is submission to theocratic and not strictly secular dictatorship. In any case, the answer hinges on much more than the emergence of a strong leader.

Granting, moreover, the fact of group personality and group temperament in an ethnemic sense, do the Muslim Arab states constitute a single ethneme? There are good reasons against such an assumption. Egypt is clearly a unit apart. The Arabian peninsula can be shown to represent at least one other unit. The Muslim states of the Fertile Crescent are clearly a separate unit. This gives a minimum of three Arab ethnemes, which means that three separate lines of action can be expected in any given in-

stance. On the issue of Islamic reform, Egypt might well pursue one course, Saudi Arabia another, and the Fertile Crescent still another. Non-Arab Iran is naturally not to be bracketed with the preceding units.

What of the problem of receptivity to Communism? It goes without saying that several factors are involved. The prevailing social and economic conditions enhance the appeal of communist cure-alls. The strong ethnemic feature of religion operates in the opposite direction. In this impasse the scale could be tipped one way or another by the traditional concept of state that characterizes the respective ethnemes. On this score, Egypt would seem to be most amenable in the long run to a totalitarian solution, Iran less so, and the Fertile Crescent scarcely at all.

The issues of the Near East are, of course, not likely to be decided on a piecemeal basis. Because the fate of the region has a vital bearing on world stability, major political developments would probably take place here on a regional scale. But political questions as such are short-term problems. The fundamental issues of the Near East, on the other hand, have centuries of incubation behind them. They require long-term solutions. It is in this connection in particular that ethnemic characteristics bid fair to play a significant part.

Events of recent weeks and months have made it abundantly plain that matters have now come to a head. The Near East is on the eve of a transition which could well be of epochal proportions. The forthcoming changes will be brought into being by the various classes and groups within the population of each state, and they will react in turn on each of the participating elements. All this calls for many detailed investigations. Yet sight should not be lost of the fact that society is not the sum of so many fragmented sections. It is rather the synthesis of all of them through the entire length of its organic existence. It is a structure in depth, nowhere more so than in the Near East.

THE DISPUTED WATERS OF JORDAN

M. G. Ionides

IN 1951 AND 1952 both Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan laid complaints against Israel before the United Nations in respect of the waters of the River Jordan. Syria complained that Israel's work on reclaiming the marshes of Lake Huleh (north of Lake Tiberias) infringed Syrian rights. Jordan complained that Israel had been cutting off the supply of water to the Jordan south of Lake Tiberias by closing the sluice gates, which are in Israel territory, and by the abstraction of water for irrigation.

The immediate practical issues at stake in these cases do not appear to be large. But they are the first rumblings of something much bigger, the question of how the River Jordan's waters as a whole shall ultimately be shared between the Arabs and the Jews. In the years to come the Arabs will need all the water they can get to strengthen their weak economy and to help absorb the 880,000 refugees, who are still without proper means of support, subsisting largely on charity; while the Jews will need all they can get because Israel is already over-strained, and the pressure of her population is surely bound to grow. But it seems there is not enough water in the Jordan and her tributaries for both, and perhaps not enough for either. So far, it is true, neither Israel nor Jordan has begun to tap the main waters of the River Jordan and its only big tributary, the Yarmuk; so the problem is not yet acute. There are as yet only small abstractions, such as by pumping to estates. There is also the Lake Huleh drainage scheme, in Israel, which is not big in relation to the total supply of water. But both Jordan and Israel have large schemes in preparation to meet great and pressing needs, and it is in respect of these that the dispute will arise.

♦ M. G. IONIDES, A.M.I.C.E., was Director of Development in the government of Trans-jordan from 1937-1939.

The purpose here is to discuss this question upon the background of development projects advanced for Palestine and Transjordan before World War II and, in particular, on studies of how the Jordan Valley could be irrigated. When one has worked with either the Jews or the Arabs, it is natural to be sympathetic with the point of view of the one with which he has worked and difficult to see the problem impartially.

* * *

Before looking into the future it is necessary to trace the history of irrigation projects for the Jordan Valley. It starts fifteen years ago in 1937; no serious study had appeared before that, and there are no traces that the Valley was ever extensively irrigated in antiquity, as were the other river valleys of those parts — the Nile, the Euphrates, the Tigris — where innumerable traces remain of ancient systems. But the Jordan is different. Unlike those other, broader valleys, the Jordan is in a deep, sharp-walled trough, the Rift Valley, and the plateaus on either side are watered by the rain. The climate in these plateaus and down in the coastal plain bordering the Mediterranean is very like that of California. The rain falls in the winter and spring, and there is a long, dry summer, not uncomfortably hot; there are numerous springs and small streams in the hills and the coastal plain, with wells and cisterns as well. People could always live in these pleasant hills, as they do now, and the pressure of population never obliged them to go down into the deep valley and execute big and expensive irrigation projects there. It was certainly not due to technical inability; they knew well how to do it. Now, however, for the first time in history, necessity is beginning to call for the fullest use of the River Jordan.

After World War I when Palestine began to be opened up, under the British Mandate, it was to the fertile hills and the coastal plain, not to the deep valley floor, that people looked for land, as had always been the case. The Jewish National Home policy was based on the assumption that land could be found for unlimited immigration, and it soon came to be believed — in the West — that Palestine and Transjordan were lands flowing with milk and honey, aching for the settler's plough, with only a few

obstinate Arabs selfishly blocking the way. This belief grew, and Jewish settlers came in increasing numbers. But Arab resistance turned to revolt, and eventually a Royal Commission (one of a whole series of investigations) was sent out in 1936. In 1937 they published their report, and recommended partition into Arab and Jewish areas. If this were done, they pointed out, there would be several hundreds of thousands of Arabs for whom there would be no room in the Jewish area to be partitioned off and who would have to be settled elsewhere—mainly in the remaining Arab part of Palestine and Transjordan. Was there room for them? The Royal Commission recommended a hydrographic survey to see how much new land could be developed.

This survey in Transjordan, after proper investigation, showed that the only way of providing any substantial new areas of land was by irrigation in the Jordan Valley between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea. A preliminary project for the eastern bank was submitted to the Partition Commission when they arrived in Palestine in the spring of 1938 to examine the Royal Commission's partition proposal in more detail. The report on this project was never published officially, but an outline of it appeared in 1946.¹ The plan was to divert water from the Yarmuk River, supplemented by a feeder canal from the south end of Lake Tiberias, the lake itself acting as a reservoir to store up the winter flood waters. It was to irrigate 300,000 dunams (75,000 acres), disposing of a regular flow of 507 million cubic meters in a year. Although it was confined to the east bank (the limit of Transjordan's boundary) it was clearly possible to carry water on to the west bank as well, if necessary.

Partition was rejected. One of the main reasons was that the surveys had shown that there was no truth whatever in the belief that there were vast unused resources. "The conclusion is inescapable that the only source of water on a scale large enough to affect the capacity of the country to any appreciable extent is from the two main rivers of the country, the Jordan and the Yarmuk." And even this would provide for only a fraction of the expected requirements.

¹ M. G. Ionides, "Jordan Valley Irrigation in Transjordan," in *Engineering*, September 13, 1946.

World War II came. Then in 1944 Dr. W. C. Lowdermilk published his book, *Palestine, Land of Promise*,² which outlined a great, visionary plan for a "Jordan Valley Authority" which would create a single unit for development on the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority. His plan was later elaborated by James B. Hays in 1948 in his book, *T.V.A. on the Jordan, Proposals for Irrigation and Hydro-Electric Development in Palestine*.³ In the introduction to the latter book Dr. Lowdermilk said: "There are few places in the world where mankind has a more favourable opportunity to adopt a constructive approach towards the problem of the common man, removing the basic causes of conflict and war by the creation of abundance for all. We can, through this approach, make the Middle East a blessed example rather than a breeding ground for strife." Unfortunately, the Lowdermilk project was received by the public in a way which had the opposite effect.

In the first place, Dr. Lowdermilk's views gave further weight — whether intentionally or not makes no matter — to the belief that there was plenty of land and plenty of water in Palestine and Transjordan for all the Arabs and all the Jews. This was understandable enough, from the Zionist point of view. The Jewish National Home and the Zionist hopes of building out of it an independent Jewish State had become a major political issue in London and Washington, and the chances of bringing it off were still in the balance. Belief in the existence of vast lands waiting for the settlers was almost a *sine qua non* for this policy. But the Arabs believed it was a myth. They were right, as British surveys had shown. Eight hundred eighty thousand Arab refugees, of whom in four years the United Nations has succeeded in finding lands for only a tiny fraction, are the living proof today, if "living" is the right word.

In the second place, the Lowdermilk-Hays plan was all too clearly designed to benefit the areas of Jewish settlement, the Arab areas figuring as "residuary legatees." In the foreword to the Hays book Dr. Emanuel Neumann, Chairman of the Commission on Palestine Surveys, indicated that the basic conception

² Harpers, New York.

³ Public Affairs Press, Washington.

of the Lowdermilk-Hays project is to "carry the waters of the north through a network of reservoirs and canals to the fertile plains and to the parched but potentially rich lands in the southern part of the country." Again, it was understandable that a project, prepared by Zionists to suit the needs of the Jewish community after the goal of an independent State would have been achieved, should be aimed at the irrigation of the areas in which the Jews were interested. But it could hardly be expected not to arouse the instant antagonism of the Arabs; especially since the "basic concept" was to take as much as possible of the Jordan's waters right out of Jordan's own valley, away from the people of it, and run it over the watershed of the basin to irrigate lands far away.

It is true that the plan suggested, in principle, that half the waters of the River Yarmuk should be left for Transjordan (the Yarmuk is the Jordan's main tributary), but only as a subsequent stage in the scheme, and for a dam to irrigate the lower valley lands near Jericho. "However," says Mr. Hays' report *T.V.A. on the Jordan*, "the recovery of the remaining Jordan waters must await the completion of the previous irrigation works and diversions for the River, which will enable a more accurate determination of what is left in the Jordan." The intention to take every possible drop of water out of the upper Jordan and use it outside the valley for the Jewish settled areas, and then see what was left over for the people of Jordan's own valley, could not have been more baldly expressed.

The version of the Lowdermilk-Hays project I have been discussing was, of course, established some time before the establishment of Israel in 1948, but it was adopted as a guide to Zionist thinking in the years leading to that event. Dr. Emanuel Neumann says in his foreword to *T.V.A. on the Jordan* that in the United Nations Resolution of November 29th, 1947, in favor of partition, "The Jewish State was awarded an area embracing the upper reaches of the Jordan in the north. . . . Thereby the opportunity was given for carrying out the basic conception of the Lowdermilk-Hays project . . ." In the event, when the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, Israel did in fact secure access to the Jordan's headwaters and to Lake Huleh. This gave

her physical access to the areas she needed to execute the "basic concept" of the Lowdermilk-Hays plan, the irrigation of the coastal plain. She also secured possession of the southern outlet to Lake Tiberias. There was now, in 1948 and onwards, a clear division of interests in the waters of the Jordan. Jewish aims became concentrated even more clearly in the coastal plain; Arab interests in the Jordan Valley. The Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel began to plan separately.

* * *

The Government of Jordan called in a British firm of consulting engineers, Sir Murdoch MacDonald and Partners, to re-examine and improve the 1938 project. They prepared, and published in 1951,⁴ a scheme for irrigating both sides of the valley between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea. It was based on the assumption that a joint Israel-Jordan scheme would some day be possible. It, therefore, provided for irrigating the whole floor of the valley, part Arab, part Jewish. Lake Tiberias would be used as a reservoir, in the joint Arab-Jewish interest, to store the excess flood waters of both the River Jordan and its tributary, the River Yarmuk, for use in the summer when the natural supplies are at their ebb. There are various possible ways of bringing the waters under control, and other methods are now being explored by the Point IV engineers; it is not necessary here to discuss the technical details. The essence of the 1938 project, of the Murdoch MacDonald project, and of the more recent Point IV project is the same: to irrigate the floor of the valley between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea. The general title, "Jordan Valley Project," may be given to this broad purpose, to which the present discussion relates.

Israel proceeded on the Lowdermilk-Hays "basic concept." There are various ways of fulfilling this, but the essence of them all is to lead the water out of the Jordan Valley into the coastal plain and the Negeb. The "Coastal Plain Project" is a good general title for this plan and it contrasts sharply with the Jordan Valley Project. There seems to be no officially published plan,

⁴ Sir M. MacDonald & Partners, *Report on the Proposed Extension of Irrigation in the Jordan Valley*, (London).

but a seemingly authoritative account appeared in 1951,⁵ describing several stages through which development of the coastal plain is to be achieved. Included is a hydro-electric power scheme in what might be called a fourth stage of the water development program. A 25-mile tunnel is contemplated to carry water from the Mediterranean Sea near Acre across the country into Lake Tiberias at a 700 foot lower elevation where the power plant would be located. Other power plants have been contemplated along the Jordan River between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea, an additional 600 feet below sea level. But these, said the author of the account, are merely indicative of what might be done under peaceful world conditions and from the Israeli view are out of the question at present since all the sites are in Arab territory under the control of Jordan. The transit of the water from the Mediterranean Sea to Lake Tiberias might be by tunnel or by pump-plant and conduit. "Each of these power schemes," according to the published account, "is predicated on taking for irrigation all of the fresh water that now flows down the Jordan River and replacing it with salt water from the Mediterranean." Lake Tiberias would, therefore, become a salt lake; its sweet waters and those of the lower Jordan, where Jewish interest is now small but Arab interest great, would be polluted.

The main elements of this problem of sharing the Jordan's waters as they have become crystallized today are:

(a) The Kingdom of Jordan has about 470,000 Arab refugees who fled from Israel. Their former lands are now occupied by Jews. The only way of making any big impression on their settlement in the Kingdom is by a Jordan Valley Project. The refugees need all the water they can get.

(b) Israel has brought in hundreds of thousands of new immigrants. The Coastal Plain Project indicated that Israel must stake its future on water and that Israel would collapse under the weight of its immigrants unless they could get water to make the land produce. The only way for Israel to get water on a big scale is by this or some similar Coastal Plain Project. The Jewish immigrants also can utilize all the water they can get.

⁵ W. G. Bowman, *Engineering News Record*, March 22, 1951.

(c) There is not enough water for both the Jordan Valley Project and the Coastal Plain Project.

So far, the major dispute has not yet been joined. But it is clearly foreshadowed. The outcome will depend much upon the attitude taken by the western governments, especially of the United States and the United Kingdom. How ought the water to be shared? How much ought to go to the (Arab) Jordan Valley Project and how much to the (Jewish) Coastal Plain Project? Suppose an impartial arbitrator had to decide; how would he judge it? What criteria would he apply?

* * *

It would be good indeed if it were possible to think that an arbitrator could decide on the precedents of international law. This, at any rate, is the starting point for discussion. In reviewing the legal aspects of the problem,⁶ most helpful precedents have been found in the United States, especially in a case between Kansas and Colorado decided in 1907. The dispute was over the waters of the Arkansas River, which flows for 280 miles through Colorado before entering Kansas. The latter state, objecting to a large irrigation project undertaken by Colorado, maintained that the project would exhaust the river to such an extent that scarcely more than a trickle would cross the border between the two states. The Court was asked to decide according to the private law rule of riparian rights, which forbids an upper riparian owner to interfere, to any serious extent, with the flow of water which would naturally reach the owner of the lower land. In all probability this would have meant that Colorado could never undertake any large scheme of irrigation in her own territory. Colorado, however, took the stand upon the principle of absolute sovereignty and maintained that as sovereign she was entitled to do exactly as she pleased with the whole of the water upon her own territory. This meant that she claimed the right to use all the waters of the river in her own territory and thus "turn a large area of Kansas into a desert."

It is important to note that the Court rejected the arguments put forward on both sides, found its own principle of decision

⁶ H. A. Smith, "The Waters of the Jordan: A Problem of International Water Control," *International Affairs*, XXV, #4 (Oct. 1949), pp. 415-425.

without help from either of the parties and expressed the basic principle in the words, "equitable apportionment of benefits." It seems clear, then, that there are no absolute legal rights on either side and that legal tribunes may have to decide the apportionment so that it be "equitable."

If this view of the Colorado-Kansas judgment were accepted and followed, an arbitrator would reject any claim that Israel — the upstream State — is entitled to do exactly as she pleases with the whole of the water on her own territory. He would also reject any claim by the Kingdom of Jordan that Israel must not interfere in any way with the flow of water which now flows down to Jordanian territory. It is difficult to imagine that an arbitrator who adopted this position could award Israel the right to execute a scheme predicated on taking for irrigation all the water that flows down the Jordan River and replacing it with salt water from the Mediterranean; or that he could support a claim by the Kingdom of Jordan that no water must be diverted by Israel. And having reached that decision, he would have to decide how much of the water should go to each. How would he proceed; what criteria would he apply? He would first have to take into account another clear principle, upon which the Jordan Valley Project worked out by Sir Murdoch MacDonald and Partners was based: "the general principle, which to our mind has an undoubted moral and natural basis, that the waters in a catchment area should not be diverted outside that area unless the requirements of all those who use or genuinely intend to use the waters within the area have been satisfied."

The arbitrator would see that most of the Coastal Plain Project lies outside the watershed of the Jordan basin; not all — the Lake Huleh scheme and other areas are within the watershed. On the other hand, the whole of the Jordan Valley Project is within the valley and is planned to meet the requirements of the people who live in that part of the valley, Arab and Jewish according to the lie of the land. If he were guided by the general principle stated above he would be bound, it would seem, to relate the apportionment of the waters to the irrigable lands within the valley; and to take the view that no claim to a share could be generated by lands lying outside the watershed — *i.e.*,

in the coastal plain — unless there were a surplus left over after satisfying the prior claims of lands lying within the watershed, whether Jewish or Arab. He would plot the areas capable of irrigation from the Jordan waters within the valley — including the Yarmuk tributary — on the assumption that a joint Arab-Jewish project to make the fullest possible use of the waters was contemplated. If the available water enabled all these lands to be irrigated, part would be Jewish, part Arab, according to the natural lie of the land, and the amount of the respective shares in the water would thus be automatically settled. If there were an excess of water, he would probably allocate it to Israel since she is technically able to use it in the coastal plain.

Once the shares had been calculated by this process, in terms of the proportions of the total water supplies, it would be for each state to decide for itself how it wished to use the water. If Israel decided that she did not wish to use her share in the Jordan Valley, but to devote it all to her Coastal Plain Project, that would be for her to decide, at her own discretion; all that is being considered here is the method by which an arbitrator might decide how the respective shares would be calculated.

* * *

Unfortunately, it can never be as simple as this. The process outlined starts with a legal principle, passes on to a general natural or moral principle, and goes on through a logical and technical course to a rational result. It will not be like that in practice, even assuming that relations between the states become amicable enough to make a settlement possible at all. There are other big factors which no arbitrator could omit in arriving at an "equitable apportionment of benefits." He could not reasonably leave out of account the circumstances in which the State of Israel was established, and in which the Arab refugees fled from their homes.

It was of the essence of the policy of establishing a Jewish State — a policy backed by men of the highest integrity in both the United Kingdom and the United States of America — that it should be a place to which Jews might go freely from all over the world. Industries might expand in Israel to provide work for the immigrants, but agriculture must also expand, and more

water for irrigation was bound to be essential. It could only come in substantial quantities from the Jordan. It could, therefore, be cogently argued by Israel that the assumption that water could be taken from the Jordan for the Coastal Plain Project to provide new land for immigrants was a necessary implication in the policy of establishing Israel. She would undoubtedly argue that the right to take the water must be considered as having as full a sanction by the weight of world opinion as had the establishment of the State itself; that the two are inseparable.

On the other hand, it could not possibly be reconciled with the principles of The United Nations or with any conception of equity or humanity that a partition of Palestine should be arranged which left homeless the Arabs who would be obliged to leave the Jewish part. When partition was examined in 1937-38, as explained above, it was obviously necessary to be satisfied that the Arabs who would have to leave the Jewish area to make room for new Jewish immigrants could be settled. Otherwise, an arranged partition was unthinkable. The Jordan Valley Project was the biggest contribution in sight, inadequate though it was. This project ante-dated the Lowdermilk scheme by five or six years. The Arabs could argue, also most cogently, that a project worked out for the express purpose of providing for resettling Arabs obliged to leave a Jewish State if partition took place should be used for that purpose now that partition has in fact taken place. The Jews have already seized possession of the agricultural lands from which the Arabs fled in 1948. How could the world now support Israel (the Arabs could argue) in depriving those same refugees of one of the few hopes of resettlement, in favor of Jewish immigrants of the future?

There are other factors that would have to be taken into account as well. All that is attempted here is to give an account in broad terms of the three major ones. First, there is the legal principle of "equitable apportionment of benefits." Second, the natural or moral principle that the waters of a river should go primarily for the benefit of the people who live in its own valley. If that were all, an arbitrator's task would be comparatively simple. The third factor, politics, makes settlement impossible at present. Nor is it just the local politics of two conflicting

national interests. It is part and parcel of the wide division of opinion, throughout the world, on the Arab-Israel problem as a whole. It follows that a grave responsibility rests upon the other nations, particularly upon the United States and the United Kingdom.

* * *

Even though the main dispute about the waters has not yet arisen, it is still possible for something to be done. It should be hoped that both Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan will ensure that whatever projects they are working on now should be so planned that they will fit technically into a joint scheme which will, at some future date, make the fullest possible use of the waters of Jordan. This would entail, among other things, using Lake Tiberias as a fresh water reservoir. Secondly, it should be hoped that both the Kingdom of Jordan and Israel will make it clear that, in the meantime pending a settlement, any waters they may divert will be without prejudice to a final settlement; that is, that such diversions will be regarded as still belonging to the whole pool of waters which will ultimately fall to be shared.

There is one other thing that could be usefully done now. It would be of the greatest benefit if a United Nations agency could collect, compile and publish authoritative records of measurements of the waters of the Jordan, and maps showing those areas in the valley which are reasonably capable of useful irrigation. These data would be the technical basis of any attempt to adjudicate, and since world opinion will count for much in this issue, the sooner the world has authoritative facts to study the better.

THE PEOPLES OF THE SUDAN

David C. Rife and John R. Randall

THE RECENT AGREEMENT between Egypt and Great Britain has, at least temporarily, relieved the tension over the future status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It can be hoped that the ultimate solution of the problem will be worked out with equal restraint and attended by success. In the meantime, an examination may well be made of some of the pertinent facts involved in the dispute over the Sudan. One of the most important of these involves the nature of the peoples of this large and relatively under-developed country. Unluckily for the peoples of the Sudan, and possibly for the peace of the world, their country not only straddles the line that separates white from black Africa, but also contains the major part of the upper Nile, water from which is a vital necessity to Egypt. In the nature of events, it seems almost impossible that any solution of its future status will not bring trouble, and possibly suffering to the Negroid peoples who inhabit the southern portion of the country, if not to many of the other Sudanese as well. Complete independence or control by Egypt, one contemplates either with misgivings; continued control by Great Britain seems unlikely, undesirable and impossible in the light of present sentiment that exists in Egypt.

Egypt's major claims to control over the region to her south are based upon her need of irrigation water from the Nile system, and to her close relationship, ethnically and culturally to the people of the Sudan. No one will deny her need of Nile water, though even by exercising sovereignty over the Sudan, she still would be deprived of the Nile sources which lie in Ethiopia and Uganda. Hence "Unification of the Nile Valley

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under Egyptian sovereignty"—a popular slogan in Egypt—is not possible in fact. Equally questionable may be the claim of close relationship, ethnic and cultural, of the Egyptians to the Sudanese. Recent findings concerning the distribution of simple inherited variations among the Sudanese people fail to substantiate this claim.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Certain geographic and historical facts may be of help in bringing into focus the conditions that complicate the problem of political control. The Sudan is a big country, approximately a third the size of the United States, and over twice the size of Egypt; but geographically it could be termed rather simple. With the exception of the Red Sea Hills in the northeast and the Nuba Hills south of El Obeid, the country is essentially a vast plain which the Nile traverses from south to north. Somewhat more than three-quarters of the Sudan lies to the west of the river. Climatically, the area is transitional from the hot, dry desert of southern Egypt, to the constantly hot, constantly wet regions of equatorial Africa. As one progresses southward through the Sudan from Wadi Halfa in the north to Mongalla near the southern border, the annual rainfall increases from less than .04 of an inch to 39 inches. Not only is there a regular increase in the amount of rainfall received, but also an increase in the number of months over which the rainfall is spread. Wadi Halfa receives all its measurable precipitation in a single month, while at Mongalla there are eight months each with over one inch of rain.

The increase in amount of annual precipitation and in the number of rainy months has, of course, a direct bearing upon the natural vegetation. Again, as one travels southward from Wadi Halfa, there is a gradual change from true desert, with its scanty vegetation, to desert scrub, to short grass savanna, to tall grass savanna, and finally to broadleaf evergreen forest. These changes in climate and vegetation in turn are reflected in the use of the land made by the various Sudanese tribes.

The Sudan is sparsely populated; the average density is only about eight persons per square mile. No figures are available for

a detailed picture of population distribution, though the largest densities, as might be expected, are found in the areas of maximum rainfall, and in those areas where irrigation has been developed. The Sudan has few sizable cities, and probably not more than ten percent of the 8,000,000 inhabitants could be classed as city dwellers. The single largest concentration of people is found in the group of three cities, Omdurman, Khartoum and Khartoum North, all of which are located at, or near, the junction of the Blue and White Nile. The population of these three cities is variously estimated at between 175,000 and 250,000. Omdurman, the largest (approximately 120,000) is a purely native city; Khartoum (approximately 70,000), the capital, is a relatively cosmopolitan center where the majority of foreigners, other than West African laborers, make their residence. Probably not more than three to five other cities have populations above 30,000 (El Obeid, Wad Medani, Kassala, Port Sudan and Berber).

The nature of the people and their culture is of primary importance, or should be, in any consideration of their future political status. A line drawn east and west, approximately along latitude twelve degrees north, divides the Sudan into its two major culture areas: to the north the people are largely of Negroid-white descent, Arabic in culture, and Muslim in religion; to the south the people are Negroid, and pagan. Various groups or tribes have their own languages and distinct customs, but all are truly African, ethnically and culturally. The line dividing major cultures is essentially coincident with the line that separates desert and steppe on the north from tall grass savanna and forest on the south; hence, it is a climatic and vegetational line as well as a cultural one.

The people of the northern Sudan are divided into the following major groups: (1) the Beja tribes of the Red Sea Hills, made up of the Hadendoa, Bisharin and Beni Amer; (2) the Barbara (Nubian) tribes along the Nile in the north; and (3) the tribes of the central region, the Kababish, Kawahla, Ja'aliin and Baggara. These groups, along with the urban population of the northern regions, account for about seventy-five percent of the total population of the Sudan. The people of

the southern region include: (1) the Sudanic tribes west of the White Nile, the Azande, and Moru-Madi; (2) the Nilotes (Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer) who inhabit the swamp areas of the upper White Nile; and (3) the Nilo-Hamites in the far south. These three groups number approximately 1,700,000, or twenty-five percent of the total population.

The history of the area is important insofar as it explains the background and origin of the Sudanese and their present day attitudes toward political control. Evidence of early occupancy is scanty indeed, and is based largely upon archeological findings in the northern Sudan. Some five thousand years ago, the inhabitants of Nubia were apparently rather similar in physical appearance to the ancient Egyptians, but since this very early period, people or groups of people have migrated into the Sudan, changing the make-up of the people of the northern half of the country. The main directions of movement into the Sudan and the peoples involved were: (1) Negroid people from the south; (2) Ethiopians, and later, Arabs from the east; (3) Egyptians, and later, Arabs from the north; and (4) Libyans — at a rather early date — from the northwest. The major results of these migrations, from a present day view, were, first, a mixture of Negro blood with that of people of Caucasian origin (Egyptians, Hamites and Semites) and, secondly, the acceptance of an Arabic culture and Islam by a majority of the people of the northern half of the Sudan. Prior to the conquest of the Sudan in 1821 by Muhammad Ali, the modern world knew practically nothing of the southern Sudan. Only through periodic slave raids did it have a tenuous contact with the north.

The Sudan remained under the control of Egypt from 1821 until 1881, when El Mahdi led a successful revolt against the government. His successor, however, was defeated at the Battle of Omdurman, in 1898, by a combined Anglo-Egyptian force, and in the following year the British and Egyptians established the Condominium for the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Agreement of 1899 was renewed in 1936 for a period of twenty years. There is little question but that the Sudan suffered under control by Egypt. The resources and people of the country were exploited; taxes were exorbitant; and the slave trade flourished.

The bloody revolt of the Mahdi was, in part, a Sudanese reaction in kind.

If life in the Sudan under the Condominium has not been all that it might have been, there has at least been much that has been good. There has been development along various lines: transportation, education and agriculture have been improved. There has been law and order, and a large measure of justice. It would be difficult, indeed, to attempt to balance the good against the bad. Now, shortly, the Sudanese must make up their minds as to whether they want complete independence or union with Egypt, (or, just possibly, membership in the Commonwealth of Nations).

The Nile water that is so vital to Egypt, and is the basis of one of her most insistent claims to control of the Sudan, is equally necessary to the development of the Sudan. But probably of even greater importance is the relationship between the Egyptian people and the Sudanese. The Egyptians have been chafing under the presence of the foreigner and have been doing all within their means to be relieved of him. Would not the situation in the Sudan be the same were it to be controlled by Egypt?

Although the people of the northern Sudan are similar to those of Egypt in that they are in part Arab or Hamite in origin and adhere to Islam, there are some major differences in their cultures. The Sudanese are as much pastoralists as they are cultivators. The steppes and savannas lend themselves well to a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence based upon various types of live stock and some cultivation. Possibly half of the people of the Sudan can be classed as sedentary as opposed to the other half who, of necessity, must move about regularly to obtain subsistence. On the other hand, Egyptians are pre-eminently sedentary cultivators, tied to their sources of irrigation water. The desert areas of Egypt are notoriously barren and support relatively few nomads. Probably less than five percent of the population of Egypt live outside the Delta and the Valley of the Nile. The clash of interests between the nomadic and the sedentary is age old.

If, in spite of some differences, the northern Sudanese show some degree of relationship to the Egyptians, the same is not the

case in respect to the southern Sudanese. Although there has been convincing evidence that there has been contact between the northern and southern Sudanese in the past, and that the latter have acquired a number of cultural practices of the former, this does not necessarily imply extensive inter-marriage or inter-breeding. If there had been much admixture, there should be, in the hybrid population, great variability of pigmentation, hair form and stature. Yet this is not the case, in spite of the occasional appearance of features that are not typically Negroid.

The answer to minor variations in appearance may well lie in the fact that there is not just one true Negro type. All major ethnic groups have minor subdivisions, differing from each other in the frequencies of various traits. The West African Negroes and the Nilotes do not differ one from the other any more than do Swedes from Syrians, yet no one would seriously question that both Swedes and Syrians are Caucasian.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

The name Sudan is derived from the Arabic *Bilad-al-Sudan*, meaning "Country of the Blacks." The appropriateness of the name is really apparent to anyone who visits the area. Even in northern Sudan where there is considerable admixture of white blood, the natives are as dark as American Negroes. The southern Sudanese, especially the Nilotes, are the darkest people in the world, and are notably darker than the Negroes of West Africa. Two other ethnic groups, the Arabs and the Hamites, must be taken into consideration in any investigation of the ancestry of the Sudanese of today. A great deal more is known about the Arabs than is known about the Hamites.

One anthropological authority¹ considers Hamites as Caucasians and describes their purest representatives as the predynastic Egyptians, the "hill" Ababda of Egypt and the Beni Amer of the Red Sea province of the Sudan. They are of medium height (64-66"), long headed, skin yellowish or copper red brown, hair wavy or frizzly, beard scant and nose straight and narrow. Among the Sudanese, the Beja tribes of the Red Sea Hills are doubtless the best examples of Hamites. Anyone who has entered

¹ C. G. Seligman, *Pagan tribes of the Nilotic Sudan*, London, 1932.

the country by way of Port Sudan has likely observed them chanting in unison as they worked at the docks. Belonging to the Hadendoa tribe, they are readily identified by their enormous shocks of dark, frizzly hair, described by Kipling as a "hayrick head of hair," and famous in his time because they broke a British square of soldiers. There is considerable evidence that they came to the Sudan at least four millenia ago, perhaps to provide the labor necessary to procure the continual stream of gold mined from the Red Sea Hills, so necessary in maintaining the magnificent state of the ancient Pharaohs. There is an engraving in a tomb chapel in Upper Egypt dating back to 1900 B.C. showing the shock of hair and physical proportions of an individual typical of the modern Hadendoa and the Beja have oral traditions going back to battles at least 1200 years ago. When Arabs began coming to the Red Sea Hills during the ninth century, they intermarried with the Beja, who became Muslims and adopted many Arab customs, although they still speak their own languages and Arabic. There is undoubtedly some admixture of Negro as well as Arab ancestry in the Beja tribes of today.

The Barbara in the most northerly portion of the Sudan (formerly Nubia) appear to have considerable Negro ancestry, as indicated by thick lips, squat noses, and comparatively dark pigmentation. They bury their dead in the same manner as the ancient Egyptians, suggesting Hamitic influences, they are sedentary and speak both Arabic and the Barbara language.

The highest proportion of Arabic ancestry among the Sudanese is doubtless encountered between Lat. 18° N. and 13° N. among the nomadic camel breeding tribes which are proud of their Arabic lineage. Another important group of Arabs, the Baggara, the most fanatical supporters of the Mahdi, occupy a narrow north to south belt just north of the Negroes in southern Sudan. Nomadic cattle owners, they range from sandy land in the north during the rains, in order to keep flies away from their cattle, to the grassy plains in the south during the dry season. They manifest a greater amount of Negro admixture than do the other Sudanese Arabs and are the darkest of all Sudanese Arabs, often having broad noses and thick lips. It is not uncommon for ex-slaves among them, who rear their master's children, to marry

their own to them. In brief, the northern Sudanese show unquestionable evidence of mixed Negro and Caucasian ancestry, the proportions varying from one locality to another. The situation, however, is somewhat different among the southern Sudanese.

The Nilotes average approximately seventy inches in stature and are among the longest headed people on earth; they possess relatively long legs and short trunks, are spindle shanked and have very dark brown or blackish skin. Each tribe has its own king, language and customs. They possess large herds of cattle, which are a great source of pride and constitute their wealth. They dislike clothing and the men usually go naked, or wear only a shoulder cloth. They usually carry a spear, and have an elaborate head dress prepared by treating the hair with mud. The Nilo-Hamites are shorter, have rounder heads and flatter noses than do the Nilotes. They have more goats than cattle, and like to wear clothes. Agriculturalists rather than herdsmen, the Sudanic tribes show more prognathism than do either the Nilotes or Nilo-Hamites and resemble West African Negroes in body conformation.

Anthropologists have based their conclusions that the Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites have Hamitic ancestry on the following criteria, most of which are cultural practices that are typically Hamitic rather than Negroid. The practice of maintaining herds of live stock, the custom of having "rain stones" to induce rain, grooved posts erected near Nilo-Hamitic graves, and the artificial deformation of cattle horns among the Nilotes are believed to have been Hamitic customs, as they do not occur among west and central African Negroes. There are also many similarities of the languages of the Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites to Hamitic languages. In general, the Nilo-Hamites show greater similarities to the Hamites than do the Nilotes. Occasional individuals among the Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites possess facial conformation and features which appear to be non-Negroid. An anthropologist² writes: "the true Negro undoubtedly represents one of the primitive African stocks. His main characteristics are tall stature, a skin dark brown or verging on black, woolly hair and

² *Ibid.*

moderate dolichocephaly, a flat broad nose, thick and everted lips, prominent cheek bones, and varying degrees of prognathism. Such true Negroes are found in the rain forests of the west and the Guinea Coast, but only in limited number, if at all, in the drainage basin of the Nile, where so many of the blacks present evidence of Hamitic admixture. Yet, strangely enough, it is these mixed tribes that exhibit the darkest skins, and, in spite of the moderate stature of most Hamites, the tallest stature."

Nilotes, in common with other Negroes, possess comparatively strong and heavy skulls. Although it is not uncommon for them to hit each other over the head with clubs during a brawl, fatalities seldom result. A prison official at Malakal in the southern Sudan relates the following incident. A Shilluk engaged in a game of chance with an Arab trader and lost most of his money. The next day he decided that he had been cheated, went to see the Arab and demanded his money back. When the Arab refused, the Shilluk hit him over the head with a club. The Arab died, and an autopsy revealed his skull had been crushed. A prison sentence of only seven years was given as the Shilluk had not intended to kill the Arab, but merely to remind him that he meant business. A similar blow administered to a Shilluk would probably have done no lasting damage.

Throughout the southern Sudan the natives distrust the Arab traders and do not mingle with them. The southern Sudanese seem satisfied with the present government and question domination by either Egypt or the northern Sudanese. Their elders remember stories of the slave raids in times past and live in fear and dread of any drastic change in their present mode of life.

GENETIC CRITERIA OF RELATIONSHIP

In general, the average degree of genetic relationship between two individuals depends upon what proportion of their ancestry they have in common. Members of pairs of identical twins have identical heredities because both members of a pair were derived from the same embryo. Brothers and sisters tend to have one-half of the same heredity, uncles or aunts and nieces or nephews one-fourth of the same heredity, first cousins one-eighth of the same heredity, and so on, the more distant the family relationship the

less the similarity in genetic makeup. These degrees of genetic relationships are averages and may vary more or less in individual cases.

The units of heredity, the genes, are discrete molecules which maintain their individuality from one generation to another. They are not subject to contamination or dilution and are not changed by ordinary environmental factors such as climate, disease, age, culture, or experience. Environment and culture may mask or modify the *expression* of many genes, but they do not alter the genes. Genes are subject to sudden and relatively permanent changes known as *mutations*. Under natural conditions it has been estimated that a mutation of a particular gene will occur in about 1 out of 100,000 germ cells. Mutation rates can be increased by x-rays and other types of artificial radiation, but it is not known what causes them to occur under natural conditions. They are the stepping stones of evolution, for they provide the basis for hereditary variations.

Genes are carried by the chromosomes and are arranged in linear order within them. Since the number of gene loci within a particular type of chromosome is usually constant within members of a species, it follows that the number of genes must also be constant. All mankind belongs to the genus and species, *Homo sapiens*, and possesses twenty-four pairs of chromosomes. The number of human gene loci, according to recent estimates, is from 30,000 to 40,000.

Populations differ from each other in essentially the same way as do individuals, as they are, after all, aggregates of individuals. The closer the relationship between two populations, the greater will be their similarities in the kind and distribution of genes they possess. The differences between populations, however, are more of a quantitative nature than are those between individuals. For example, any individual is either pigmented or an albino, whereas populations vary as to the percentages of pigmented and albino individuals comprising them. The proportion of germ cells in a population which carry a particular gene is referred to as the gene frequency. The more closely two populations are related genetically, the greater will be their similarities in gene frequencies.

Gene frequency analysis thus provides a tool for estimating the degrees of relationship between populations. Unfortunately, many common and conspicuous anthropological variations are due to such complex interactions between heredity and environment that gene frequency analysis is not feasible. Stature, head and face measurements, hair form, and pigmentation are each subject to environmental modification as well as to age and sex differences. This does not mean that common anthropometric traits should be discarded in evaluating ethnic relationships. Though exceedingly useful, they do not provide as efficient tools as simple traits free from environmental and cultural modification and amenable to gene frequency analysis.

Genetic traits have been used extensively for several years in determining individual relationships, notably in the classification of twins as to whether identical or fraternal, and in clearing up cases of disputed paternity. The various blood groups are ideally suited for such tests. They are solely dependent upon heredity, they are easily tested, and are not changed by age, disease, transfusions, or any known factor. Their modes of inheritance are simple and clear cut. Identical twins never show intrapair variations in the blood groups, whereas fraternal twins show the same degrees of intrapair variations as do brothers and sisters. When the blood groups of the mother and child are known, it is a certainty to what groups the father could belong. If the child is group A and the mother is group O, the father must be either A or AB. The test is negative rather than positive in that it indicates to what groups the father could not belong, but if a man is in the appropriate group it does not prove he is the father.

The ABO blood groups vary greatly in their frequencies in various parts of the world. Europeans are characterized by higher percentages of group A than of group B, whereas Asiatics have as high percentage of B as A. Peruvian Indians appear to be all of group O. Comparable ethnic differences have been encountered for the frequencies of the Rh blood groups, and others. Blood, alone, tells a great deal about genetic relationships. Like tests for disputed paternity, however, there are certain limitations to the amount of information which may be obtained. For example, marked differences between two populations with

respect to blood group frequencies is convincing evidence that they are not closely related. But two distantly related populations occasionally have similar blood group frequencies on a chance basis. In other words, such comparisons provide negative rather than positive evidence.

In 1949, Corkill³ published an account of the distributions of the ABO blood groups among 4,370 Sudanese soldiers. The tribal makeup varied considerably from one regiment to another. Table 1 shows Corkill's tribal classifications according to regiments, and the percentages of the blood groups within each. Both Sudanese Arabs and Sudanic Negroes are well represented. The Beja of the Red Sea Hills are represented by a smaller sample, and the Nilotes include only 56 Dinka. In 1952,

³ N. L. Corkill, "Blood Group Patterns in Sudanese," in *Sudan Notes and Records*, xxx (1949), pp. 267-270.

Table 1: BLOOD GROUPS OF SUDANESE *

Population	Investigator	Number	%O	%A	%B	%AB
<i>Beja</i>						
Beni Amer	Corkill	96	42.0	22.0	31.0	4.0
<i>Arabs</i>						
Riverain	Corkill	598	45.0	27.0	25.0	3.0
Ja'alayin	Corkill	206	51.0	27.0	18.0	4.0
Ta'aisha	Corkill	77	42.0	31.0	18.0	7.0
Shaigiya	Corkill	432	44.0	26.0	24.0	5.0
<i>Mixed</i>						
Gederaf area	Corkill	323	38.0	26.0	24.0	11.0
Khartoum	Corkill	337	50.0	29.0	17.0	4.0
Khartoum	Corkill	183	50.0	28.0	21.0	0.5
Khartoum	Corkill	207	43.0	22.0	31.0	4.0
Khartoum	Corkill	187	48.0	25.0	23.0	2.0
Dongola	Corkill	63	43.0	29.0	22.0	6.0
<i>Mostly Sudanic</i>						
Nuba	Corkill	626	47.0	30.0	20.0	3.0
Nuba	Corkill	380	45.0	34.0	17.0	4.0
Fur	Corkill	77	46.0	25.0	25.0	4.0
<i>Nilotes</i>						
Dinka	Corkill	56	49.0	28.0	14.0	9.0
Dinka	Rife et al **	121	52.8	28.0	14.8	4.1
Shilluk	Rife et al	91	52.7	19.7	24.1	3.3
Nuer	Rife et al	100	52.0	28.0	17.0	3.3

* N. L. Corkill, "Blood Group Patterns in Sudanese," *Sudan Notes and Records* xxx (1949), 267-270.

** David C. Rife, "An Investigation of Genetic Variability among Sudanese," *Amer. Jour. Physic. Anthro.*

Rife *et al.*⁴ determined the ABO blood group distributions of 312 Nilotes from the Dinka, Shilluk, and Nuer tribes, as shown in Table 1. The blood group distributions of Nilo-Hamites in the far south and Nubians in the northern Sudan have not been investigated.

Inspection of Table 1 reveals rather surprising similarities in blood group distributions among the various people represented. Among the fifteen samples collected by Corkill group O varied from thirty-eight to fifty-one percent; group A varied from twenty-two to thirty-four percent; group B from seventeen to thirty-one percent; and group AB from three to nine percent. The Nilotes are characterized by slightly higher percentages of O and lower percentages of B than the other Sudanese peoples.

Table 2 shows the observed ABO distributions in samples taken from Sudanese, West African Negroes, Egyptians, Ethiopians, Syrians, bedouins, Englishmen, and people in the United States. It would be of interest to know the blood group distributions among Arabs in Arabia, but unfortunately such data are not on record. Nilotes and West African Negroes show striking

⁴ David C. Rife, "An Investigation of Genetic Variability among Sudanese," in *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*.

Table 2: ABO BLOOD GROUP DISTRIBUTIONS ***

Population	Number	%O	%A	%B	%AB
Nilotic Negroes (Total of Rife's data)	312	52.56	25.64	18.26	4.14
West African Negroes	325	52.30	21.64	18.26	3.20
Sudanese soldiers (Total of Corkill's data)	4370	45.40	27.80	22.20	4.50
Ethiopians	400	42.80	26.50	25.30	5.00
Bedouins (Syria)	208	43.30	22.10	30.30	4.30
Syrians	509	44.40	26.30	24.00	5.30
Egyptians ****					
Soldiers ****	10045	32.60	35.40	24.30	7.45
Cairo	502	27.30	38.50	25.50	8.80
Assiut	419	24.60	34.40	31.00	10.00
English (London)	422	47.90	42.40	8.30	1.40
United States of America	20000	45.00	41.00	10.00	4.00

*** All except Sudanese, and Egyptian soldiers after W. C. Boyd, *Genetics and the Races of Man*, 247-248.

**** V. B. Abdoosh and S. El-Dewi, "The Blood Groups of Egyptians," *Jour. Roy. Egypt. Med. Assoc.* 32, no. 10 (1949), 715-726.

similarities to each other, especially with respect to group O. Sudanese soldiers, Ethiopians, bedouins, and Syrians show essentially similar distributions. Egyptians, however, show marked differences from all of the other populations represented in Table 2. They differ from the other African and Middle Eastern people in having much lower percentages of group O, and higher percentages of group A. They differ from English and Americans in having higher frequencies of B, and lower frequencies of both A and O. English and Americans (as well as other western Europeans) show about the same frequencies of O as do the Sudanese soldiers and Syrians, but much lower frequencies of B and higher frequencies of A than any of the others in Table 2. The blood group distributions clearly suggest much closer relationship of the northern Sudanese to West African Negroes, Ethiopians, Syrians, and Syrian bedouins than to the Egyptians.

They do not tell us much, however, concerning the degree of Negro-Caucasian mixture in the northern Sudanese. Handprints provide such a criterion. The configurations on finger tips and palms are established at four months of embryological development and are not changed thereafter by any known environmental factors. They show great variability, the degree of correlation between individuals being directly proportional to the degree of familial relationship. The prints of identical twins show greater similarities between the two right and two left hands of a pair than between the right and left of either member, whereas the prints of fraternal twins often show striking intra-pair differences.

Various ethnic groups show marked differences in the incidence of patterns on palms and finger tips. Hand prints provide permanent objective records of common variations principally determined by heredity, unaffected by age and post-natal environment. Although these variations are polygenic and not amenable to such simple gene frequency analysis as the blood groups, they provide excellent criteria for evaluating group relationships, far better than skeletal measurements and pigmentation.

Hand prints of approximately 600 Sudanese were collected,

and included 100 secondary school students from the northern Sudan, 340 Nilotes, 70 Nilo-Hamites, and 50 students at University College in Khartoum, who had come from various parts of the Sudan. Northern and southern Sudanese showed marked differences in the frequencies of whorls on finger-tips, and of patterns on the ulnar side of the palm. The southern Sudanese showed low whorl frequencies on finger-tips and pattern frequencies on the palm, corresponding with the frequencies which have been observed among other Negro populations. The northern Sudanese showed higher whorl frequencies on finger tips corresponding with those observed among bedouins and other Middle Eastern peoples while their palms showed pattern frequencies intermediate between those of Negroes and Middle Eastern peoples. The hand prints thus provide convincing evidence of a considerable proportion of white ancestry among the northern Sudanese, as contrasted with the typically Negroid prints of the southern Sudanese.

CONCLUSIONS

If one had no access to historical or anthropological data and had to base his conclusions solely on the ABO blood group distribution and the hand prints, he would most likely decide that the southern Sudanese are Negroes unmixed with other ethnic groups and that the northern Sudanese are a mixed Negro-Caucasian population. He would further conclude, on the basis of the blood group distributions, that there is no close relationship between Egyptians and northern Sudanese.

The blood group and hand print data of the Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites, as well as the observation that they are characterized by very dark brown skin and woolly hair, do not support the belief that these peoples are of mixed Negro-Caucasian descent. They appear to be types of Negroes, differing from West and Central African Negroes with respect to average stature, head shape, and degrees of prognathism. The three types of Negroes in the southern Sudan (Nilotes, Nilo-Hamites, Sudanic) show minor inter-group differences to lesser degrees than the differences between all three Sudan groups and West African Negroes. There is convincing evidence, however, that contacts

with Hamitic peoples at some time in the past have left their imprints in the cultural practices of the Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites.

Sudanese history, anthropological observations, and genetic data with one accord show that the northern Sudanese are of mixed Negro-Caucasian descent. Although the northern Sudanese have adopted the language, religion, and many of the cultural practices of the Arabs, evidences of considerable Negro ancestry are readily apparent to the casual observer. One encounters varying degrees of skin pigmentation among them, although dark brown is common and blond is a rarity. Features and body conformation likewise manifest great individual variations, ranging from typically Negroid to Caucasian. In general, the Barbara (Nubians) appear to have the greatest proportion of Negro ancestry, while the nomadic camel breeding tribes and Bejas have the highest proportion of white ancestry.

The degree of relationship of the Sudanese to the Egyptians is of primary interest in this discussion. Egyptians are Caucasians, and their closest Sudanese relationships, therefore, must be with the peoples of the Arabic or northern portion of the Sudan. People in both regions speak Arabic and are Muslims, for the most part. There is an important and outstanding difference, however, in their modes of life. The Sudanese Arab, like his relatives in Arabia, is essentially a nomadic herdsman. Egyptians, on the other hand, are characterized by great attachment to their home villages and the plots of land which they cultivate so intensively. Although the Arabs overran Egypt after the advent of Muhammad in the seventh century, A.D., it appears that a great many of them migrated to the Sudan and other parts of Africa two centuries later. Egypt does not provide alluring inducements to wandering herdsmen. The land is either barren desert, or is under irrigation, in which event, it is too valuable to be utilized for grazing.

Comparisons of the ABO blood group distributions among northern Sudanese and Egyptians provide convincing evidence that they are not very closely related. Boyd,⁵ an outstanding

⁵ W. C. Boyd, *Genetics and the Races of Man*, (Boston, 1950), pp. 247-248.

authority on blood groups, has tested tissue from 122 Egyptian mummies. His findings suggest that the blood group distributions of ancient Egyptians were somewhat similar to those of modern Egyptians. Although Egypt has been conquered at various times by its neighbors, it seems likely that the Egyptians were never completely assimilated by their conquerors.

The evidence indicates that the ethnic ties between Egypt and the Sudanese are more distant than those between the Sudanese and their other neighbors. All groups of mankind are related, but from the standpoint of comparative relationships of contemporary populations, Egyptians and Sudanese are not closely related.

MODERN HEBREW LITERATURE OF ISRAEL

Judd L. Teller

NEWSPAPER KIOSKS and bookshops everywhere in Israel display a profusion of small, paper-covered books, often no more than oversize pamphlets. This is the new Israeli literature — short stories, novels and poetry — produced by young people in their twenties and thirties, the post-World War II generation, writing in the ancient Hebrew language now undergoing its 'nth renovation since the beginning of its modern renascence in the eighteenth century.

Israeli Hebrew faces the exciting task of accommodating the needs and satisfying the wants of a contemporary people who challenge it to match the vigor, solace and service hitherto provided them by scores of mother-tongues, representative of diverse cultures. In the process of accommodation the language sometimes tends to bright colors, like a middle aged woman determined to hold her young lover. The student of Biblical or Mishnaic Hebrew, or, for that matter, of the relatively recent literature created by Eastern European Jewry in the two centuries which terminated in the 1920's, may be baffled by the bizarre slang of the newest Israeli Hebrew literature. But at no time does it constitute a barrier to intelligibility. After a few weeks residence in Israel, any student of Hebrew will have made his adjustments, if not his peace, with the country's use of the language. The newcomer is no more baffled than the older Hebrew writers residing in Palestine by the weird words and syntaxes grafted to the language by the crop of new writers.

Actually, one cannot speak of an ancient and a modern Hebrew. Although the language has grown and been enriched since its distant beginnings, at no time in its development has it reached

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an impasse of unintelligibility such as prevails between Chaucerian and contemporary English. The explanation for this is simple. There has been incessant continuity in literary Hebrew precisely because the language had for many centuries been the written, not the spoken tongue of the Jews. This condition precluded a clash between the language of the Book and the language of the marketplace, such as one finds in Arabic. When Zionists, not too long ago, restored Hebrew to its status as a spoken tongue, the vocabulary for daily speech had to be lifted straight out of the Book.

Although Israel's press is polyglot, its books with few exceptions are all published in Hebrew. The production pace of original works cannot keep up with readers' demands, nor can their quality sustain the interest of the hard-core of omnivorous readers who whetted their tastes on many languages. Consequently, the major proportion of each year's book output consists of translations from the finest and the best-selling in other lands.

Israel is the sanctuary of expatriate writers, expatriates from their language as well as from their lands — men and women with varying reputations for the private vocabularies they had mined in Yiddish, French, Hungarian, Russian, Czech and German. They find it impossible to hack their way through, once again, to a style of their own in Hebrew. They continue to write in their accustomed tongues, and their works, in toto or in fragments, are published in Hebrew, often before they appear in the original tongue. Czech-German novelist Max Brod, friend of Franz Kafka and editor of his diaries, has lived in Israel for some two decades and has an intelligent man's command of the language. Yet, he still writes in German. One of the reasons, it is believed, that caused novelist Arnold Zweig to feel unhappy in Israel and eventually to resettle in Germany was his inability to acquire Hebrew. Although the late German Jewish refugee poetess Elsa Lasker Schiller wrote verse in a syntax that had a Biblical ring, she could never learn Hebrew in her long residence in Jerusalem. A unique exception, among literary men, is Aryeh Ludwig Straus, who had begun to acquire some reputation in Germany as a promising poet when Nazi events forced him to resettle in Palestine. There he undertook the task, for-

midable for an adult poet, of mastering Hebrew. He succeeded beyond all expectations. Although his output has been slender, the quality of his poetry places him in the front ranks of the newest Hebrew poets as a pure lyricist. It is interesting, however, that he still retains his German first name, Ludwig, at a time when it is almost a mandatory fashion for men in the public eye to Hebraize even their family names.

Contemporary Israeli Hebrew writers may be roughly divided into two categories: the men and women in their middle years and older, almost all of whom are European-born, although they may have been living in Palestine for decades; and those under middle age, most of whom have either been born in Israel, or brought up there from childhood. Of course, there are exceptions, such as Nathan Alterman, fifty-two year old poet, educated in Tel Aviv's Herzliah High School, and sixty-six year old Judah Burla, Palestine-born and the very first Sephardic writer of modern Hebrew fiction. The two groups are dissimilar both in their use of language and their view of Jewry and Israel. Yet many of the dissimilar attitudes were produced in the young, unknowingly, by their predecessors. The older writers all are Zionists, and it is Zionism that brought them to Palestine and to Israel. The others, the *sabra* writers are, for the most part, contemptuous of Zionism, and yet this contempt is the indirect product of Zionist indoctrination.

Zionism has always maintained that life in the diaspora so gravely imbalanced Jewish psyche that only life in a sovereign state could restore equilibrium to the Jew. Some hoped that on his ancestral soil the Jew would become like other people. Others within the camp of political Zionism were not interested in equating the Jew with others, but rather in providing for his brilliant intellectualism the sun-space denied him in diaspora. Zionism could be accepted even by self-hating Jews as a more dignified way of assimilation — assimilation through a sovereignty paralleling other peoples'. Thus, there has run through Zionism the dichotomy of *ahavat israel*, love for the Jewish people, and of self-contempt; most embraced Zionism for the first reason, though some embraced it for the second reason. Since Zionism's emphasis has always been on the more perfect Jew

whom only a sovereign Jewish society can produce, small wonder that the *sabra* grew up a confirmed believer in his own superiority over other Jews. That being the case, the new Israeli literature, produced by the *sabra*, celebrates the *sabra* and is almost oblivious of all other Jews. There are exceptions to this, of course, such as the novelist S. Yizhar, the best stylist among the new crop of writers.

The *sabra's* attitude towards Jews outside Israel also has been determined in some measure by much of the Hebrew literature of the past century or more. This bellicose, combattant literature was engaged in a struggle against the rabbinic-patriarchal authority which ruled ghetto life, and against the revelation of patriarchalist tendencies in Hassidism, the religious democratic revolution which impeached absolutist rabbinical rule. Combating these conditions, Peretz Smolenskin, Mendele Mocher Sefarim and other writers of the nineteenth century savagely exaggerated the defects and drew merciless and ruthless caricatures of Jewish society. They were, as regards intent, the Upton Sinclairs, Sinclair Lewises and Theodore Dreisers of Jewish ghetto life. Just as the Kremlin has used the savage critical portraits of America by these writers to detract and traduce the United States among those unfamiliar with it, so can the Hebrew literature of that particular period serve to present a distorted picture of Jewish ghetto life to those unfamiliar with it. To the *sabra*, the life of Jews a half century ago or more is alien. He has been told that it was a humiliating existence, and finds horrible confirmation of its "sordidness" in the older Hebrew writing. He refuses to identify his own literature with that created under such shocking conditions. Abraham Kareev, poet and incisive critic, has charged in a recent book that the older Hebrew literature, particularly its fiction, has left a legacy of hatred for the ghetto Jew.

Chaim Nachman Bialik (1873-1934), towering figure of the Hebrew renascence and great poetic voice of Zionism, emerged into literature concomitantly with the Herzlian movement. The ghetto disciplines against which an earlier generation had fought were now crumbling. The promise, however, of a full and equalitarian cultural life outside the ghetto, which his literary prede-

cessors had predicted, was not realized. The Dreyfus case, the Kishinev pogrom and the blood-ritual libel against Mendel Beilis were a sad commentary on European humanism. Bialik acclaimed the superiority of the moral mores of the ghettos over the morality of a society capable of so hounding the Jew. The ghetto was by now no more than a vanishing pageantry and Bialik its mourner. He set the fashion for a new Hebrew literature, saturated with nostalgia for the life that had been. The next generation of Hebrew writers, all of them settled in the Jewish National Home, inspired by Bialik's example and outraged by Nazism, produced a literature largely romanticizing the pseudo-ghetto. Notable among these writers are S. J. Agnon, one of the great writers of our times, and Shin Shalom and the late Asher Barash.

The *sabra* writer, brought up in a deliberately attempted rational and secular society, is averse to romanticism and cannot reconcile this latter day adoration of the ghetto with the savage caricatures produced by the earlier writers or with Zionist doctrine about the imbalance of the Jewish personality in the diaspora. He finds it difficult to differentiate between the *galut*, meaning the conditions under which the Jew lived, and the Jew as a human being and the faith by which he lived. Even those later writers, beginning with Bialik, who affirmed the ghetto Jew, continued to deplore *galut* as a morbid setting for his faith. Almost a decade before political Zionism announced itself through Theodore Herzl, Mordecai Ze'ev Feierberg, the novelist, had a central character in his fiction cry out: "Blow out the candle of the Galut—a new candle must be lit!", and a play written a half century later by Ukrainian-born Israeli novelist Hayim Hazaz closes ecstatically on the outcry: "The Galut has been destroyed, it has been consumed in flames!" The destroyers of the *galut*, in his play are followers of the pseudo-Messiah Sabbatal Zvi who regard the sacrifice of the material and spiritual possessions of the *galut* not too steep a price for the restoration of the Jewish people to its ancestral soil. When first published in the 1930's, the play seemed a mere reaffirmation of an extremist and by no means universal Zionist view. However, when Am Oved, Histadrut publishing house, almost unwittingly

reissued the play in 1950, there was fierce indignant public reaction. The European *galut* had already been most horribly destroyed, not by the voluntary action of Jews, but by Hitler-Himmler decree. In 1950, although most certainly not Hazaz's intention, his play sounded like an endorsement of that horrendous extinction of a people's culture.

The several generations of modern Hebrew writers who preceded the *sabra* may have been ambivalent in their feeling for the *galut* Jew, but their work was deeply and almost exclusively concerned with him, and consequently with Judaism, for a people is indivisible from its culture. *Sabra* writing, however, has realized the ostensible purpose of Feierberg — "blow out the candle of Galut, a new candle must be lit!", and of Hazaz — "we must bury ourselves with the dead in order to rise anew." The new *sabra* writing is a very dim illumination, and resurrection seems not yet accomplished; fortunately, too, the *sabra's* literary predecessors have not buried themselves and continue to contribute new works to Israeli Hebrew literature. So far as the *sabra* is concerned, however, he has blown out the candle of *galut* and buried the past; his fiction is unconcerned with "the Jew" — the global Jew — and, consequently, with Judaistic cultural traditions. He also possesses none of the idiomatic richness which is a concomitant of Judaistic culture. For the purposes of this report Judaistic culture is that complex treasury of ideas and literature which embraces the Babylonian Talmud and the vast theological and philosophical literature created since, and it includes all the Zionist dialecticians, all Yiddish literature and modern Hebrew literature up to and including Chaim Nachman Bialik.

The absence of Judaistic culture from *sabra* writing does not imply an absence of religious faith. Modern Hebrew literature, true to its antecedents, has always been concerned with religion; even those most fiercely embattled against the restrictions of orthodoxy, were themselves moderately orthodox, observant Jews; their successors, less combatative, but also less or not at all observant, labored in spiritual anguish to reconcile rationalism and the ancestral faith, for they felt that divorce from the faith, for which generations had been martyred, was tantamount to renunciation of the bonds that hold the people together.

For a little more than a decade, immediately following World War I, Hebrew writing seemed completely unconcerned with religion. Like all literature at the time, it was more concerned with form than with substance or than it was with solving man's problems through faith. Around the 1930's, the pendulum of interest began to swing back to religion. Some, like Agnon, became severely orthodox. Nazism had much to do with this. The Zionist pioneer generations had broken with their parents and their mores, each man and woman interring his private *galut* when starting out for Palestine. This resulted in a dormant sense of guilt. Then came Nazism, the destruction of Eastern European Jewry, the extinction of the parents and their traditions. Suddenly, these traditions seemed very much worthwhile; indeed, priceless. Many writers felt impelled to atone for the heartbreak they had caused their parents and to preserve in their writings much of what they had once renounced.

This re-embrace of the faith produced Israeli literature's greatest poet, Uri Zvi Greenberg, who had begun as a Yiddish writer at the close of World War I, but reached his full maturity as a poet in Hebrew, in the 1930's and 1940's, with hymns celebrating his renunciation of a society that had countenanced the horrors perpetrated against the Jews.

Notwithstanding their emotional readjustment to parental religious traditions, that entire generation of writers preceding the *sabra* has always been, and with few exceptions continues to be secular in its view of society. Man has long been their God; the *kibbutz* their heaven; and faith in man their religion. They still visualize the perfect Jewish state as a society of men behaving humanely towards each other, not because they fear Divine retribution, but because they are incapable of inhumanity towards their fellows.

Brought up on this type of ethical culture secularism, intermixed with primitive communalism, with agrarianism, largely non-Marxist socialism, and pride in the teachings of the Hebrew prophets, the *sabras* have found the faith wanting. They cannot be sentimental about this secular faith, as their parents had been, for their parents had brought it forth after the anguish of spiritual wrestling. This secular faith has provided the *sabra* no

consolation in the face of death on the battlefield. It has not, they see, banished jealousies and special privileges even from the supposedly utopian *kibbutz* society. It has not protected Israeli society from the adverse moral effects, common to all peoples and countries, resulting from austerity, and food and housing shortages. Brought up in a somewhat boyscoutish society, where even adults comported themselves by a boy scout code of honor, and conditioned to strive for moral perfection, the *sabras* were pained and shocked by the imperfections of reality. It is after The War of Liberation that evidence began to appear of their search for a faith. The *sabra* felt, as most young men do, that he could do a better job of state-building than his elders and rejected, derisively, the great Zionist faith in Jewry which had sustained his predecessors. At best, he is indifferent to the dialectics which fascinated them. He is somewhat like a rich man's son, bored by the bequeathed (ideological) wealth. The many diaries left behind by *sabras* who died on the battlefields, and which have since been posthumously published, are studded with entries which speak of yearnings for the pageantry and elation inspired by a formalized religion. In the more formal works, however, of the *sabra* writers there is not much evidence of this yearning for a doctrinal religion, although there is ample evidence of the existence of a vacuum awaiting to be filled by some great faith.

The yearning for pageantry is evident, for example, in the utterances and writings of the several score pseudo-intellectuals, poets and essayists, who compromise the neo-pagan Canaanite group which advocates a return to the hedonism of pre-Mosaic days. Counterposing this is a considerably larger group connected with the magazine *Soolam*, published by former Sternists and Irgunists. This publication is strongly and articulately religious and Judaism-conscious, as demonstrated by its frequent quotations from the works of past and contemporary *galut* rabbis. However, even the orthodox young Israelis are not of a single mind on the retention of the great Judaistic culture created in the *galut*. There is the pamphlet, for example, issued by two prominent members of *Hapoel Hamizrahi*, the religious labor party. Undoubtedly reflecting the views of a substantial section of the party, it advocates a radical revision of all rabbinic the-

ology and legislation created in the *galut*, and the retention only of such residues as are applicable to, and consistent with, a society settled in its own homeland. This is almost tantamount, although the authors have denied it, to a rejection of most Oral Law which has influenced the Jew even more decisively than has the Torah, for the Oral Law applied the Torah to the Jew's daily life. Thus, the pseudo-pagan Canaanites, who disavow all Jewish tradition, and the orthodox authors of this pamphlet, may be said to share a common aversion for *galut* culture — differing primarily in degree, the authors willing to accept little, the Canaanites nothing.

The charge that *sabra* literature is lacking in consciousness of that formidable and awe-inspiring interval between the Second and the Third Commonwealths has been vehemently refuted by Professor Simon Halkin, American Hebrew poet, critic and novelist, now on the faculty of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has written for *Bechinot*, a magazine of literary criticism published by Mosad Bialik, the Jewish Agency's publishing house, a long essay on *sabra* poetry. He cites, in substantiation of the charge against *sabra* literature, frequent references to Biblical events in *sabra* descriptions of the Israeli landscape. The Biblical past is hardly more than a tribal past if dissociated from subsequent Jewish history, in- and outside of Palestine, so that consciousness of Biblical events is no index to the *sabra's* relationship to the great mainland of a continual Jewry and a continuous Judaistic tradition. Consciousness of the Israeli landscape and of the mysticism of the region is an important feature of *sabra* writing. Their predecessors were Zion-conscious rather than Palestine-conscious, more responsive to the symbolic significance of their old-new homeland than to its physical aspects. The *sabra*, on the other hand, is primarily responsive to the land's contours and colors, to its physical rather than spiritual features. The physical landscapes closest to the European-born writer have been Poland, Galicia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, whose seasons are associated with his childhood and adolescence. The *sabra's* elementary landscape is Israel, and his attachment, embracing the entire region, extends to its peoples and tribes.

Israel's young intellectuals include a number of supporters of

the Fertile Crescent concept of the whole area as a self-contained entity, independent of any larger imperial framework. One explanation for this support among some *sabra* political writers is that it expresses the *sabra's* desire to be integrated into the region; another, that he seeks new attachments to compensate for his current detachment from global Jewry. The first reason—whether the Fertile Crescent is laudable or not—is an augury of Israel's determination to participate in the shaping of things to come in the Middle East; the second reason disturbs those concerned with the continuity of global Jewry and Judaistic cultural traditions. Some Israelis concerned both with the political importance of Israel's integration in a regional framework and with the spiritual continuity of Jewry, have presented a substitute for the Fertile Crescent—one based not on the Arab desert, but on the kinship of the Mediterranean states of Lebanon, Israel, Greece and Italy, whose cultures have mixed with Hebrew culture. This concentration on the Mediterranean nations, with their western cultural traditions, is also intended as a means to provide a closer relationship between Israeli culture and the global Jewish culture, the latter of which is essentially a western culture.

The *sabra's* region-consciousness is, for him, the way out of a psychological trap. The *sabra's* trap is his self-centeredness. His writing is the most self-centered in all Hebrew literature. However, it has nothing of the nature of America's gigantic Thomas Wolfe, nor of Hebrew literature's Yosef Hayim Brenner (1881–1921) and Micah Yosef Berdichevsky (1865–1921), whose self-centeredness did not, like the *sabra's*, exclude the world. On the contrary, they embraced the globe and were unable to contain themselves, and their senses and intellect were deluged by all that poured in on them. These older writers lived in an area larger than their allotted time-space.

Sabra writing deals with the past two decades only, and treats those years as if they were a time unto themselves, hermetically sealed off from past and present universal time. Events in Palestine that happened concurrently to others than the *sabra* are largely disregarded in *sabra* literature, and in its novels the elders are treated as mere trespassers.

What has happened to the *sabra* is unimportant if unrelated to the fascinating whole. He smuggled weapons past British sentries on the roads to Jerusalem, was arousing to love, fought tenaciously in The Independence War, and, on discharge, nursed resentments common to all veterans before they adjust to civilian status. All of this can have great meaning if depicted against universal time — the yearnings of infinite generations for the restoration of Zion, the horrors that poured down upon European Jewry, the mysticism of the in-gathering of the dispersed. But this, the *sabra* fails to do. A striking failure, in this regard, is Moshe Shamir's first and best novel, which established his reputation. His story of an adolescent, the son of Kibbutzniks, falls flat because the *sabra* "hero" is cast in disproportionate scale to the sociological history of the *kibbutz*, which is rooted in complex traditions — in Tolstoyanism, Hassidism, and in the several rebellions of the emancipated Jew; in his rebellion against the ghetto imposed by external police authority and against the ghetto imposed from within by rabbinical strictures; and in his mutiny, jointly with others, against feudalism, monarchy and tyranny and for the brotherhood of man. The success and failure of the *kibbutz* is not that of Zionism alone, but of the western world whose leading thinkers for several generations contributed towards the ideas which were the mortar and bricks of the utopian settlements. Nothing of this, however, comes true in the novel. All that Shamir is concerned with is a mediocre young *sabra*.

Literature must communicate with forces outside itself if it is to preserve its power of articulation. It is impossible for the *sabra* to break out of his shell, unless he attaches himself to something larger than himself. Unwilling or unable for the time being to communicate with the mainland of Jewry, he hopes to find gratification by communicating with a regional myth. Only regional homogeneity can sustain regional mysticism, and in the Middle East the diverse still exceeds the homogeneous.

This region-consciousness is reflected also in the treatment of the Arab in *sabra* literature which bespeaks the wrongness of war coupled concomitantly with the rightness of Israel. Most *sabra* books — particularly by S. Yizhar, the most exacting of

the young novelists, and Uri Avinerik, the sensationalist purple-prose war diarist — are notable for their apparent absence of hatred for the enemy; indeed, for their feeling of compassion for him and for their desire to live in peace with him. Of course, this attitude is atavistically Judaistic, in the tradition of a people that has been warred against but had never warred in two thousand years. It also betrays an affection for the Arab which is either the source or the result of region-consciousness. Modern Hebrew literature has, in fact, never been anything but sympathetic to the Arabs. Although plagued by attacks from hostile neighbors, the early Jewish settlers at the turn of the century, were nonetheless so captivated by their "Ismaelite cousins," that they quickly learned his tongue, copied his headdress, acquired his food habits, and affected other of his manners. There was bravado in this, of course. Short story writer Moshe Smilansky, author of sentimental tales from Arab life and with the decorative quality of Persian rugs, was literary spokesman for these celebrants of Arab patriarchalism.

When the first Mufti violence against the Jews occurred in 1920, a restrained silence about the Arabs set in in Hebrew literature and it continued until the establishment of the State of Israel. The two communities lived side by side, with no inter-communication, like planets suspended in space. While the Mufti bands were demolishing Jewish pioneer homesteads, the Hebrew writers could not celebrate the Arab, nor, differentiating between politician and peasant, could they denounce him. Hence, they bridled their tongues and kept silent, which in itself implied definite moral instruction to their successors.

This incessant silence was broken only after the establishment of the State of Israel. Today there is no more eloquent spokesman for the Israel Arab than fifty-two year old Nathan Alterman, educated in Tel Aviv, an impassioned humanist, and one of Israel's leading poets.

Sabra war literature began to roll off the presses even before the armistice agreements with the Arab states were signed and has projected more Arab characters than all of modern Hebrew literature before it. This interest in the Arabs is accounted for by many factors, among which notably are: (a) the meeting of

Jews and Arabs in Israel after years of detached proximity; (b) the influx of Oriental Jewish immigration which has whetted Israeli interest in the culture from which these have come; and (c) the *sabra's* general region-consciousness.

His region-consciousness, as already pointed out, is an effort to compensate for his alienation from the *Golah*, or world Jewry. This alienation would surely have been less complete had European Jewry survived World War II and subsequent events and had retained its pre-war status as a great center of Hebrew culture. European Jewry, until a little more than a decade ago, had been a market for Hebrew books and a producer of vigorous Hebrew writing. Before 1920, Odessa was the axis of *Golah* Hebrew culture; in the 1920's the center shifted to Berlin; and only when Hitler broke on the horizon did the writers settle in Palestine. The Hebrew language high schools in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia continued, until 1939, to graduate annually thousands of potential Hebrew book readers. Had these centers survived, the *sabra*, for reasons of self-interest, would have endeavored to produce works salable and applaudable in the *Golah*. He might even have sought to imitate *Golah* writers. Of course, there still are people outside Israel who write Hebrew books, but there are few among them of stature. There are still Hebrew readers across the globe, but there is not a single concentrated Hebrew book market anywhere outside Israel capable, as yet, of considerably supplementing the Israeli book market.

A deliberate effort has been undertaken to arouse the *sabra* to take interest in the larger body of Jewish and world literature. The magazine *Bechinot* has been tutoring the young writers in the elementals of their craft. Mosad Harav Cook, the religious publishing house, Mosad Bialik, publisher of fine editions of Hebrew classics and translations of world classics, Am Oved and Sifriyat Poalim have been assiduous in providing the Hebrew reader with the best in fiction, poetry, political science and philosophy from all literatures. Am Oved and Sifriyat Poalim have published translations from the Yiddish, hopeful that this might reduce the distance between the *sabra* and his predecessors. Some claim that the *sabra* is beginning to show a taste for these works but there is no evidence in his writing to support these

contentions. It is true that the *sabra* has begun to show evidence of humility generally, and this should sharpen his receptivity. Unfortunately, however, he has been the prey of political parties which dangle honors and ready-made ideologies before him in an effort to attract him into their ranks. Political ideologies prejudice him, limit his receptivity, and warp his interest in literature, even before this interest has become manifest.

Sabra literature faces a grave crisis also in relation to the Israeli reader. The eastern element of the Israeli population may soon constitute a large proportion of Israel's book audience. Certainly, this will be true in another half decade. The *sabra*, self-centered, is a depicter of moods, not a teller of tales. The eastern Jew, like the Arab, although outwardly passive, is a man of impassioned attitudes. The *sabra*, although basically an activist, is resigned to or affects resignation towards life. How can his writing appeal to the eastern Jew? Nor can it, at the present stage, appeal to the Western Jew whose sophisticated tastes and catholic interests transcend anything the *sabra* writer is now able to offer.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

MANY UNMISTAKABLE SIGNS point to a widening of American awareness that there is a variety of facets in the developments in the Middle East. The increasing number of magazine articles and reports on the area, the startling and informed questions put to speakers by students and supposedly ignorant audiences, the many books and pamphlets published on the Near and Middle East, and the numerous conferences are evidences of an awakening public concern about that part of the world. If any explanation is necessary, it would appear to be the result of the continued drama of the Iranian situation, the Suez Canal question, the Sudan problem, the Israeli solution, the Nagib regime, the Soviet pressures to capture the Middle Eastern peoples, and the Turkish entry into NATO, to say nothing of the host of problems that are conjured up by the mere mention of Pakistan and Morocco.

During this last quarter perhaps the most important development in regard to growing American recognition of the significance of the Middle East was the announcement that the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, would make an official trip to the Middle East in May of this year. This trip by the first Secretary of State to make such a visit will call the American public's attention to this area, more than ever. It is an official gesture of interest and goodwill on the part of the new administration with respect to the Middle Eastern peoples and their governments.

In the relations between the United States and the Middle East the peoples of the latter area frequently assert that Americans are only interested in the economic or, at best, the political factors of the region. Though this may have seemed to be true on many occasions, indications of its falseness are available and during the quarter announcement was made of a Colloquium on Islam, to be held in the autumn at Princeton, New Jersey, and co-sponsored by the Library of Congress and Princeton Univer-

sity. Through the Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State, scholars from thirteen Middle Eastern and Muslim countries are being invited to attend the Colloquium and to travel in the United States for several months. These delegates, together with representative American scholars, will discuss the relation of Islamic culture to the contemporary world. Behind the Colloquium is this growing recognition of the need for further knowledge and understanding in the United States of the cultural bases of Islamic civilization and of the spiritual and intellectual aspects of Islamic life.

Most observers accepted the Soviet breaking of diplomatic relations with Israel on February 12, 1953 as part of apparent anti-Jewish developments within the U.S.S.R. and her satellites. The Russian note handed by Foreign Minister Vishinsky to the Israeli Minister in Moscow gave as the reason the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv on February 9 and the resulting injury of three Soviet citizens. Undoubtedly perpetrated because of the purges in Czechoslovakia and the Jewish doctor imprisonments in the U.S.S.R., the bombing was officially condemned by the Israeli Government, but the U.S.S.R. refused to accept this condemnation and ensuing apologies as sincere. World reaction to this diplomatic severance was immediate. Many in Israel and in the West feared that this move was a calculated Soviet step to enhance their program with Arabs and was a forewarning of things to come. Arab governments, however, feared that this move might lead Western governments unwittingly to play the Soviet game by showing increased sympathy for the Jews behind the Iron Curtain, giving additional "moral and material" support to Israel, and thus corroborating the Soviet propaganda among the Arab peoples. This latter fear presumably led the Washington diplomatic representatives of seven Arab states to call upon the Under Secre-

tary of State General Walter Bedell Smith on February 17 and to bring to his attention "the grave danger of indulging in such support." That such a concerted action upon the part of so many states occurred is further evidence of the extent of communist penetration into the area and the potency of its propaganda. Stalin's death and the ensuing shifts in Soviet tactics have brought relief to this situation but there is no evidence that it is more than a temporary relaxation.

The changing pattern of Middle Eastern politics received a welcome turn in Cairo on February 12, 1953 when General Muhammad Nagib and Sir Ralph Stevenson for the United Kingdom signed an Agreement to end the Condominium that was established for the Sudan in 1898. Furthermore, this Agreement becomes part of the Self-Government Statute which the Sudan Government formulated last year after consulting with the Sudanese Legislative Assembly. This Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12 becomes a most historic mark for it ends another episode in British colonialism in Middle East and Africa, serves as a step in solving the Suez difficulties, and paves the way for Sudanese political self-determination. The Self-Government Statute now provides for the election of a Sudanese Parliament and an all-Sudanese Cabinet which will govern under the authority of the Governor-General (British) for a three-year transitional period. The parliamentary elections are scheduled for May and are being supervised by a seven-man International Commission. (Dr. Harold W. Glidden of the Board of Advisory Editors of this JOURNAL is assistant to Mr. Warwick Perkins, the American Commissioner.) The convening of parliament (in Khartoum) is the automatic signal for the beginning of the three-year transitional period. Another International Commission will supervise the Sudanization of the administration by which, as rapidly as pos-

sible, the foreigners, mainly British, will turn over their positions to Sudanese. At the end of the three-year transitional period, or before that time should the process of Sudanization be completed, the Sudanese Parliament may request for self-determination. Within three months of such a request, Egypt and the United Kingdom will withdraw their armed forces and an elected Constituent Assembly will determine whether the Sudan is to be linked with Egypt or to be completely independent. During the transitional period, the Governor-General must work with an International Governor-General's Commission which is to be composed of two Sudanese (nominated by Egypt and the United Kingdom), an Egyptian, a Britisher, and a Pakistani who will serve as chairman of the Commission. Since the southern Sudanese are somewhat fearsome of their future in the hands of the more highly developed northern Sudanese, the Self-Government Statute makes special provision on behalf of the former. At least one-fourth of the members of the Sudanese Parliament and two members of the Cabinet must be from the southern provinces and the Governor-General and his special Commission are specifically charged with the responsibility of insuring fair and just treatment of all sections of the Sudanese population.

That this was an historic occasion there was no doubt in Sudanese minds and February 12 may well become a new national holiday. Kitchener Square in Khartoum was the scene of a parade of Sudanese, Egyptian and British troops, Sir Robert Howe, the Governor-General, addressed a crowd of some twenty thousand people on the importance of the occasion and in the evening gave a reception for distinguished individuals, and special prayers were said in mosques throughout the country for unity among the people of the Sudan.

Chronology¹

DECEMBER 1, 1952 — FEBRUARY 28, 1953

General

1952

Dec. 12: Ambassador Edwin A. Locke resigned as special representative of the Secretary of State coordinating U.S. economic and technical assistance in the Middle East.

Dec. 20: An International Forestry Conference for the Middle East concluded its meetings at Amman. It requested the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to establish a technical research center for forestry.

aviation in the Arab countries; at the same time it passed a resolution urging those Arab states which had not yet joined the International Civil Aviation Organization to do so.

Egypt

1952

Dec. 1: Twenty-two prominent politicians, detained by the Government since September, were released from army custody. Among those released were Ahmad Nagib al-Hilali, former Prime Minister, and Hafiz Afifi.

Dec. 5: The Government released 30 persons who had been detained for political reasons. In explanation of the releases it was announced that the Government had now established itself and that all citizens henceforth would enjoy personal liberty. Through a spokesman, members of the group released declared that during internment they had taken the opportunity to "liquidate all political feuds and unite for the sake of Egypt and her new era."

Dec. 6: After a visit from Mustafa al-Nahhas, General Muhammad Nagib announced that active steps would be taken to "eliminate all hard feelings, to bring the various factions together."

Dec. 7: General Muhammad Nagib announced that he would call a meeting of political leaders "to try to end dissensions and discuss measures for Egypt's welfare."

The Government approved 3 laws dealing with trade unions, individual labor contracts, and conciliation and arbitration in labor disputes.

Dec. 8: It was announced that a national committee composed of representatives of the political parties, professional and other bodies, and leading jurists, would be formed to amend the Constitution or to draft a new one, that the resulting document would be submitted to a referendum, and that the national committee would decide whether women (at present without political rights) should take part in this referendum. It was added that a separate referendum might be held on the "vital issue" of whether or not the monarchy should be retained.

General Muhammad Nagib reshuffled his Cabinet, dropping 4 and bringing in 5 new Ministers. The new Cabinet is as follows:

Muhammad Nagib — Prime Minister, War, and Marine

Sulayman Hafiz — Deputy Prime Minister, Interior

'Abd al-Galil al-'Imari — Finance

'Abd al-Razik Sidki — Agriculture

Murad Fahmi — Public Works

Nur al-Din Tarraf — Public Health

Afghanistan

1953

Jan. 8: It was announced that the U.S. Government had extended a loan of \$1,500,000 to the Government for the emergency purchase of wheat and flour from the United States.

Algeria

1953

Jan. 14: The Court of Appeals confirmed a sentence of 4 years' imprisonment and a fine of \$760 imposed on Zerroukhi Chikh, an Algerian school teacher, for making uncomplimentary remarks about French administrators in a classroom.

Arab League

1952

Dec. 20: The Political Committee met to consider the Palestine question as dealt with in the United Nations, the situation in French North Africa, West Germany's agreement on indemnities with Israel, and the agenda of the Arab-Asian conference.

1953

Jan. 14-15: The Political Committee met in Cairo. The principal item on its agenda was West Germany's reparations agreement with Israel.

Jan. 17: The Communications Committee met in Cairo and various resolutions were passed which would aim at establishing a Pan-Arab network of rail, road, air, and sea transport. Five sub-committees were appointed to study the technical aspects of the question.

Jan. 20: The Aviation Sub-committee drew up a plan which would unify laws regulating civil

¹ The *Middle East Journal* assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of the following items which are drawn from *The New York Times*, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, and the *Mideast Mirror*.

Ahmad Husni—Justice
 Isma'il al-Qabbani—Education
 Husayn Abu Zayd—Communications
 Mahmud Fawzi—Foreign Affairs
 William Salim Hanna—Municipal and Rural Affairs
 Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri—Wakfs
 Abbas Ammar—Social Affairs
 Bahgat Badawi—Commerce and Industry
 Sabri Mansur—Supply
 Fu'ad Galal—National Guidance
 Fathi Ridwan—Minister of State

The Prime Minister, General Nagib, visited former Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Nahhas.

Dec. 10: General Muhammad Nagib, in a radio broadcast, announced the abolition of the Constitution of 1923, and the Government's intention of drafting a new Constitution "to realize the aspirations of the Egyptian people."

Dec. 11: Colonel Adib Shishakli, Prime Minister of Syria, arrived in Cairo on an official, 5-day visit.

Dec. 20: The Egyptian Press Syndicate, an organization which includes most active newspapermen, voted to suspend publication of newspapers as of Jan. 1 unless censorship was removed.

Dec. 21: The Government issued a decree, retroactive to 1939, providing that persons convicted of corruption or abuse of power should be barred from political activity and public office, and should be required to return to the State sums obtained illegally while in office; the decree also imposed penalties of fines and imprisonment for persons taking part in politics or accepting office after conviction.

Minister of State, Fathi Ridwan, announced that a special court, consisting of 3 judges of the higher courts and probably 4 army officers, would be set up to try cases of corruption, and that each defendant would be allowed only one defense counsel in order to avoid unnecessary prolongation of trials.

Dec. 26: The Cabinet approved the floating of a £E 200,000,000 loan, bearing 3 percent annual interest and repayable over 30 years, to finance the Government's agrarian reforms.

1953

Jan. 1: At the request of the Government, the United Kingdom released £10 million from the No. 2 (blocked) Egyptian account to the No. 1 (free) account, in accordance with the terms of the 1951 agreement. (Under the terms of the financial agreement of 1951, £10 million would be released each year for 9 years.)

Jan. 2: It was revealed that formal charges of corruption and abuse of power involving 6 former Cabinet ministers and 8 lesser politicians active under the old regime, had been laid before Minister of State, Fathi Ridwan. Among those implicated were Fu'ad Sirag al-Din, former Minister of Interior and Finance, 'Uthman Muhamram, former Minister of Public Works, Sulayman Ghannam, former Minister of Commerce, Ahmad Zaki, former Minister of National Economy, and

Muhammad al-Wakil, also a former Minister of National Economy.

Jan. 3: General Nagib announced that a 5-year plan for the economic development of the country had been formulated. Husayn Fahmi, a former Finance Minister, would head a Permanent Council for the Development of National Production.

Jan. 12: A committee composed of 50 people from all professions, political views, and religions to redraft the Constitution was announced.

Jan. 16: Twenty-five Army officers were arrested on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Government.

All political parties were dissolved and their funds confiscated under a decree issued by General Nagib, who also announced that there would be a "transitional period" of 3 years before constitutional government would be restored.

Jan. 17: The Cabinet issued a decree extending to July 23, 1953, the supreme powers conferred on General Nagib. The Cabinet also issued a decree forbidding the formation of new political parties, and imposing penalties of up to 3 years' imprisonment or a fine of £E 2,000 for infringement of the ban.

Colonel 'Abd al-Nassir, acting Chief of Staff, revealed that 25 officers and 15 civilians had been arrested, and that the Government proposed to arrest every known active Communist, and that 6 Communist newspapers had been suppressed. Among the men arrested were Fu'ad Sirag al-Din, Abbas Halim, and Col. Muhammad Rashad Mehanna.

Jan. 20: A military court found Lieut. Col. Muhammad Husni al-Damanhuri, who had been appointed Governor of the Western Desert after the Army coup, guilty of attempting to incite rebellion among the armed forces on Jan. 14, and his brother, Capt. Hasan Rifaat al-Damanhuri, guilty of failing to give information on the plot; the former was condemned to death and the latter to 5 years' imprisonment and dismissal from the Army.

Jan. 23: A 4-day "Liberation Festival" was inaugurated by a speech from General Nagib in which he announced the formation of a Liberation Front to replace the political parties dissolved on Jan. 16.

Jan. 25: A decree was adopted which would empower the Government in the event of war, threat of war, or international tension, to proclaim a state of general mobilization, to call up reserve officers, to direct persons employed in public utilities or industries related to defense, and to requisition essential materials, buildings, and transport.

Feb. 2: The Government concluded an agreement with the Soviet-dominated Government of East Germany on the exchange of \$11,200,000 worth of goods. Under the agreement Egypt would send East Germany cotton, manganese ore, and phosphates in exchange for fertilizers, agricultural machinery, printing presses, and cardboard.

Feb. 12: The Cabinet accepted from a French firm a bid of £E 10,141,000 for the Aswan hydroelectric scheme.

Feb. 15: The West German trade delegation left without concluding any agreement with the Government.

Feb. 23: The Government signed an agreement for technical assistance with the U.S. Government.

India

(See also Kashmir Problem)

1952

Dec. 1: Technical experts from India, Pakistan, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened discussions for the purpose of settling disputes over water rights.

Dec. 12: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to continue as President of the Congress Party for another term.

Dec. 19: It was announced that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had granted a loan of \$31,500,000 to the Indian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., to help in the implementation of its 5-year scheme for increasing blast furnace capacity.

It was announced that the Government would establish an Andhra State consisting of the Telugu-speaking areas of the State of Madras, but not including the city of Madras.

Dec. 29: The Government signed an agreement with the United States for a malaria control project. The U.S. would contribute \$5,200,000 to its cost, and India, Rs. 14,900,000 (more than \$3,500,000).

1953

Jan. 4: Nearly 13,000 teachers in the East Punjab went on strike demanding better pay and allowances.

Jan. 8: It was reported that the Government would nationalize civil aviation and run the airlines as a state-owned enterprise.

Feb. 27: Finance Minister Chintaman Deshmukh presented a budget for the fiscal year, beginning April, 1953, to the lower house of Parliament. Revenue was estimated at \$875,520,000 and expenditure (exclusive of deficit spending) at \$877,620,000. \$399,680,000 was allocated for defense.

Iran

1952

Dec. 17: The draft of a new election law was made public by Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq. It would increase the number of deputies from 136 to 172, and provide for nation-wide elections to be held all in one day. It also would make candidates put up a 20,000 rial (\$625) deposit or present the signatures of 100 supporters when they declare their candidacies.

Dec. 23: Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq issued a decree which restricted foreign diplo-

matic, consular, and other officials to one term of office in Iran, and prohibited their reassignment to posts in Iran and their re-entry into the country. The decree authorized the Foreign Minister to grant exceptions to this ban only when the officials concerned had "worked for the improvement of relations between their countries and Iran," and, even in such cases, only with the consent of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Majlis*. It also provided that foreign consultates in the future could only be opened on the recommendation of the Iranian Foreign Minister, with the approval of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Majlis*.

Dec. 24: Hosayn Makki resigned as legislative member of the Supreme Council of the National Oil Company of Iran in protest against the Council's selection of Dr. Reza Falah as director of the Abadan refinery.

Dec. 28: It was disclosed that all 4 of the legislative members of the Supreme Council of the National Oil Company of Iran had resigned in a dispute over the selection of operating executives.

1953

Jan. 6: Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq won a vote of confidence in the *Majlis* when 64 out of 65 Deputies present gave him their vote.

Jan. 8: Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq requested the *Majlis* for a year's extension of his special powers. As a result Hosayn Makki, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ayatollah Kashani, Speaker of the *Majlis*, tendered their resignations in protest.

Jan. 9: The Supreme Court of Aden ruled that the 900-ton oil cargo of the tanker *Rose Mary* was the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company even though the Iranian Government had nationalized its oilfields.

Jan. 15: The Governments of the United States and Great Britain presented proposals for settlement of the oil controversy to Prime Minister Mosaddeq.

Jan. 18: Ayatollah Kashani, Speaker of the *Majlis*, in a letter read to the Deputies, declared that he could not permit the *Majlis* to consider the plenary powers bill of Prime Minister Mosaddeq as it violated the separation of powers provision in the Constitution.

Jan. 19: After Ayatollah Kashani, Speaker of the *Majlis*, withdrew his opposition to its consideration of Prime Minister Mosaddeq's plenary powers bill, the *Majlis* voted 59 to 1 to extend for 1 year the plenary powers held by Prime Minister Mosaddeq.

Jan. 31: The 25-year Iranian-Soviet fisheries agreement expired and the Government notified the U.S.S.R. that the joint company which had been operating the caviar concession was "automatically dissolved."

Feb. 7: The Government promulgated a law regulating the press. By its terms the Government would have the authority to grant or withhold licenses for publication of newspapers and maga-

zines, prescribe regulations for the journalistic profession, determine qualifications and salaries of newspaper men and suppress publications that it considered a menace to public order and welfare.

Feb. 8: The *Majlis* unanimously approved a bill prohibiting the importation, manufacture, purchase, sale, and use of alcoholic beverages.

Feb. 13: An earthquake devasted the hill village of Turud (northeastern Iran) killing two-thirds of the 1,500 population.

Feb. 14: On application of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company the oil cargo, 4,600 tons, of the Italian tanker, *Miriella*, was impounded by a Venetian court pending final decision as to its ownership.

Feb. 21: It was reported that the United Kingdom had presented new proposals for settlement of the oil dispute and that the U.S. had offered to buy Iranian oil when the compensation question was settled.

Feb. 23: A threatened strike of government employees led Prime Minister Mosaddeq to promulgate a law which would provide severe penalties for striking against the Government, beginning with the forfeiture of one-third of a month's pay for the first offense and ending with dismissal after the fifth offense.

Feb. 28: Demonstrations in favor of the Shah led him to alter his plans for leaving the country. Mobs stormed the house of Prime Minister Mosaddeq and forced him to flee for safety to the nearby headquarters of the U.S. Point Four Administration. An extraordinary session of the *Majlis* was called at which the Prime Minister personally demanded a vote of confidence within 48 hours. Otherwise, he stated, he would "go to the people" in a referendum.

Iraq

1952

Dec. 18: An electoral law providing for direct one-stage elections to take place Jan. 17 was promulgated.

Dec. 21: Prime Minister Nur al-Din Mahmud appointed 3 new Cabinet Ministers as follows:
Nadim al-Pachachi — Economics
'Abd al-Rahman — Communications
Sa'id Qazzaz — Social Affairs

1953

Jan. 17: General parliamentary elections were held.
Jan. 24: The caretaker government of Prime Minister Nur al-Din Mahmud resigned after the first meeting of the new Parliament.

Jan. 29: Gamil al-Madfai was named Prime Minister and he announced the following new Cabinet:
Gamil al-Madfai — Prime Minister
Nuri al-Sa'id — Defense
Ali Jawdat al-Ayoubi — Deputy Prime Minister

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi — Foreign Affairs
Ahmad Mukhtar Baban — Justice
Hussam al-Din Juma'a — Interior
'Abd al-Wahab Murjan — Public Works, Communications

'Abd al-Rahman Jawdat — Agriculture

Dia Jaafar — Economy

Khalil Kanna — Education

Ali Mumtaz — Finance

Majid Mustafa — Social Affairs

Muhammad Hassan Salman — Health

Feb. 7: Muhammad al-Sadr was elected President of the Senate.

Feb. 12: It was announced that a Communist cell had been discovered in Basrah in January, that those arrested would be put on trial before a Military Tribunal on February 16.

Israel

(See also Palestine Problem)

1952

Dec. 1: The Foreign Office protested to the U.S. that U.S. jet aircraft had flown over the Israeli part of Jerusalem.

Dec. 3: It was announced that General Mordecai Makleff had been appointed Chief of the General Staff to succeed General Yigdal Yadin who had retired.

Dec. 8: Itzhak Ben-Zvi was elected as President.

Dec. 18: An agreement was concluded between the leaders of the Mapai and General Zionist parties to form a new Government coalition.

Dec. 22: Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced the following new Cabinet:

David Ben-Gurion — Prime Minister, Defense

Moshe Sharett — Foreign Affairs

Levi Eshkol — Finance

Golda Myerson — Labor

Benzion De-Nu — Education

Peretz Naphtali — Agriculture

Behor Shitreet — Police

Dov Joseph — Minister Without Portfolio

Pinhas Lavon — Minister Without Portfolio

Peretz Bernstein — Commerce, Industry

Israel Rokach — Interior

Joseph Saphir — Health

Yosef Serlin — Communications

Pinhas Rosen — Justice

Dec. 30: A supplementary technical assistance agreement was signed by the Government with the United Nations.

1953

Feb. 9: A violent explosion occurred inside the Soviet Legation.

Feb. 10: Thirty persons were arrested in connection with the bombing of the U.S.S.R. Legation.

Feb. 12: The U.S.S.R. broke off diplomatic relations with the Government.

Jordan

(See also Palestine Problem)

1952

Dec. 27: The Government announced that it had cancelled the concession of the Palestine Potash Company because it had not lived up to the terms of the concession agreement.

1953

Jan. 20: A vote of confidence, 22 to 14, was given to the Government.

Feb. 15: An agreement with Syria on a hydro-electric and irrigation project on the Yarmuk River was signed. Its cost was estimated at \$60 million.

Feb. 17: The Government signed the Arab League agreement on nationality, reciprocal recognition of court sentences, extradition of criminals, and powers of attorneys.

A branch of the U.S. Information Service was opened in Amman.

Feb. 18: An economic and financial agreement was signed with Syria. Among other things the agreement provided for the exchange of agricultural products and locally manufactured goods free of customs duty, and free transit between the two countries.

Kashmir Problem

1952

Dec. 8: India rejected a joint U.S.-British resolution in the United Nations aimed at resolving the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The resolution would have allowed 3,000 to 6,000 armed Pakistani forces in Kashmir on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line and 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side of the line, during a proposed plebiscite.

Dec. 16: Pakistan announced that it was willing to accept India's demand that 28,000 Indian troops remain in Kashmir during a plebiscite, if the forces of Azad (free) Kashmir were also allowed to remain.

Dec. 23: The U.N. Security Council voted to request India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations at once to decide the size of troops to remain in Kashmir during a plebiscite.

1953

Feb. 19: India and Pakistan concluded an unsuccessful 2-week secret conference on the Kashmir question under the auspices of Dr. Frank P. Graham, U.N. Mediator.

Lebanon

(See also Syria)

1952

Dec. 3: It was announced that the Government had dismissed 300 civil employees in an effort to root

out inefficiency and malfeasance in Government departments.

Dec. 7: Municipal elections throughout the country were held.

1953

Jan. 3: Akram Hourani, leader of the dissolved Arab Socialist Party of Syria, Michel Aflaq, leader of the dissolved Renaissance Party of Syria, and Salah al-Baytar, its Secretary, sought political asylum in Lebanon, announcing that they had fled Syria in order to evade arrest.

Jan. 7-10: The border between Lebanon and Syria was closed by the Government of Syria on Jan. 7 and 9, and finally reopened on Jan. 10.

Jan. 12: The Government signed an agreement with the U.S. for technical assistance to agricultural schemes and a statistical survey.

Jan. 26: Representatives of the Government met with representatives of Syria at Shatura in an effort to negotiate an economic agreement to supplant the one that would expire Feb. 4.

Feb. 2: Counter proposals to the draft economic agreement presented to Syria were presented by Syrian representatives at Shatura when discussions were reopened.

Feb. 5: The Government resumed economic discussions with representatives of Syria at Damascus. A Syrian proposal to establish a Joint Council with supra-national economic powers was accepted as a basis for discussion.

Feb. 11: It was announced that the police had arrested 60 members of the Syrian National Party for holding an unauthorized meeting in the town of Margayun and smuggling pamphlets and circulars about their party into Lebanon.

Feb. 12: It was announced that the Government had allocated LL 24,000,000 to finance development schemes.

Feb. 15: The Government accorded women full suffrage rights.

Feb. 17: The Government signed an agreement with the U.S. for technical assistance to the Qassimia River scheme for irrigation and hydroelectric power.

Feb. 19: Attempts of the Lebanese and Syrian Governments to achieve some sort of economic accord broke down in Beirut.

The Government signed an interim commercial treaty with Syria. It would run for 6 months while a permanent agreement was being negotiated.

An agreement was concluded between the Government and the U.S. for a preparatory survey of the Litani River irrigation and hydroelectric scheme.

Libya

1952

Dec. 2: King Idris al-Senussi arrived in Cairo on an official visit.

Dec. 18: Elections to the Municipal Councils of Benghazi, Barce, and Derna were completed.

MOROCCO

1952

Dec. 7, 8: Open rebellion broke out against French rule in Morocco. French troops and policemen laid seige to 2,000 Moroccan workers who barricaded themselves in the Casablanca headquarters of the Moroccan General Labor Confederation. Five thousand people marched on the police station in Casablanca but were turned back by the police who opened fire on them. Later more than 6,000 Moroccans carrying Moroccan independence flags and banners began a march on the European section of Casablanca but were turned back by the police.

The Government prohibited the publication of 4 newspapers published by nationalists.

Dec. 9: One thousand people demonstrated against French rule in Beni Mellal, 100 miles southeast of Casablanca, but were dispersed by French troops.

Five hundred people were arrested for demonstrating against the Government.

Dec. 11: One thousand Moroccans marching toward the European section of Rabat were dispersed by French forces.

It was reported that 100 Moroccans had been arrested for demonstrating against the Government.

Dec. 12: The Government sentenced 167 Moroccans to 1-year prison terms for demonstrating against French rule.

Dec. 13: French authorities stated that all leaders, as well as most of the educated members of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, had been arrested and sent to internment camps in Southern Morocco.

Dec. 17: The Political and Security Committee of the U.N. rejected by a 27 to 25 vote the resolution of the Asian-Arab group which proposed that the U.N. request France to negotiate with the Sultan of Morocco in order "to reach an early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco, the aspirations of her people, and the Charter of the United Nations." The Committee passed, by a vote of 40 to 5, a compromise Latin-American resolution which requested France to negotiate the question but which did not specify with whom the French should negotiate.

Dec. 19: The General Assembly of the U.N. adopted by a vote, 45 to 3, a resolution which expressed "confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, the Government of France will endeavor to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter."

Dec. 29: French authorities removed Moulaz Hassan Ben Ali Quazzani as Pasha of Port Lyautey and forbade him to live in Rabat. The reason given for this action was that he was maintaining contacts with the Istiqlal Party.

1953

Jan. 19: Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef requested of French President Vincent Auriol that negotiations be held on the status of Morocco.

Feb. 13: The French Foreign Ministry announced that France had decided to negotiate with the Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef.

NORTH AFRICA

1952

Dec. 23-25: A meeting of Arab-Asian states (Arab League States, India, Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan) was held in Cairo, at the instance of the Egyptian Government, to discuss the situation in French North Africa. The representatives at the conference unanimously agreed to "protest to the envoys of France in their countries in the terms embodied in the note of the Arab League member states." Their resolution also stated that "the bloc is at the same time anxious over the hesitation of some states to recognize the right of peoples to self-determination and independence, a matter which leads to bloodshed, to disorder, and to human misery. The bloc hopes that France will settle the Moroccan and Tunisian questions in accordance with the United Nations Charter. . . . The members have agreed to consider this meeting as a prelude to another meeting which will be held soon and will be attended by their Premiers if the policy of France makes this necessary."

Pakistan

(See also Kashmir)

1952

Dec. 22: Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin presented to the Constituent Assembly the report of a committee detailed to draw up a draft constitution. The draft constitution, based upon Islamic principles, decreed that the head of the state should always be a Muslim, and provided for a federal legislature consisting of 2 houses, each having parity between East and West Pakistan.

1953

Jan. 5: Fourteen of 15 defendants accused of conspiring to set up a military dictatorship leading to a Communist state were convicted and sentenced by a special court in Hyderabad.

Jan. 8: Communist-led rioting of students took place in Karachi.

Jan. 9: Rioting throughout the day led to the imposition of a curfew.

Feb. 13: The Government accused India of diverting river waters for its own use.

Feb. 27: Ten Muslim religious leaders and more than 700 persons were arrested in Karachi for demonstrating against the Ahmadiya community, a Muslim sect opposed by orthodox Muslims.

Palestine Problem

1952

Dec. 18: A U.N. resolution which proposed direct Arab-Israeli negotiation on the Palestine question was defeated in the General Assembly by a vote of 24 to 21, which was short of the two-thirds vote needed for adoption.

Dec. 28: Because a technical state of war still exists between Israel and the Arab states, the Israeli Government protested to the British Government over the latter's offer to sell military jet airplanes to Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.

Dec. 29: The United Kingdom rejected the protest of Israel regarding the offer to sell jet aircraft to 4 Arab states. The British Foreign Office also stated that it had reminded Israel in November that under the terms of the Tri-partite Declaration of May 25, 1950, the British Government, along with France, and the U.S., guaranteed the *status quo* in the Middle East, and that under the terms of that declaration, it was recognized that the Arab states and Israel needed to maintain "a certain level of armed forces" for the purposes of assuring internal security and self-defense and defending the area as a whole.

1953

Jan. 7: The Israeli Government presented a formal note to the United Kingdom protesting its sale of jet aircraft to Arab states.

Jan. 28: As reported by a U.N. observer, an Israeli force of over 150 men launched "a pre-meditated, concentrated military attack" upon the Jordanian village of Falma, near Tulkarm. The headman, and 10 others of the 70 inhabitants, including women and children, were killed.

Israeli attacks led Jordan to make representations to the United Kingdom and the United States; it invoked its treaty of alliance with the former and demanded that the latter take action in accordance with the Tri-partite Declaration of May, 1950.

The Joint U.N. Jordanian-Israeli Truce Committee declared that an Israeli attack upon the village of Rentees was "a flagrant violation of the Truce," and warned the Israeli authorities to "stop their repeated aggressions" upon Jordanian territory.

Feb. 5: It was announced that the British Government had made "urgent representations" to Israel, at the same time expressing strong disapproval of Israeli raids upon Jordanian territory.

Feb. 14: The United States, through its Ambassador in Jordan, stated that it did not condone in any way Israeli aggressions upon Jordan.

Feb. 17: Diplomatic representatives of 7 Arab states in the United States made representations to the United States that if it heeded the latest request of Israel for "moral and material support" it would be upsetting the *status quo* in the Middle East.

Petroleum

1952

Dec. 15: A U.S. Federal District Court investigating allegations of an international oil cartel granted the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company immunity from producing secret documents located outside the United States.

Dec. 16: The U.S. Federal District Court postponed its inquiry until Mar. 16, 1953, in order to give General Eisenhower's Administration time to decide whether or not it wished to continue the suit against 7 major oil companies and a large number of their subsidiaries.

Saudi Arabia

1953

Feb. 6: An Egyptian military mission arrived on a good-will visit.

Feb. 7: President Camille Shamun of Lebanon arrived on an official visit.

Sudan

1953

Jan. 10: The Umma, National Unionists, Socialist Republicans, and the Nationalist Parties came to an agreement as to the future powers of the Governor-General's Commission and the Parliament.

Jan. 12: The United Kingdom presented a proposed agreement on the Sudan to Egypt.

Feb. 12: An agreement providing for the immediate introduction of self-government in the Sudan and for the exercise of self-determination by the Sudanese people was signed by the United Kingdom and Egypt. Under this agreement elections for a self-governing legislature would be held immediately. The elections would be supervised by a commission of 7 members—3 Sudanese, 1 Egyptian, 1 Briton, 1 American, and 1 Indian. Within a period of 3 years the Sudan would be free to choose between complete independence and association with Egypt.

Syria

(See also Lebanon, and Jordan)

1952

Dec. 9: Dr. Hjalmar Schacht arrived in Damascus at the invitation of the Government to survey the country's economic and financial condition.

1953

Feb. 8: It was disclosed that the Government was demanding increased royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company and Tapline for oil transit facilities across the country.

Tunisia

1952

Dec. 4: Ferhat Hached, general secretary of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (U.G.T.T.) and chief nationalist leader, was murdered.

Dec. 6: Six labor and nationalist leaders were arrested in order to forestall any violence because of the murder of Ferhat Hached.

A 3-day general strike was called by the U.G.T.T.

Dec. 12: The Political and Security Committee of the U.N. voted 28 to 25 against a resolution sponsored by the Asian-Arab group which would have requested France to resume negotiations with the "true representatives of the Tunisian people" regarding the independence of Tunisia. The resolution would also have set up a 3-nation commission to lend "good offices" and assist in the negotiations.

The Committee then approved by a 45 to 3 vote a Latin-American compromise resolution which merely expressed the hope that negotiations would be continued, without specifying who would represent the Tunisians.

Dec. 15: The Resident-General, M. De Hauteclouque, submitted 60 decrees to the Bey of Tunis, Sidi Muhammad al-Amin, for his signature.

Dec. 17: The Bey officially announced through Prime Minister M. Baccouche, that he had decided "irrevocably" not to sign the 2 decrees providing for elected municipal councils with a mixed Franco-Tunisian membership, and rural district councils.

Dec. 20: Yielding to French pressure, the Bey of Tunis signed the 2 decrees he had refused to sign on Dec. 17.

Turkey

1953

Jan. 20: Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü arrived in Yugoslavia for an official visit.

Jan. 26: Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü arrived in Athens on an official visit.

Jan. 28: Admiral Earl Mountbatten, Commander-in-Chief of the N.A.T.O. naval forces in the Mediterranean, arrived in Ankara for official consultations with Turkish statesmen and military leaders.

Feb. 17: The Government held discussions in Ankara with representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia on measures for collective military defense.

Feb. 25: A treaty of friendship and collaboration was concluded between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.

DOCUMENT

For the Successful Struggle for Peace, National Independence, and Democracy We Must Resolutely Turn Toward the Workers and the Peasants

Khalid Bakdash

The following report was delivered before the plenary session of the Central Command of the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon held in January 1951. The Central Command has unanimously approved this report and has charged all committees and organizations (regional committees, branch committees, and cells) to study it and make it the basis of their activity (Beirut and Damascus, 1951). Price 25 piasters (12 cents).

1. Our responsible comrades and command organization have become so engrossed in immediate day-to-day operations that they have forgotten the basic aim of the Party. Stalin has warned against this. [Quotes Stalin's pamphlet *Strategy and Tactics*, Arabic edition, p. 14.]

2. The Party has always firm aims which do not change during the course of a given strategic phase. [Refers to *ibid.*]

3. Our land and party is now in the phase of the democratic national liberation. Our goals in this phase can be summarized as:

a. Putting an end to imperialist political and economic domination and to its agents.

b. Liquidation of the remnants of feudalism in our country.

c. Establishment of a popular democratic regime. Slogans in this phase: Peace, National Independence, and Democracy.

4. When this has been accomplished a new phase will be begun which will require:

a. Strengthening of the popular democratic regime.

b. Creation of conditions necessary for the realization of socialism in the country.

5. Our struggle for these aims is organically blended with the general struggle against the danger of World War III which world imperialism under the leadership of US imperialism is trying to start in order to extend its domination over the whole world.

6. Our job during the present stage is to muster the broad masses and especially the workers and peasants. We must get them to embrace these slogans effectively and prepare for the struggle, to the highest degree, in order to realize them.

a. To bring this about, the principal orientation of our effort and activity must be toward isolating the nationalist bourgeoisie and putting an end to its influence among the people. For this bourgeoisie, no matter how much the names of its parties may vary, uses its influence to deceive the people and turn it away from the revolutionary struggle; it works also for an understanding with imperialism.

7. Is the Party not doing its job, as some of our comrades say, when it (a) broadcasts the above slogans; (b) wages in its publications and demonstrations a relentless struggle against Anglo-American imperialism and its warlike schemes; (c) exposes the treason of the rulers and their subservience to imperialism, the maneuvers of the bourgeois nationalist parties, and moves to isolate them from the people; (d) supports and strengthens the Partisans of Peace movement; (e) struggles for the demands of the workers and peasants and other

* An abridged translation from the Arabic by Harold W. Glidden.

popular masses; (f) strengthens itself and its party organization and mercilessly combats traitorous Titoist elements and expels them from its ranks?

8. This is good, but not enough. It is really only creating the necessary atmosphere for effective action toward the realization of our goals. As Lenin and Stalin teach us the principal force of the patriotic democratic revolution is the working class,¹ and its principal allies in our country are the peasants. Their principal allies abroad are the camps of peace, socialism and democracy led by the Soviet Union (see Stalin, *Strategy and Tactics*, Arabic edition, chapter on Strategic Leadership, p. 9).

a. Other popular groups, such as students, intellectuals, and small merchants, are an important force in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism . . . , but they alone cannot even in the best of circumstances do more than harass imperialism and its schemes and their struggle cannot bear fruit unless it rallies around the struggling working class and marches under its guidance side by side with the masses of peasants.

b. The big landowning classes, the shareholders in imperialist firms, and the big importers and monopolists are by nature allies and servants of imperialism and feel that their future is bound up with it.

c. The rest of the nationalist bourgeoisie (those tied up with national industry and the educated groups and others who represent it intellectually and whose interests often clash with the interests and policy of imperialism) is not a revolutionary class and cannot play a basic, decisive, or guiding role in the struggle against imperialism. But it is possible for it to oppose the schemes of imperialism, and when the popular revolutionary struggle develops and the masses of workers, peasants, and other toilers rise in a mighty violent wave to struggle against imperialism and feudalism it can, in a temporary and limited fashion, and under certain circumstances, happen that some bourgeois nationalist elements may support the revolutionary movement against imperialism. [Quotes Stalin's article "On China" in his book *Marx-*

ism, the National Problem and the Problem of Colonies, French edition, pp. 224, 203.] As Stalin says, we must "prepare the proletariat for the role of leadership in the liberation movement by stripping the bourgeoisie and its representatives, step by step, of this position of honor." (*Ibid.*, p. 206.)

9. The unmasking of the representatives of the big bourgeoisie and their isolation from the people means, first of all, the exposure of the rulers and the big bourgeois parties, like the Populist Party and the Nationalist Party in Syria and the clique of Bisharah al-Khuri, the Edde bloc, Riyad as-Sulh, Kamil Sham'un, and their likes in Lebanon. In addition, we must work to expose the other reactionary parties and organizations led by these rulers and local leaders (*Za'ims*) or directly by imperialism, even though they may be weak. There must be a merciless struggle against organizations such as the Phalanges [Libanaises], whose leadership openly reveals it as one of barefaced nationalist treason and shameless propaganda for support of the wild beasts of American imperialism and their wars and occupationist schemes. Also we must struggle against groups like the "Independents" in Syria who openly call for the complete subjugation of our country to the enslaving war schemes of Anglo-American imperialism. We must work constantly also to unmask groups and parties claiming to be "socialist," such as the Arab Socialist Party, the Islamic Socialist Front, and *Ba'th* [Resurrection] Party in Syria; and the Socialist Progressive Party of Jumblat, etc. in Lebanon . . . , for through their seductive propaganda they constitute a danger to the growing democratic national movement against war and imperialism, feudalism, and exploitation. They try to exploit the increasing popular orientation toward socialism . . . they especially destroy [the effectiveness of our]² slogans of "distribution of the lands of the feudalists and big landowners to the peasants," and they call for the buying-out of foreign companies . . . and the putting of these companies under the control of the reactionary feudalistic government which serves imperialism. This they call "nationalization," etc. They

¹ This passage and all other underscored passages in this translation were underscored in the original text.

² Passages in brackets are clarifications or summaries made by the translator.

also try to prevent the growth of popular sympathy for the world camp of peace and socialism led by the Soviet Union by calling for a so-called "third force" or "neutrality" between the two camps. This, in effect, leads to a breaking up of the wave of hatred and growing struggle (a) against war and the aggressive schemes of the Anglo-American imperialists aiming toward the occupation of our country and (b) against the treason of the rulers.

10. Our party is the party of the working class and represents its interests politically and intellectually; it must assemble in its ranks the revolutionary workers who must constitute its core and backbone. Naturally there will be included also the best elements from among the peasantry, especially the poor ones, and the cream of the educated groups and other elements from among the toilers.

11. Does [our activity] lead with the required speed toward our party's becoming a strong party of the masses among the workers and the peasants, enjoying their confidence and adherence and able to move and muster them for the struggle for our slogans, etc?

a. Errors in the Present General Orientation of the Activity of our Organizations and Some of the Historical Causes Thereof. Our progress among the working class and the peasantry has been very slow and if it continues at this rate it cannot produce the necessary results with the required speed and in conformity with the requirements of the development of the international and home situation. Therefore, in our political and organizational activity and our work among the masses, we must make a fundamental change; it marks a decisive shift which some comrades call a "revolution." In the past the activity of our Party has been distinguished by two things:

(1) Nearly 75 percent of its activity, whether in propaganda, organizing, or daily work, has been confined to petty bourgeois elements in cities and villages on the one hand and selected workers on the other. But the broad masses of workers and fellahin [peasants] have received hardly any attention and have been the object of little of our political and organizing activity. There are town quarters (consisting mostly of petty bourgeoisie)

and villages (likewise consisting principally of petty bourgeoisie, since most of them are medium and small landowners) where the Party works hard and continuously while there are other quarters and centers where workers congregate, as well as villages inhabited by poor fellahin, where there is either no Party activity or only occasional activity.

(2) The main attention of our organizations is directed toward the creation of a lot of sound and fury around the Party and its slogans rather than toward the building-up of bases and foundations among the workers and the masses of the fellahin, especially the poor among them. [It is all very fine to make a big noise, but noise alone has no lasting effect.] The best example of this is the peace movement. Despite our great participation with all of the supporters of peace in the defense of the cause of peace, and in spite of our making a big noise around the slogans of the Partisans of Peace movement, we have not yet succeeded in carrying out our duty to center the peace movement on the firm base of the masses; for in order for the bases to be firm, strong, real, and effective they must rest especially on the masses of workers and fellahin.

(3) How did this situation come about in our Party? This came about for historical reasons connected with the rise and development of our Party:

(a) Like most Communist Parties in extremely industrially backward countries like ours, our Party grew up in a milieu far removed from Marxism — a milieu without any previous traditions of a labor movement or of socialist thought. Therefore, in order to acquaint public opinion with Communist ideas it was obliged to create the greatest possible noise about them. Owing to the circumstances of imperialist domination, feudal tyranny, and the weakness of the class struggle it was natural that this noise should first attract those circles referred to as "enlightened" from among the intellectuals, students, and certain enlightened workers. It was natural also that the Party's activity should turn to having its say in political life and to taking part in the national struggle. It is well known that it attracted elements from among the students, intellectuals, and petty bourgeoisie in general.

Then, as it developed, the Party turned to widening the scope of its propaganda and introducing it into the cities and into a number of villages. Perhaps this may have been justified at the time. But this attention to noise-making and propaganda has continued for too long and has not been accompanied by the necessary effort to build solid foundations for the Party among the workers and fellahin. We are in danger of regarding the noise as an end in itself and not as a means of reaching the masses of workers and fellahin, organizing them and building strong Party foundations among them. . . . This does not mean that we should abandon "noisemaking" or propaganda; on the contrary we must strengthen our propaganda, not as an end in itself but as a means of penetrating the workers and fellahin and strengthening and broadening the bases of the Party among them.

(b) . . . Not all the centers in which the Party developed were centers for bringing together workers and fellahin. Also, as our Party's influence spread and it became a recognized force in the country, and as the popularity of Communist ideas in general increased, especially after the remarkable Soviet victories during and after World War II, it attracted to itself widely-varying types of groups in various villages and cities. But the Party has been able neither to attract these elements which it should attract nor to establish the Party among them. For example, it is well known that the poor fellahin in the villages dominated by feudal tyranny either have not been reached by the light and activity of the Party, or if it has reached them they are prevented by the circumstances of terrorism and tyranny from discussing the Party. The Party, on its part, has not gone to them in their villages, and this is true of the masses of workers as well. . . .

Therefore we can say that (1) the general milieu and atmosphere in which our Party works are not yet proletarian, but are still generally petty bourgeois in character; (2) our effort is not being expended in the circles where it should be expended; and (3) the tendency to make as much noise as possible, without using this noise to build up organized mass foundations for the party among workers

and peasants, especially the poor peasantry, still prevails in the Party.

12. Our Party has the capability and necessary strength to become a party of the masses with strong foundations among the workers and fellahin.

a. The Party is striving now to gather the fellahin into committees and movements representing the masses, not the Party, to defend their immediate mutual demands.

b. Among women, our work has only begun. We must recognize that the influences of the reactionary mentality with regard to women continue to slow down the Party's work among them. . . . Also, bourgeois, imperialistic (American, for example), and anarchical ideas are striving to show women that freedom means the imitating of the bourgeois woman, or American or Western petty bourgeois women in general. Here our Party is fighting on two fronts: (1) against the reactionary view of woman, and (2) against the anarchical bourgeois view of woman.

c. Among our most important successes has been the progress made in working to clarify our theoretical and intellectual position with regard to a number of important questions on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings: the problems of peace and national independence; the democratic national revolution and the transition from it to the struggle for socialism; the role of leadership of the working class; the alliance between workers and fellahin; our position *vis-à-vis* the national bourgeoisie; the meaning of the Communist Party; the meaning of its role of leadership in the revolution, etc.

Our Party has been able to create to some extent a solid regional cadre for most of its organizations and to bring an increasing cadre of workers to the responsible centers. Also, it has improved the work of its command bodies and has rescued the leadership of many organizations from opportunistic, defeatist, and anarchic elements which had infiltrated into these positions of command during the period when the Party was operating openly. [It is now operating clandestinely.] The Party has made perceptible progress in strengthening its intellectual and political unity and has encouraged the exercise of criticism, including self-criticism. It has raised the level of revolutionary aware-

ness and is continuing to cleanse its ranks of saboteurs, sectionalists, and agents of the enemy, including Titoists and other imperialist spies.

Among the most important acts which the Party has carried out has been the uncovering and crushing of the Titoist-imperialist plot which had been building up for some time and which was aiming at the Titoists, those cynical spies of imperialism, securing control of the central leadership of the Party and of the regional leaderships and destroying, liquidating, and changing the Communist Party into a nationalist Titoist bourgeois party taking orders from Anglo-American espionage circles and becoming a bureau for the dissemination of slanders against the Soviet Union and serving the warlike aims of imperialism in Syria and Lebanon, like the Titoist gang in Belgrade . . . All of these have been unmasked as elements of espionage connected with the Anglo-American and Yugoslav legations and with Deuxième Bureau and Sûreté Générale circles in Syria and Lebanon. It is plain that their show of tears over the alleged loss of democracy in the Party and their propaganda against what was called the regime of "dictatorship" in the Party were only hypocritical and intended to create an atmosphere of false, bourgeois, splintering democracy in the heart of the Party in order to make it easier for the spies and traitors to carry out their activities of sabotage in an uncontrolled fashion.

d. The question now before the Party is: either we make this shift (and become the Party of the workers and fellahin, the party of the national democratic revolution, and the party of the socialist revolution), using the forces which we have gathered to direct ourselves decisively toward the workers and peasants and quickly extending these forces, thus becoming a large party of the masses able to carry out its role in the great class and national conflicts; or this shift will not come about and we shall not be able to make good use of the forces we have gathered . . . and our Party will not be able to play its role.

13. We must (a) work with complete faith in the principles of our Party and (b) avoid any compromise that might make it lose prestige or damage it in the eyes of the masses of workers and fellahin.

a. We must reveal to the masses the true face of our Party as the Communist Party, the party of: (1) the democratic national and socialist revolution; (2) peace, national independence, and popular democratic rule; (3) unrelenting hostility toward Anglo-American-French imperialism, its wars, its feudalist agents, the big monopolist bourgeoisie, and the traitorous importers; (4) agricultural reform to guarantee land and water for the fellahin and to give the lands of the feudalists and the big landowners to the fellahin; (5) the unrelenting struggle for the demands of the workers; (6) the confiscation of all public utilities controlled by imperialist capital (petroleum, the bank of issue, railways, electricity, water, the tobacco monopoly, ports, etc.) and their nationalization without compensation to their foreign, thieving, capitalist owners; (7) complete faith in the first homeland of socialism, the Soviet Union, and in its leader, the great Stalin, the teacher of the workers of the world and their guide to the way of national and social liberation; the way of peace, the independence and equality of peoples, and socialism.

b. Some responsible persons in our organizations do not distinguish as they should between the slogans of the Party itself and those of certain popular movements which our Party supports and in which it participates.

For example, it is well understood that the Partisans of Peace is a movement which includes people of different political orientations, creeds, and social levels. Our Party supports and participates in the Partisans of Peace activities, but this does not mean that our views and position on every question are the same as those of the Partisans of Peace. Certain comrades do not understand this clearly; they think that our support of the Partisans of Peace means that we are abandoning certain slogans of ours to which not all the Partisans of Peace agree. This is a serious and disastrous error. We do not and will not attempt to impose all our slogans on the Partisans of Peace movement, but this does not mean that we are giving up these slogans or that we are not struggling for them in the name of our Party, or that we do not call upon the people to embrace them.

Again, we believe that US imperialism

started the aggression in Korea. But some of the Partisans of Peace do not want to go any farther into the discussion and are satisfied to seek a peaceful solution to the Korean question and a withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, without seeking the causes or source of the aggression. We agree with them on a peaceful solution for the Korean question and the withdrawal of foreign troops, but in our press and propaganda we shall continue at every opportunity to reveal the truth — that it is US imperialism which began the aggression.

Further, certain Partisans of Peace might say that "Our country, since the evacuation of the foreign troops, has become independent, especially since it is not bound by any imperialist treaty. But we are with you Communists in refusing to grant the imperialists any military base in our country and in resisting any attempt to use our soil as a center of aggression." We Communists say, "[We are with you in that], but at the same time we shall continue to say in our press and propaganda that . . . this is true only in a legal sense. For the truth is that our country is not independent as long as the American, British, and French imperialists dominate our most important utilities by means of their companies and as long as they also direct the regime in our country through their agents in the regime. . . ."

Again, it may happen that a big feudalist or landowner supports the aims of the Partisans of Peace and signs the Stockholm Appeal, for instance. Our comrades then think that they then should keep silent about the deeds of bestial oppression done by this feudalist against his fellahin or that they should cease advocating the giving of the feudalists' lands to the fellahin in order not to anger this feudalist. They are blackening the face of the Party before the fellahin and are damaging one of its most important slogans with them in order to appease a feudalist. This is entirely unacceptable and there can be no compromise on this point.

Or we might find a bourgeois industrialist who supports some of our democratic slogans. But we must not on that account keep quiet about his atrocious exploitation of his workers or abandon the organizing of the working

class, the principal leading force in the democratic national revolution, in order to appease a member of the bourgeoisie, whoever he may be.

Stalin says: "The united front can have a revolutionary significance only under the circumstances and conditions in which the Communist Party enjoys complete freedom to carry out its political and organizing activity, to organize the proletariat into an independent political force, and to incite the fellahin against the big landowners." (Stalin, *Marxism, the National Question and the Question of Colonies*, French edition, p. 228.)

The line which we should take in elections in Syria and Lebanon is that indicated above: No election agreement which could blacken our face or compromise our slogans with the masses of workers and fellahin. We will support no candidate, however democratic he may claim to be, if this would cause confusion in the ranks of the workers and the fellahin, who are the principal force whether in defeating the imperialist war schemes now or finally putting an end to imperialism and its agents in the future.

For example, it is said that preparations are being made for two electoral lists in the Biqa.³ Certain comrades had the idea of comparing the two lists to see which was "the more dangerous." They said: "There is a list which seems to be based on an appeal for Greater Syria⁴ and among its supporters are people in touch with Amman. Therefore, this is one which is the more dangerous." This position is entirely unsound. Both lists are imperialist and feudal. . . . The leaders of the Phalanges [Libanaises], for example, who have been unmasked as agents of imperialism, may prefer the US treaty scheme to Greater Syria, but we and all our sincere compatriots consider both schemes as constituting a danger of occupation and imperialism and as exposing Lebanon to the danger of destruction by atomic bombs.

Let us take the elections in Tartus,⁵ for

³ The valley in Lebanon between the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon mountains.

⁴ A plan for the unification of pre-World War I Syria under the leadership of the late King Abdallah of Jordan.

⁵ A city in Syria.

example. There were two candidates, one supported by a group of feudalists and the other by another group of feudalists. The first was well known to be a supporter of Anglo-American imperialism, while the other announced that he supported the "third force" and was against any imperialism, whether Western or "Eastern." He plainly called the Soviet Union "Russian imperialism" (exactly like Tito, and it was not by accident that the traitorous Titoists in Syria and Lebanon supported him). The only difference between the two candidates was that the second referred to himself as democratic and called his opponent a "fascist"—but this is a difference in name only. . . . If the so-called "democratic" candidate had been a member of the Populist Party [the government party], who would not have known that the Syrian Popular Party—the party of the "fascist" candidate—is likewise the party of the government? Both parties are in the camp of Anglo-American imperialism and the camp of feudalism.

c. We must establish broad foundations and bases among the workers and fellahin for the Peace movement and for all mass movements and organizations. The principal mass movement at present is the Peace movement. The strength of the movement is not measured by the amount of noise it makes or the number of honorable popular and national personalities it gathers around itself, but by the degree to which it penetrates into and has foundations among the workers and fellahin and the rest of the toiling masses, including the middle class. The main reason the Peace and other mass organizations have not spread or are not firmly based is that they are still confining their activities to petty bourgeois circles and have not paid sufficient attention, in youth and women's activities as well, to the working class and fellahin.

d. Our most important concerns in our work among the workers and in the labor union movement: Our work in the union field must be on a mass basis and in depth. To date it has been confined mainly to the better-paid elements and the rest have been almost entirely neglected. The opportunistic labor leadership, and the imperialist and government spies, and those leading union activity are trying to pre-

serve the *status quo* and limit labor activity to certain limited groups of workers who are better paid than others. The line which the Communist and progressive union strugglers have been following has been helping to perpetuate rather than to change this situation.

While it is true that there are good elements in the direction of existing unions, they are afraid to struggle and are either deceived by the government and imperialist agents or do not wish to anger them, etc. We must endeavor to cooperate with these good elements, but our union comrades must avoid the danger of thinking that this constitutes union activity. Thus it sometimes happens that our union comrades spend long hours in conferences and discussions or efforts with these elements without asking themselves whether these activities are reaching the masses of the workers. At the same time, some of our union comrades think they are spending too much time with the masses of terribly exploited workers, and there are even some who believe that this is not proper for "union leaders." This happens, and we must frankly admit it. This must be changed.

The well known aims of our union activity in depth among the masses are:

- (1) Creation of the unity of the workers . . . for the struggle for their common demands;
- (2) the organizing of unorganized workers and getting them to struggle for their rights and demands;
- (3) the activation of the masses of workers who are members of existing unions and urging them to exercise their union rights, overseeing and participating in their union life, endeavoring to turn them into true class unions, the practicing of union democracy in them, and the unification of the union movement.

The Communist and progressive union struggles must give up outworn traditions based on the belief that their principal or only concern is to endeavor to gain control of the leadership of existing unions without trying to build up among the workers a firm mass basis on which they can depend.

Another thing we must combat and which is nourished by the opportunistic union leaders is the dangerous tendency to mislead the workers belonging to existing unions by making

them believe that every struggle must be carried on solely through the present opportunistic union leaders. The workers must be made to understand that despite the pressure of the union leadership it is their duty to organize themselves and struggle directly for their demands. . . .

Our responsible union comrades must understand that it is the Party organizations which give the general direction to union activity and that they [the union comrades] are responsible for carrying out these directives, studying the details of union life, and finding solutions for given problems. [This is true also for our comrades working in all other mass movements and organizations.] [Quotes Stalin on this point.]

There are sometimes two tendencies, both of which are mistaken: Some of our union comrades expect that the solution to every union problem will come to them from the responsible bodies of the Party—in other words, that the Party committees should be turned into union committees or "administrative committees" for the unions. This would mean (a) the liquidation of the Party's role as the political leader of the people and its being turned into a union organization; and (b) sacrificing the higher class interest of the workers, which is represented in the Communist Party's struggle for peace, national independence, and socialism, for immediate or union interests. The second mistaken tendency is the belief of some of our union comrades that they do not need to direct the Party bodies and oversee them in the field of union activity. This also means the denial of the Party's role as leader, for it is the highest form of organization and the one which is charged with the direction and control of all other types of organization, including union. [See Stalin's pamphlet *The Party*,⁶ Arabic edition.]

[Union activity is only one phase of Communist activity among workers.]

We must also combat the "trade-unionist" mentality, the mentality of defeatism, opportunism, etc. [Here quotes Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, p. 783, on the role of the working class as the liberators of humanity from capitalism and war.]

Communist members of unions must carry out all their other duties as members of the Communist Party; they must disseminate the Party's slogans and policy among the masses of workers and spread Marxist-Leninist ideas among them. They must strive to introduce the best elements among the workers into the Party and establish cells and Party organizations in factories and in places where workers gather. They must attract the masses of workers to the movement for the defense of peace and for the struggle against war, [against] the return of foreign occupation to our country, and [against] its use in the warlike schemes of the imperialists. They must link the economic struggle with the struggle against war and imperialism. They must try to attract the masses of workers to the struggle for peace, national independence, popular democratic rule, and socialism and must strive to head and lead the entire popular struggle in the direction. . . . For this reason the Central Command has given clear instructions that it is the duty of every union struggler . . . to be a member of some Party body in conformity with his position and level (this is true also of comrades struggling in all the mass organizations and movements.)

We continually strive to create a cadre of workers for all types of command bodies of the Party. . . . This is a political, intellectual, and theoretical struggle and the union struggle is only one part of it.

Another wrong idea is that the Communist workers think they represent the working class in the Communist Party and in other Party bodies. The truth, however, is that they represent the Communist Party among the workers. . . . The representative of the workers is the Communist Party as a whole, for it is the party and vanguard of the working class. . . . Every member of it . . . represents the working class and its higher interests based on the struggle for peace, independence, democracy, and socialism.

14. Our objectives in working among the fellahin. Work among the fellahin requires clarity in the Party's position *vis-à-vis* the various groups of which the rural population is composed. At present, however, this clarity is not easy to attain since we have little ex-

⁶ Ch. 8 of his *Foundations of Leninism*.

perience in working in the rural areas and have little knowledge of the subject. But it is possible, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings and by relying on general knowledge and the few known statistics, to delineate our theoretical position with regard to the cause of the fellahin of our country and indicate the principal outlines of our position with regard to these groups.

The reactionary rural class, or that in which the remnants of the Middle Ages are represented, is that of the feudalists and big landowners. Along with the big urban monopolists tied up with imperialist foreign capital, it constitutes the principal support and ally of imperialism in our country.

This class is made up of feudalists who own wide expanses of land and exploit the toiling fellahin on their lands, in most cases by feudal methods known as "share-cropping" [*muhāsa-sah*] (or giving them a percentage of the crop — a fourth, a fifth, etc.); and of big landowners who likewise possess large areas of land (either owned outright or on a long-term lease), except that these have begun to pursue mostly capitalistic means of exploitation; *i.e.*, they hire agricultural laborers on a daily or monthly basis or for a fixed wage for a year or at any rate some definite period. [This wage is usually made up of a sum of money plus a fixed amount of the crop.] There are also landowners who employ both the feudal and the capitalistic methods of exploiting their extensive lands.

This is the class which we want to eliminate from the rural areas when we say that the goal of the phase of the national democratic revolution which our country is facing is to put an end to the domination of imperialism and the liquidation of the remnants of feudalism. It is the lands of this class that we demand be given to the fellahin.

Against this class we must and can marshal all the masses of the fellahin, and this is what we mean when we say that the program of preparing our forces in the democratic national liberation stage is the alliance of the working class with the fellahin. (See Stalin, *Strategy and Tactics*, Arabic edition.)

However, our position *vis-à-vis* all the groups which make up the masses of the fellahin is not the same. The term "masses of the fellahin"

does not mean, however, that the fellahin constitute a homogeneous group, and our Party has a definite position *vis-à-vis* each one of these groups. The details of our position with regard to each of these groups will be determined after study and experiments which will be carried out by our Party organizations and especially by our comrades struggling among the fellahin . . .

But on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings we can divide the masses of fellahin into three major groups: (1) the poor fellahin, or as Lenin says, "the toiling and exploited rural masses"; (2) the middle class fellahin; and (3) the wealthy fellahin.

The first group is composed of: (1) The agricultural proletariat or the workers who gain their livelihood by working for wages on agricultural undertakings (whether they are hired on a yearly or daily basis or for a fixed wage for a fixed period). This class, although not very numerous in our country, is continuously increasing; Lenin says that "The organizing of this class in all its branches and the carrying out of widespread propaganda in it is a basic duty of the Communist Parties." (2) The "semi-proletarians," as Lenin calls them; in our country they are the share-croppers on the lands of the feudalists as well as those who exploit a small piece of land (which they may either own or lease) which, however, is not sufficient to support their families, for which reason they work also for wages in agricultural or industrial enterprises. (3) Those who have a small plot of land (which they either own or lease) sufficient to support their families and which they can work without having to hire help.

These are the groups which, as Lenin says, constitute the majority of the rural inhabitants in all capitalist countries.

These three rural groups are the basic force of the national democratic revolution and will in the future form the main force upon which our Party will rely in the rural areas in the struggle for socialism.

Regarding the middle class fellahin, it is important to distinguish them because it often happens that our comrades confuse them with the wealthy fellahin (or kulaks), which is a very dangerous thing.

By "middle class fellahin" we must under-

stand, from the economic standpoint, the small cultivators who: (1) likewise possess a small amount of land, either outright or leased for a fixed period; however, this land, in addition to supporting his family, under the capitalist system provides him at least in the best years with a surplus which he can turn into capital; (2) usually have from one to three hired hands (Lenin, *Selected Works*, p. 755).

Thus the middle class fellahin, by virtue of their economic position, are a great allied force in the struggle against feudalistic imperialism. But this economic position itself will in the future cause them to hesitate between the bourgeoisie and the working class in the struggle for socialism. The more we work today to defend their demands against the government and the feudalists and to draw them into the national democratic struggle for peace, national independence, and democracy, the easier will it be in the future to prevent them from joining the bourgeoisie against the working class.

It clearly results from the words of Lenin that it is not the amount of land which determines whether a fellah is small, middle class, or wealthy; this is decided by what the land produces . . .

The wealthy and the big fellahin (or kulaks, as our strugglers in the rural areas are accustomed to call them), are described by Lenin thus: "The big peasants are, in agriculture, capitalist exploiters. As a rule they have a number of hired laborers. The only thing that relates them to the peasant masses is the low level of their culture, their way of life, and the fact that they themselves work with their hands on their own holdings. They are the most numerous of the bourgeois groups which are frankly and determinedly hostile to the revolutionary proletariat. Therefore, it is the duty of the Communist Parties working in the rural areas to devote the greatest attention to the struggle against these social groups in order to remove the majority of the toiling and exploited rural population from the intellectual and political influence of these exploiters" (Lenin, *Selected Works*, p. 787). . . .

These rich fellahin are the rural bourgeoisie, the "notables" of the countryside. Of course, the struggle to put an end to imperialism and feudalism does not touch them directly or

directly threaten their exploitation. The confiscation of their lands is not an immediate objective of the working class, even after victory in its socialist revolution.

Nevertheless, these exploiters are like the national bourgeoisie in the cities; they will be overwhelmed with fear when they see the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism, for they feel their class kinship with the feudalists and the big landowners. However, this does not deny that at least some of them might support the national democratic struggle against feudalism and imperialism when it develops and rises. But it is a bad mistake to consider them (or their colleagues, the national bourgeoisie in the cities) as one of the effective national democratic revolutionary forces. On the contrary, even in the best of circumstances they represent a narcotic force which works to turn the masses of toiling fellahin from the path of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

Our objective now is to isolate them and eliminate their influence among the masses of fellahin. This is a delicate matter which requires a great deal of flexibility, experience, and reliance on events which will convince the fellahin by example and experience. It is a difficult matter but is vital and necessary, particularly since the rich fellahin, or rural bourgeoisie, are a numerous group and widely scattered throughout the rural areas. They have many ways of deceiving the fellahin and bringing them under their influence. To win these fellahin over to the working class will require persistence and patience and a courageous and bold struggle to defend the demands of the masses of toiling fellahin.

The establishment and activity of the Communist Party in the rural areas. As is well known, the core of our Party in the city must be the workers, though at the same time we accept all honest toiling elements from all groups of the people . . . Lenin says that "The urban proletariat, the industrial proletariat, will doubtless constitute the central core of our Party, the socialist democratic party of the workers. . . . But we must attract to our Party and must educate and organize all workers and all those who are exploited, as stated in our program, without

exception. . . ." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, French edition, p. 542.)

Thus in the rural areas we will receive into our Party all honest toiling and exploited revolutionary elements, or all Communist elements, whether from the workers, the fellahin, the intellectuals, the students, the artisans, etc. But we must now make sure that the core of our Party in the rural areas, or the principal core in the composition and creation of our Party organizations in the rural areas, is made up of the best and most aware element of the poor fellahin, the agricultural workers, the semi-proletarianized, and the small fellahin. These are the ones who suffer the worst exploitation and oppression by the feudalists, the big landowners, and the government. Likewise, in the cities our activity must be directed primarily toward the masses of the workers . . . [On this point quotes Lenin, *Selected Works*, French edition, vol. 1, pp. 541-542]. . . .

Lenin says that what we require in the rural districts is "Socialist democratic (*i.e.*, Communist or Party organization) committees everywhere in every village. They must reach an understanding with all democratic revolutionary elements, groups, and peasant circles with the object of establishing revolutionary committees. There is a complete similarity here to the independence of the socialist democratic workers' (*i.e.*, Communist) party in the cities and its alliance with all revolutionary democrats." (Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 542.)

The separation between the rural Party organizations and the mass organizations which the Party works to establish among the fellahin is something which is necessary and very important. Here it is worthwhile to consider carefully the following words of Lenin: "We do not believe that there should be socialist democratic peasant (or Communist Party) committees, since if they are socialist and democratic (or Communist) they are then not purely peasant. And if they are peasant, they are not purely proletarian and are not socialist-democratic (or *i.e.*, Communist)." (Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 541.)

Therefore, by "rural party organizations" we mean . . . that these should not be merely organizations of fellahin, but should take in all exploited toiling elements which embrace

Communism — workers, fellahin, intellectuals, teachers, etc. In the case of "organizations and mass movements of the fellahin," we mean that these mass organizations and movements must be peasant in character, *i.e.*, composed of the peasants themselves, with the aim of struggling for their immediate demands against the government and the feudalists. This is very important, since our comrades in a certain rural district misunderstood this distinction, and when they were told to strive to organize mass movements or organizations of fellahin under the name of "The Salvation of the Fellah" or other names to struggle for the immediate demands of the fellahin they began to constitute in the city a committee composed of intellectuals and other elements and called it "The Committee for the Salvation of the Fellah." They did not understand that the main aim of fellah organizations is to organize the fellahin themselves and attract their broad masses to the struggle for their demands against the feudalists and the government.

The mass movements and organizations among the fellahin are one form of cooperation between Communists and non-Communists. Communists must participate in them with all sincerity and must be the moving force in them . . . and by example must convince the masses of fellahin that the Communist Party is the best and boldest defender of their demands. . . .

This is no place to enumerate all the immediate demands of the fellahin. They must be delineated and the fellahin must be marshaled around them according to the conditions prevailing in each district. But we must understand that we are not to be satisfied only with demands against the government, such as the prohibition of forced labor, beating, and torture; the lightening of taxes; the opening of roads; the provision of medical services for rural districts; the provision of water and light; the opening of schools; etc. We must give great attention to demands against the feudalists and big landowners. Here we must not only repeat the slogan of the confiscation of their lands and giving them to the fellahin . . . , but we must also rally the masses of fellahin around other immediate demands directed against the feudalists and big land-

owners. Such demands, for example, would be those for an increased share of the harvest for sharecroppers on the feudalists' lands, etc. . . .

This report lays down the general lines along which we must work among the fellahin. But our organizations charged with working in the rural areas and our strugglers specializing in working among the fellahin must remember that among their most important objectives is the study of the situation and sharing in clarifying the various political and organizational problems arising from work among the fellahin. . . .

The experiences of the Bolshevik Party and the Chinese Communist Party teaches us that success in work among the fellahin is not only possible, but is a main prerequisite for the success of our Party and its cause.

Since the national bourgeoisie in our country has come to power, it has accomplished nothing for the fellahin. It has scattered about notions which its propaganda has taken great pains to spread among the fellahin, but the hopes which some had pinned on the so-called "national regime" have been disappointed. The fellahin have received neither land nor freedom; feudal oppression has not lessened, but has even increased in some areas. The objective now is that the fellahin should understand through their own experience that the sole avenue of escape open before them, the only avenue for their taking-over of the land, is that of an alliance between the fellahin and the working class. This is the way of the national democratic revolution, of the struggle to put an end to imperialist domination and to the remnants of feudalism in our country. This is the way laid out by the Communist Party.

This objective can be fully attained — without any reservation and without any doubt.

15. "After the laying-down of the political line, organizational work is that which will decide everything" (Stalin).

[Quotation expanding on this from Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, French edition, p. 499.]

Steps which must be taken to accomplish this desired shift toward the workers and peasants:

(a) The position of our Party organizations and command bodies in their activities at present.

(1) Propaganda. We do not always remember in our written propaganda that we are writing primarily for workers and fellahin and that we must write so as to make the Party's policy comprehensible to their deep and wide masses. Even more, our organizations do not think of making our propaganda reach especially the masses of workers and peasants. For example, our newspapers and leaflets are distributed in a general fashion without special measures to see that they reach factories, gathering places of workers, and the masses of poor fellahin.

(2) The distribution of the cadre likewise proceeds in a haphazard fashion, without any serious effort to devote most of our forces and our best cadre to activity among the workers and peasants. Likewise, when creating cadres we do not remember that above all it is necessary to create cadres of workers and fellahin.

(3) The command bodies of the Party do not devote the major part of their attention and effort and the activity of their members to strengthening and expanding activity among the workers and peasants.

For example, we find a Regional Committee devoting only one day a week to dealing with the problem of activity among the workers. In the city, our main effort should be among the workers. Another Regional Committee, within the sphere of activity and responsibility of which there is a large rural area, has hardly held one meeting a month for the consideration of work among the fellahin. This subject was left almost entirely to the comrade in the Regional Committee who was charged with the supervision of this field.

The Regional Committees usually think only within the framework of the situation and activities of existing branch committees and cells. . . . But they do not consider whether the activity being carried on by these branch committees and cells will effectively lead to strengthening the Party among the workers and fellahin. . . . They do not think of creating anything new. This is absolute slavery to the haphazard development of the Party and to routine. It is the same with the branch committees and the cells. Many of these observations apply to the Central Command also.

We need the following:

(a) All our activities must lead in the first place to the strengthening of our Party politically and organizationally among the workers and fellahin. In an election campaign, for example, our aim should be to marshal the masses for the struggle for peace, against the enslaving warlike imperialist schemes directed against our country, the publicizing of the responsibility of Anglo-American imperialism for kindling the fires of a terrible third world war, unmasking the treason of the rulers, etc. But by "marshaling the masses," we mean first of all the masses of workers and fellahin, which is the basic force in this struggle. For the principal gauge of our success in any electoral campaign is the degree of our success in spreading our policy among the masses of workers and fellahin; in organizing them for the struggle for peace, national independence, and democracy; and in building and expanding solid foundations for our Party among them. This holds true also for all or most of the various political campaigns which we carry out.

(b) We must improve and expand our propaganda (newspapers, leaflets, various publications, etc.). Naturally, the most important thing in our propaganda is the unmasking of the lies and deceptions with which the imperialists cloak or justify their criminal attempts to cast the world into the furnace of a third world war; the unmasking of their aggressive acts against Korea and China and everywhere else in the world; explaining the policy of peace of the Soviet Union and the popular democracies and their efforts to build peacefully and set up plans leading to the continual improvement of the life of the popular masses, etc. We must expose also the deceptions with which the rulers attempt to cloak their policy leading to the execution of the Anglo-American military schemes in our country and all the Middle East; we must deal with the misery and oppression which our people suffer in the towns and villages as a result of this policy, and we must describe the struggles of the workers, the fellahin, and the use of the popular masses against war and government and feudal oppression and against monopoly and exploitation, etc. . . . This must be done so that the masses of workers

and fellahin can easily understand it. But we must strive especially to see that the Party's publications and leaflets, and particularly its central newspaper reach the masses of workers and fellahin. We must also issue periodical and non-periodical bulletins, especially for the workers and the fellahin.

It will be the duty of the regional newspapers to deal with the affairs of the workers and the fellahin, their demands and their struggles; this should not be the exclusive concern of bulletins devoted to workers and fellahin. They must not be confined to economic, labor, or fellah problems alone, but should deal also with the general policy of the Party in proper terms.

Every Regional Committee must concern itself with publishing its regional newspaper and continually strive to improve it and secure the participation in it of an ever-increasing number of those who struggle with the pen. It must establish correspondents in every city and village and in general all our newspapers and periodicals must concern themselves with the letters which they receive and with comments by readers. We must also deal in our press with certain questions concerning the Party itself (naturally with the regard to security in times of clandestine activity). . . .

Finally, we must get rid of this lack of concern for regional newspapers, which we strangely find among certain members of the Regional Committees themselves. We must understand that regional newspapers are a powerful weapon in the hands of the Party.

(c) Activity among the workers and the fellahin must not be carried on by only one or two comrades in the various responsible committees. It frequently happens that when work is distributed in a Party body one comrade is charged with working among the workers or the fellahin and the concern of the Party body ends there. From time to time, the comrade responsible for the workers or the fellahin is requested to make a report on his field of activity; the success or failure is "recorded" and that is the end of it. Specialization is needed, for one of the points of greatest weakness in our Party activity in general is the lack of specialists. The error is that in such an important field as this activity is left to one

or two comrades. Even more, it happens that the Regional Committee does not consider itself responsible for success or deficiencies in this field, but all responsible committees must understand that they are. For our political, mass, propaganda, and organizational activity must be directed so that it ensures, first of all, on the one hand the penetration of mass activities among the workers and fellahin, and on the other the strengthening of the Party bases and foundations among them. This work among the workers and fellahin must be carried on by all Party bodies; this includes our student comrades, who in addition to their activity in the vital and important student field must assist in the Party political, educational, and organizational work among the workers and fellahin.

Finally we must once and for all abandon the idea that activity among the workers should be solely of a union nature. . . . The Regional and other committees in addition to overseeing and directing the activity of the union strugglers, must work to set up foundations and bases of the Party among the workers and impel the Party organization as a whole (cells and branches) to work toward this end. At the same time they must endeavor to invent and carry out by all ways and means [by means of a cadre chosen from each organization] the establishing of Party cells in factories and workers' meeting places, etc. (The same is true for villages.)

(d) We must work in all mass movements and organizations . . . , side by side with the Partisans of Peace, in the movement for the defense of peace. This should not be left entirely to one member of the responsible Party bodies; these latter are collectively responsible for the progress of these matters and such progress must continually be controlled.

(e) Organizational work, or that which is concerned with the internal life of the Party or the life of the organizations, whether in its leadership or in its foundations which are in the life of the cells and branches . . . must be directed toward the workers and fellahin. For example, there is not the least doubt that we will preserve our present centers in quarters and *sugq* [markets] and among the

intellectuals and students, etc. and that we will work to strengthen, extend, and activate these centers. But these centers . . . must at the same time be a source for the cadre — a source of the necessary forces to strengthen and expand activity among the workers and fellahin. . . . But we must look upon the Party, not in every city and region alone, but in the whole country, as a unity and distribute and arrange our forces on this basis. In this connection we must combat tendencies toward narrow "provincialism" which does not look beyond its quarter or city . . . For such tendencies prevent the expansion and development of the Party and are among the effects and remnants of the feudal and guild mentality which contradict the meaning of the single homeland and in a notorious fashion contradict the meaning of internationalism! How can this be accepted by Communism, the model, sincere nationalism and the broad and exalted internationalism? [Quotes attacks by Lenin and Stalin on this "localism" and from Lenin's [sic] *History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union*, Arabic edition, Ch. 2 — "The Principles of Party Organization," p. 17.] . . .

In a word, we must remind the Regional and various responsible Party committees that their main concern, as far as the organization of the Party goes, is: (a) the strengthening of the Party organizations now existing among the workers and in places where the poor fellahin are numerous; (b) the creation of new organizations (cells) in workers' centers in which we do not as yet have cells, and in the rural areas, especially those in which the poor fellahin element is numerous; (c) the creation, education, and promoting of a cadre of workers and poor fellahin.

[Calls for more self-criticism. Quotes Molotov's *Stalin and the Stalinist Leadership*.] We must by no means water down or desist from criticism or self-criticism, for fear of hurting our comrades' feelings, especially those of the responsible strugglers. The practise of criticism and self-criticism must become a habit and a law in our Party. [Quotes Stalin, *To Create a Bolshevik*, Arabic edition, pp. 64-65.] By doing this we not only improve our activity but also uncover elements who are trying to sabo-

tage and divide, as well as enemy agents sent by the imperialists and government espionage circles to strike at the Party from within. The reason for this is that the revolutionary awakening . . . is above all a political problem. While it is true that attention to a man's past, his surroundings, his milieu, his relations, the manner of his life, his character, and morals, etc. is necessary, this alone does not suffice as a basis for the revolutionary awakening. The principal basis of the revolutionary awakening is attention to the line and mass activity of the Party, its policy, and vigilance in carrying it out, coordination between covert and overt work, control of its execution, zeal for the building-up of the Party and the carrying out of the principles of its organization, etc. . . . These are the means which assist in uncovering wreckers and enemies who have penetrated into the Party or which at least limit their damage and make it hard for them to carry out their destructive work. [Cites example of the Czarist spy Malinowski in the Bolshevik Party in Russia; from Lenin's "*Left-Wing*" Communism, an Infantile Disorder.]

16. There are therefore three things which we must do:

a. The Central Command must improve its leadership and guidance in the political, organizational, and educational fields of activity. At the same time it must expand the sphere of responsibility and the spirit of adventure and initiative among the Regional Committees. The Regional Committees must do the same thing with regard to the Branch Committees and the cells. We must put an end to the present situation whereby each Party body, from the cell up, believes that its duty is to wait for instructions from the body above it, and whereby each body expects the solution to its problems to come from the next highest body. . . . Otherwise this will never become a mass party with strong foundations among the workers, fellahin, and the rest of the toiling masses.

b. We must follow a bold, consistent, and studied policy in promoting the cadre (with due regard to preserving the clandestine circumstances of our activity); otherwise it will be difficult for us to reach the great objectives which face us. . . . But the promotion of the

cadre must be on sound criteria. . . . The recruitment of stragglers must not be solely on the basis of how much they have done, . . . but likewise on the basis of their political character and with regard to their development and their future.

Many of our responsible comrades of all ranks think that by the promotion of the cadre is meant the selection of comrades to lighten the load of work from themselves and help in furthering current activities. They do not regard the cadre as a force whose object is to lead and build up the Party, as a force on which the future of the Party depends. This is an erroneous and dangerous attitude. The cadre must be looked at simultaneously from both the political point of view and the point of view of its efficiency in action. [Quotes Stalin, *To Create a Bolshevik*, Arabic edition, pp. 54-55.] . . .

c. From top to bottom we must work to develop theoretical education work in the Party. This is the personal duty of every comrade, every cell, and every responsible body, and of course of the Central Command in the first degree. We must clearly understand that most of our difficulties, the shortcomings on our work, and our lack of progress, in relation to the possibilities and the readiness of the people, stem from the weak educational, intellectual, and theoretical level in our ranks. [Quotes Stalin, *To Create a Bolshevik*, Arabic edition, pp. 43-44.]

It is true that publications in Arabic on theory are scarce among us, but it cannot be denied that we now have an Arabic library of translated Marxist-Leninist publications which can be the basis of theoretical education to a great extent. We have the *History of the Bolshevik Party* entirely in Arabic in 12 fascicles each of which contains one chapter; this should ensure its study and circulation. We have also several categories of Leninist problems: *Strategy and Tactics*,⁷ *The Party*,⁸ *The Peasant Problem*,⁹ *The National Problem*,¹⁰ etc. We have *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* by Stalin, and *The Communist Mani-*

⁷ Chapter 7 of Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism*.

⁸ Chapter 8 of same.

⁹ Chapter 5 of same.

¹⁰ Chapter 6 of same.

festo of Marx and Engels;¹¹ Marx's *Wages, Prices, and Profits*; a translation of *The Life of Comrade Stalin*; Stalin's Speeches and Declarations during and after World War II, etc., etc. These publications, even though they are only a small part of what we need, can, if they are usefully studied and taught in the Party in an organized fashion, be a basis for giving our strugglers some elementary information which can help orient them in their thought and activity. In addition, there are the articles taken from *For a Lasting Peace*; *For a People's Democracy* and which are issued by us as "selections" [muqtatafat]. If they are likewise carefully studied in Party

circles they can enlighten our comrades on developments in the world situation and on a great number of problems concerning the Party and its policy, problems of Party building and organization, etc.

But our comrades do not make the necessary effort to benefit from these publications. The unfortunate fact is that the responsible members of the Party usually give the excuse that they are too busy for theoretical education. But this cannot be accepted — the necessary time for study must be found. . . . We must understand thoroughly that if we do not deal with the problem of theoretical education and make it a normal and continuing thing in Party life alongside our endeavor continually to increase the number of Arabic-language Marxist-Leninist publications, we shall never make any progress. . . .

¹¹ This and the following work by Marx were published by the People's Publications Bureau in Beirut and Damascus in 1947.

ECONOMIC REVIEWS

The Beginnings of Point IV Work in Iran

Franklin S. Harris

THE TECHNICAL collaboration program carried on by the United States government in various countries has gone through an interesting evolution. The idealism that has usually characterized this "land of the free" has led naturally into the concept that one nation might be "its brother's keeper" in certain situations where the welfare of each nation was at stake.

A number of years ago the American Congress authorized appropriations to carry on technical assistance in countries of Latin America, but this aid was restricted to the Western Hemisphere. The idea that technical assistance might well become world wide was voiced by President Truman as point four of his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949. Accordingly known as Point IV, the Act for International Development, passed on June 5, 1950, provides for the expenditure of United States government funds in countries which have applied for this assistance.

Since the close of World War II, it has become evident that because of the location of Iran, its resources, and the financial condition of the people, that land is one of the most critical areas in matters affecting world peace and security. It is not necessary at this time to discuss reasons for this situation. We assume that all who are familiar with the international scene will concede the critical nature of Iran, which has played so many important roles since Cyrus the Great conquered Babylon nearly 2500 years ago.

All who are informed regarding conditions in the Middle East are aware of the help that the countries there might derive from the technical advances of the modern world. These

factors formed the basis for the selection of Iran as a country with which to carry on technical collaboration. The present article outlines the steps by which this cooperative effort came to its present rather satisfactory working arrangement.

SIGNING THE AGREEMENT

The signing, on October 19, 1950, of the agreement between the governments of Iran and the United States to engage in technical collaboration under the Point IV program was the first agreement to be signed under this legislation. A large number of officials of both countries witnessed the signatures and everyone present had the feeling that this historic occasion presaged a new era of cooperation and inaugurated a period of active collaboration that would be of tremendous benefit to each country.

The agreement provided that the cooperative projects should be directed by a seven-man commission, designated as "The Iranian-United States Joint Commission for Rural Improvement," which first met the day the agreement was signed. The personnel of the Commission was to consist of four Iranians and three Americans, with the Chairman being Minister of Agriculture, Ibrahim Mahdavi. The other Iranian members were to be the Minister of Health, Dr. Jehanshah Saleh; the Minister of Education, Dr. Seyid Shamseddin Jazayeri; and the Director-General of the Seven-year Plan Organization, Dr. Muhammad Nakkai. The head of the American group was the United States Ambassador, Henry F. Grady, who was to name the other two American

♦ FRANKLIN S. HARRIS, formerly President of the Utah State Agricultural College, was the first Technical Director of the Commission for Rural Improvement in Iran.

members, (Dr. Robert M. Carr and Mr. C. Edward Wells, both of the Embassy Staff).

THE TECHNICAL STAFF

At this first meeting the author was elected as Technical Director of the Commission and Professor Hoyt J. B. Turner was made Supervisor of Field Activities. The former had previously been President of the Utah State Agricultural College and, eleven years previously, had spent a year in Iran as Agricultural Adviser to the Iranian government under the administration of Reza Shah Pahlevi. Professor Turner had been a member of the faculty of the University of Georgia and had had several years of experience in cooperative work in China and South America.

They had been sent to Iran several months earlier by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the United States Department of Agriculture as a mission of technical collaboration between Iran and the United States. Their activities in Iran had been somewhat informal pending the signing of a definite agreement.

The Joint Commission early announced a policy of working on the village level rather than confining its efforts to advising higher officials in the various Ministries. For a long time Iran has used the services of numerous foreign technical experts in many of its government departments. Too often these specialists had confined their activities to the departments, where they had been in touch with only the higher officials. They rarely went into the field, where the real problems are found and where the solutions must ultimately be made.

The files of the various Ministries were full of learned reports by foreign experts who gave advice to the government on every phase of its activities, but usually nothing was done to put the recommendations into operation. Frequently, this resulted from the fact that no funds were available to implement the suggestions that had been offered. Money had been found to make a survey and to pay for the report, but nothing was available for actual operations.

In many cases no action was taken because of a change in administrative officials, a phenomenon not peculiar to Iran. Rather than

give their predecessors credit for doing something the new ones might hire experts of their own to prepare recommendations which they could embody in their own programs.

With a knowledge of these facts in mind, it is not difficult to understand why this Commission, made up of four capable Iranian officials of high rank, and three Americans intent on spending United States funds wisely, established a policy of using the Point IV funds to aid directly the people who are in need.

The Technical Director and the Field Supervisor were instructed to select a limited number of villages that could serve as demonstration centers for larger surrounding areas. Obviously it would be impossible to work in all of the 40,000 villages of Iran, or even to visit all of them. It was thought, therefore, that from certain strategically located key centers the demonstrations could radiate to surrounding villages.

THE FIRST VILLAGE

The first village to be selected as a demonstration center was Isfahanak, a few miles from Isfahan, the great industrial and artistic center of Iran. Not far from the center of the country, the area is served by the Zayandeh Rud river, one of the most dependable sources of irrigation water in Iran. In general, the soil is fertile, having been derived largely from the disintegration of limestone and the climate is adapted to the raising of a wide variety of field crops and many fruits and vegetables while the neighboring highlands support abundant grazing.

Since ancient times, the Isfahan area has been an important center of agriculture, but it attained its greatest prominence in the time of Shah Abbas the Great, who in the sixteenth century made it his capital. During this period, the natural resources were developed, structures of rare architectural beauty were erected and many arts and industries were brought to a high state of perfection. So famous was this region that a common saying was that, "Isfahan is half the world and more."

Located down the river from the main city, Isfahanak is in a region where the supply of river water is too scant for best crop production. It needs to be supplemented by water

ECONOMIC REVIEWS

The Beginnings of Point IV Work in Iran

Franklin S. Harris

THE TECHNICAL collaboration program carried on by the United States government in various countries has gone through an interesting evolution. The idealism that has usually characterized this "land of the free" has led naturally into the concept that one nation might be "its brother's keeper" in certain situations where the welfare of each nation was at stake.

A number of years ago the American Congress authorized appropriations to carry on technical assistance in countries of Latin America, but this aid was restricted to the Western Hemisphere. The idea that technical assistance might well become world wide was voiced by President Truman as point four of his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949. Accordingly known as Point IV, the Act for International Development, passed on June 5, 1950, provides for the expenditure of United States government funds in countries which have applied for this assistance.

Since the close of World War II, it has become evident that because of the location of Iran, its resources, and the financial condition of the people, that land is one of the most critical areas in matters affecting world peace and security. It is not necessary at this time to discuss reasons for this situation. We assume that all who are familiar with the international scene will concede the critical nature of Iran, which has played so many important roles since Cyrus the Great conquered Babylon nearly 2500 years ago.

All who are informed regarding conditions in the Middle East are aware of the help that the countries there might derive from the technical advances of the modern world. These

factors formed the basis for the selection of Iran as a country with which to carry on technical collaboration. The present article outlines the steps by which this cooperative effort came to its present rather satisfactory working arrangement.

SIGNING THE AGREEMENT

The signing, on October 19, 1950, of the agreement between the governments of Iran and the United States to engage in technical collaboration under the Point IV program was the first agreement to be signed under this legislation. A large number of officials of both countries witnessed the signatures and everyone present had the feeling that this historic occasion presaged a new era of cooperation and inaugurated a period of active collaboration that would be of tremendous benefit to each country.

The agreement provided that the cooperative projects should be directed by a seven-man commission, designated as "The Iranian-United States Joint Commission for Rural Improvement," which first met the day the agreement was signed. The personnel of the Commission was to consist of four Iranians and three Americans, with the Chairman being Minister of Agriculture, Ibrahim Mahdavi. The other Iranian members were to be the Minister of Health, Dr. Jehanshah Saleh; the Minister of Education, Dr. Seyid Shamseddin Jazayeri; and the Director-General of the Seven-year Plan Organization, Dr. Muhammad Nakkai. The head of the American group was the United States Ambassador, Henry F. Grady, who was to name the other two American

♦ FRANKLIN S. HARRIS, formerly President of the Utah State Agricultural College, was the first Technical Director of the Commission for Rural Improvement in Iran.

members, (Dr. Robert M. Carr and Mr. C. Edward Wells, both of the Embassy Staff).

THE TECHNICAL STAFF

At this first meeting the author was elected as Technical Director of the Commission and Professor Hoyt J. B. Turner was made Supervisor of Field Activities. The former had previously been President of the Utah State Agricultural College and, eleven years previously, had spent a year in Iran as Agricultural Adviser to the Iranian government under the administration of Reza Shah Pahlevi. Professor Turner had been a member of the faculty of the University of Georgia and had had several years of experience in cooperative work in China and South America.

They had been sent to Iran several months earlier by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the United States Department of Agriculture as a mission of technical collaboration between Iran and the United States. Their activities in Iran had been somewhat informal pending the signing of a definite agreement.

The Joint Commission early announced a policy of working on the village level rather than confining its efforts to advising higher officials in the various Ministries. For a long time Iran has used the services of numerous foreign technical experts in many of its government departments. Too often these specialists had confined their activities to the departments, where they had been in touch with only the higher officials. They rarely went into the field, where the real problems are found and where the solutions must ultimately be made.

The files of the various Ministries were full of learned reports by foreign experts who gave advice to the government on every phase of its activities, but usually nothing was done to put the recommendations into operation. Frequently, this resulted from the fact that no funds were available to implement the suggestions that had been offered. Money had been found to make a survey and to pay for the report, but nothing was available for actual operations.

In many cases no action was taken because of a change in administrative officials, a phenomenon not peculiar to Iran. Rather than

give their predecessors credit for doing something the new ones might hire experts of their own to prepare recommendations which they could embody in their own programs.

With a knowledge of these facts in mind, it is not difficult to understand why this Commission, made up of four capable Iranian officials of high rank, and three Americans intent on spending United States funds wisely, established a policy of using the Point IV funds to aid directly the people who are in need.

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Since ancient times, the Isfahan area has been an important center of agriculture, but it attained its greatest prominence in the time of Shah Abbas the Great, who in the sixteenth century made it his capital. During this period, the natural resources were developed, structures of rare architectural beauty were erected and many arts and industries were brought to a high state of perfection. So famous was this region that a common saying was that, "Isfahan is half the world and more."

Located down the river from the main city, Isfahanak is in a region where the supply of river water is too scant for best crop production. It needs to be supplemented by water

from wells or other sources, a condition somewhat similar to more than 80 villages in the vicinity. When the Iranian and American officials made their first visit to Isfahanak, they were unanimous in their opinion that this would be an excellent demonstration center, for its location was such that its accomplishments could easily be observed by people from a wide and important area.

Those who were responsible for the Point IV program in Iran had at that time decided to specialize in three fields: education, health and agriculture. Isfahanak offered challenges in all. Formal education was non-existent in this particular village and no school of any kind had ever been held there. The very few villagers who could read and write had learned these skills elsewhere. All of the children were growing up entirely illiterate.

The health of the people was in an appalling state with almost all of the inhabitants suffering from malaria. The main buildings of the village had served as a fort during the Afghan invasions of more than two hundred years ago. A water moat, dug around the buildings, had never been filled up, and continued, during most of each year, to be a reservoir for stagnant water and an ideal breeding place for mosquitos. The whole aspect of the surroundings was one of filth and squalor, largely resulting from this enervating malady. Domestic animals were not segregated from the people and no adequate provisions were made to prevent the excreta of both from contaminating the culinary water supply. Tremendous improvements in sanitary and health conditions were possible with very little effort.

One of the first acts of rehabilitation was the digging of a drain to carry away the excess of mosquito-breeding water and convey it to land where it would be useful. Next came the building of a simple bath house which the village had never possessed.

THE FIRST SCHOOL

A decidedly important step at Isfahanak was the establishment of a school. Since no regular school building was available, one of the Iranian members of the Point IV staff who had majored in building construction at an American agricultural college was assigned the task

of putting an old building on the village property into such a condition that it could serve as a school. This included the digging of a well, preparation of school furniture, and installing sanitary facilities in the building.

Another member of the Iranian staff who had majored in horticulture and gardening in American schools was given charge of a school garden. Here students were taught something about modern agriculture. It was surprising to note the enthusiasm with which these children entered into this school-garden project. Many of them had thought of school as something entirely remote from their interests, but now when they saw activities related to their lives they were willing to be pupils.

The regular school work was operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, the curriculum fitting into the regular program for rural schools. Point IV funds were used for materials in visual education and for special items to bring the program in line with the newest in modern education. The school became so popular that before long children from neighboring villages sought admission and the facilities were taxed to their limit.

As an outgrowth of the school garden, experimental plats were laid out to test various field and garden crops. Dr. H. G. Geib, agricultural attache of the American Embassy, made available many valuable seeds which he had obtained from the United States and which greatly extended the value of the tests. Director Atai of the Agricultural College at Karaj had for many years been collecting samples of the best grains he could find in Iran as well as from other countries. Some of these were planted to increase the supply so that these superior strains might be more available.

DIFFICULTIES

Plans were made by Point IV officials and the Minister of Agriculture to improve many of the physical conditions at Isfahanak. Heavy machinery was requested from the United States to help with the drainage system, to build better roads and to deepen the main canal from the river. This would make it possible to secure more water to soak up the subsoil when the river was high. Thus water

would be stored in time of plenty for use during the dry part of the year.

Before this heavy equipment could be delivered, however, the seeds of dissension were sown and the program at this pioneer village was retarded. When word was spread that this village-improvement work was proceeding so favorably, certain powerful interests in the Isfahan area became aware that this program would greatly benefit any area where it was conducted. Requests began coming in to have the demonstration center changed to villages in which the petitioner had a personal interest, or which he considered a better location than Isfahanak. Whatever the motives of those who agitated for a change in location, the discussion became so heated that it finally reached the heads of government in Tehran. The statement was made that Isfahanak was privately owned and that some one would benefit personally if this village were used.

Such a statement reached the Council of Ministers and they issued a decree that wherever funds of the Iranian government were involved in this program, privately-owned villages should not be used as demonstration centers. When word of this action reached the Joint Commission, they directed the Technical Director and the Field Supervisor to curtail the work at Isfahanak. As a result, many of the plans for improving the village were suspended.

Some time after this, the Minister of Education was replaced as Minister by Dr. Zanganeh, Dean of the Law School of the University of Tehran. As a new member of the Joint Commission, he interested himself in Isfahanak, since this village belonged to an endowment which he, as Minister of Education, had to administer. After making a study of the legal questions involved, he reported that this village did not come under the restriction imposed by the Council of Ministers, since no individual would personally benefit from improvements there. The Commission accepted this point of view and removed its previous prohibition of expanding the demonstration work there. This restored Isfahanak to good standing as a center of cooperative work. In the meantime, however, other centers had been selected and the early momentum of

the work in this pioneer center was never regained.

THE SECOND CENTER

Kamalabad, which is situated about fifty kilometers west of Tehran on the main highway, was the second village to be selected as a demonstration center. It had some desirable features not possessed by Isfahanak: it was somewhat larger, it belonged entirely to the Department of Agriculture, hence no question of title could be raised; and it was situated so as to be more easily available to visitors than most other villages.

A survey of this village showed many ways in which the health, educational and agricultural conditions could be vastly improved by the facilities and technicians available in the Point IV program. No school of any kind had ever been held in the village. Bathing facilities had never been completed. Most of the irrigation water during the high water season came from a canal which derived its supply from the Karaj river. The main canal and all the smaller ditches were doing much damage to the soil by washing. They were not properly laid out and they lacked barriers to reduce the velocity of the stream.

Even though the soil and climate were adapted to the raising of garden vegetables and fruits, practically none had been planted and the farmers and their families were restricted to a much poorer diet than would have been possible with better planning and a little more effort. Parts of the village were encumbered by old walls and ruined buildings which occupied valuable space. Without proper machinery, slow hand methods of digging ditches and demolishing ruins were employed but this cleaning up was accomplished in due time. An old adobe storage house was reconstructed into a suitable school building with three class rooms. A well was dug near the school building to provide safe culinary water and an area was leveled for a playground and considerable playground equipment was made available. This served as a great stimulus in popularizing the school program.

The school garden at Kamalabad lacked some of the experimental phases that were carried on at Isfahanak, but, in its limited way,

it enhanced the practical aspects of the school program. An egg-hatching project, supervised by one of the Iranian technicians, greatly increased the interest of the entire village in the possibility of improving the quality of the poultry. The stimulation of planting vegetable gardens and improvement of orchards made possible a more varied diet for the villagers. A bath house, planned for some time, was made a reality. Point IV technicians made changes in the plans and Point IV funds secured equipment to improve greatly the bathing facilities.

One of the really important projects that contributed to the improvement of Kamalabad was the spraying of all the houses and other structures with D.D.T. to eliminate the malaria-carrying mosquitoes. While this village is not in the area most afflicted by malaria, it did have some of this dread disease and the spraying gave a great feeling of relief to the inhabitants.

Thus, Isfahanak and Kamalabad were two villages where the Point IV program did some of its pioneering in the three branches of service to which it had set itself. In the meantime, other areas were examined. A study was made of Shabankareh near Bushire on the coastal plain of the Persian Gulf where a group of villages are served by a government irrigation project, with dates and wheat as the principal crops. A school had been opened and its principal teacher was a young man who had taken the course in agricultural education given by Point IV technicians and others at the Agricultural College at Karaj during the previous summer. He was applying the modern techniques that he had learned there and his school garden was excellent. When inquiry was made as to the reasons why there were no girls in school, the Point IV representatives were informed by the two chief Khans of the area that the people of the region were very much opposed in principle to any school for girls. A rather extensive experiment in the best methods of irrigating wheat on the coastal plain was set up by Point IV technicians at Shabankareh where the proper use of irrigation water is certainly one of the greatest problems confronting the farmers.

THE LOCUST CAMPAIGN

Later in the season, when the locust plague threatened the crops of Southern Iran, Point

IV specialists, headed by W. B. Mabee and his flying staff, saved the date crop of Shabankareh with the poison which was sprayed over the tops of the trees from airplanes.

The locust-control program in Iran is one of the pieces of work of which Point IV is most proud. Early in the spring of 1951 it became evident that locusts were coming in from India and Arabia in larger numbers than usual. The Iranian Ministry of Agriculture was concerned and began its work of transporting poison bait to the critical areas in the ostans of Fars, Kerman, and Khouzistan. Point IV officials and the agricultural attache of the American Embassy made a trip through the sections where locust swarms had been observed. They found much activity on the part of the Ministry and everyone thought the problem was in hand.

A few weeks later, however, it developed that that the infestation was much more serious than had at first been expected and a national calamity was feared. Cries of alarm from many sections poured into Tehran. Hussein Ala, Prime Minister, at a meeting in his office with representatives of the American and British Embassies and some other foreign legations, explained the seriousness of the situation and asked for suggestions and help from the foreign governments. After some discussion, it was explained that Point IV funds might be drawn on and that the United States had well-trained technicians with experience in poisoning locusts by spraying from airplanes. Representatives of the other countries gave suggestions, but none seemed prepared to render the prompt assistance demanded by the emergency.

Ambassador Grady cabled the situation to Washington and urged prompt action on the part of his government. The response was immediate. Within a few days large transport planes conveying small spraying planes, trained operators and poison were on their way. Mr. Mabee, who was in charge of United States locust control in Nevada, was placed in charge of the project in Iran.

Everyone was surprised and elated at the speed of action. The Iranian Ministry of Agriculture set up a special organization to cooperate with the Americans. When the personnel, equipment and supplies arrived, they went into action at once, since the locusts

were already beyond the control of the local facilities.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company placed its facilities at the disposal of the campaign, and almost before the public was aware, poison spray was being spread over locust swarms in a number of the most critical areas. Dead locusts lay on their backs in the grain fields or tumbled from tall date palms by the millions. Those in charge of the program became aware that the threatened calamity had been averted. Cooperation among several agencies had triumphed over a plague which frequently had been the winner in the contest that has been going on during most of the period of human history.

OTHER PROJECTS

By July, 1951, the Joint Commission had decided to start activities in each of the ten ostans of the country and the officials of Point IV were busy investigating the best places to establish these headquarters.

The health activities began with the arrival of Dr. Emil E. Palmquist, Chief of the Division of Public Health and Assistant Director of Point IV, and Frederick F. Aldridge, Senior Sanitary Engineer. Very soon a number of physicians, sanitary engineers and nurses began to arrive and the health work in the various villages commenced.

Cooperative work with the Iranian Ministry and the World Health Organization became effective in such projects as malaria control. The facilities of Point IV in securing D.D.T. and other necessary materials and equipment did wonders in making more effective the cooperating agencies. They had been very much limited in their service by the lack of foreign exchange with which to secure materials that had to be imported.

During the autumn of 1951 the services of Mr. John G. Evans were secured as Director of Rural Improvement, and before the close of the year Mr. William E. Warne, former Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of Interior, with extensive administrative experience, became Country Director of the Point IV work in Iran. In the meantime the author became Technical Advisor to the

Ambassador on Point IV activities and Professor Turner was given charge of the program in education.

By the middle of the autumn, the United States Congress had passed the bill appropriating money for the technical collaboration program for the fiscal year 1951-52. This made available greatly increased funds, and as a result the program moved forward by leaps and bounds. Technical personnel in health, education, agriculture and industry began arriving rapidly and equipment soon came in a steady flow.

One of the major problems was to assemble the teams of specialists for the various ostans and to give them the necessary orientation to prepare them for a particular region. The securing of suitable living quarters for the families of the specialists was no small task. The recruiting of Iranian seconds for the specialists, the securing of capable translators, chauffeurs, mechanics and clerical help all took much time. Consequently, the months slipped by before the various teams became firmly established in the field.

The availability of increased funds and an enlarged staff meant much to the extension of the Point IV work in Iran. It needed no longer to be confined to a few villages and projects. Its scope could now become nationwide. Within two years of the signing of the first agreement, all of the ten ostans of the country had been contacted, and actual projects of a highly constructive nature were being carried out in most of them.

These projects embodied not only the three original fields of work, but they were extended to include many other activities that were designed to promote the welfare of the nation. The authorized program covered various branches of agriculture, health, education, water development, industries, labor, transportation, communication, housing, mining, meteorology, business, and other phases of the national economy.

These were critical days for the Iranian government and as a result many changes were made in the personnel of the Cabinet Ministers and other officials. This meant that the persons who served as *ex officio* members of

the Joint Commission changed frequently. Naturally the new members required time to familiarize themselves with what had been done and with the plans for future work.

In spite of changes in the Iranian personnel, one could not help but be thrilled by the enthusiasm with which the new officials entered upon their duties, and the seriousness with which they tackled problems that arose. The American members of the Point IV staff were shown a good example of devotion to

country by the Iranian personnel and the work marched steadily forward.

Although the first two years were consumed largely with the problems of pioneering, they showed many constructive accomplishments. A fine technical staff was assembled, vast quantities of equipment and supplies were made ready and numerous projects throughout the country began to bear fruits that will mean much to the health, the education, and the standard of living of the entire nation.

A Policy of Conservation for the Caspian Forests of Iran

Henry S. Kernan

THE NEEDS WHICH arise from modern industry reach to the furthest corners of the earth. Their profound and immediate effect upon natural resources creates problems which many countries have been unable to solve fast enough to safeguard those resources. Forests, particularly, come under great and sudden pressures. Their harvest is comparatively simple and profitable; and their products are in immediate and wide demand. The temptation, therefore, to destroy them becomes almost irresistible to countries such as Iran whose forests are just coming within the orb of industrialization.

Because wood has become a matter of international concern, many nations have offered Iran their aid. Good will, however, is not enough. Iran expects to do her part; but Iran expects results and has developed standards to judge results.

Iranians are a people of the desert and open range; but they are, nonetheless, concerned about their forests. Foreign advisers were brought in years ago. They came and have gone. Their reports were read and their advice was in part followed. Laws were passed, a forest service was organized, and the beginnings of a policy set in motion.

Yet the destruction of the forests continues. Iranians have lost faith in forestry as a science

and as a profession capable of solving their problem. Now only a program large enough to save their forests can re-build their faith.

THE FOREST AREA

The Elburz Mountains which hook around the southern end of the Caspian Sea are high enough to create almost desert conditions on their leeward side. The Iranian Plateau is arid, and much of it is without tree growth. But on the north side the rain clouds drifting southward from the inland sea drop their burden upon approximately 3,300,000 hectares of forest land. Over about half the Elburz Mountains, this combination of high rainfall, mild climate, and long growing season have created a dense forest of high quality. Very small amounts of cypress, juniper and yew are found. About twelve native deciduous genera are abundant and produce wood whose technical qualities are excellent. Among these are oak, beech, maple, Siberian elm, basswood, ash, ironwood, alder, walnut and boxwood. The soundness, size, and form of these trees are often superlative. Reproduction is abundant; growth is rapid; and volumes per unit of surface measure are typically heavy. However, no systematic investigation has been made to collect the information necessary for their

◆ HENRY S. KERNAN is a forester for the Technical Cooperation Administration and is stationed in Iran.

scientific management. This Caspian forest is one of the last areas in the world where are found extensive tracts of temperate-zone hardwoods in a primeval condition.

Until the outbreak of World War II, the forests were relatively untouched by the turbulence of Iranian history. In this respect they differ markedly from the rangelands of the interior which have been overgrazed for centuries. During the war, much cutting took place along the highways. Since then the rising economic activity of Iran has made greater and greater demands upon her forest resource. Destruction, as rapid and as thorough as that which has wrecked so many other wooded areas of the world, is working back of the highways and up the mountainsides. Within a few years Iran may no longer have the choice of a policy because the era of exploitation will be finished. The era of amends, late and comparatively ineffective, will have begun.

The Caspian forests, moreover, stand nearly alone in the Middle East. Markets for their products both here and in Western Europe are expanding and can absorb all foreseeable production at favorable prices. There is every reason to believe that this forest can, under proper management, become one of the most productive and valuable in the world.

FOREST HOLDING LAWS

For many centuries no owner claimed these lands. Only villages were owned, and certain grazing rights to the forest beyond were established. The late Reza Shah Pahlevi was the first to register the forest as well as the fields and villages in his name. At the time of his abdication in 1941, his personal forest estate covered over a million hectares and was probably the largest in the world.

Soon afterward an act of the Iranian Parliament allowed the former owners of the villages to re-establish their claims and to include the forest. Confusion and litigation have resulted. About ten percent is public land and another twenty-five percent is still considered to belong to the Royal Domain. Much of the remaining Royal Domain lands may yet pass into private ownership as a result of claims against the government, largely prompted by the rise of forest land values.

The Forest Law of January 7, 1943 gave the Ministry of Agriculture the responsibility and legal authority to manage all forest lands in Iran. A further decree, issued by the Council of Ministers on March 28, 1943, designated the then Forest Bureau as the legal agency for carrying out the forest policy of the country. In 1949 a drastic re-organization took place. The present Forest Bongah (Corporation) was set up and given considerable independence within the Ministry. Of the 900-odd employees, some 700 are in the Caspian provinces, 170 in Tehran, and the rest in other parts of the country.

Iranian forest law is almost entirely repressive. It is principally concerned with fines, permits and minute definitions. There is no statement of general forest policy to designate the area to which the law applies, to define the role of forests and to set a standard of management that will ensure their protection and development. Nor does the forest law state the position and functions of the Forest Bongah. No clear distinction is made between state forest under the direct management of the Forest Bongah and private forests which are under its regulation. The question of grazing is largely ignored, and no payment for the right to make charcoal is required. Thus the use of the forests which is most important and most difficult to regulate goes entirely tax-free. A most serious defect is the lack of enabling legislation whereby the Forest Bongah can formulate and enforce regulations without recourse to court action. A revised forest law has been prepared and will be submitted to the parliament. This proposed law clarifies certain points but makes no fundamental change.

In reality, neither the laws nor the regulations are observed. The tribunal before which infractions are brought has thousands of cases on the docket. It is necessarily slow to act, and nearly always decides against the Forest Bongah. Probably ninety percent of all charcoal kilns operate without permits.

FOREST INDUSTRY

The regular budget appropriation for forestry within the Ministry of Agriculture is 1,500,000 rials.¹ This rather meager sum must

¹ A rial has an equivalent value of approximately \$0.025.

be supplemented by direct taxes on lumbering and by management fees, a form of financing which invites over-cutting and makes yearly planning difficult.

Approximately 10,000,000 rials a year are derived from a tax of 60 rials on each cubic meter of wood cut for domestic use; and 6,000,000 rials from a tax of 400 rials on each cubic meter cut for export. About 3,000,000 rials are received as a management fee from the Royal Domain, a source which is declining as these lands are transferred to private ownership. About 4,100,000 rials come from the State Forests. It was estimated that in the year 1330 (1951-1952) the State received 10,000,000 rials more from forestry than it spent. Various legal provisions, however, tie up these revenues. But they do indicate that a considerable amount of revenue can be had from the Caspian forests if they receive efficient management.

In view of Iran's progress along other lines, the primitive state of her forest industry is most astonishing. At Tamishan on the Caspian coast a Royal Domain sawmill with gang saws, steam power, and a laboring force of 300 workers produces about 5,000 cubic meters of rough, green lumber a year. Using Wolman salts, a treating plant for railway ties operates at Shirgah. There are several veneer mills, and some wood is sawn and hewn by hand for barrel staves and furniture stock. Round poplar poles, grown in irrigated gardens on the arid plateau, are used for beams and rafters. The total production of lumber is about 158,000 cubic meters.

In contrast, the charcoal industry consumes 6,000,000 cubic meters and is, therefore, by far the largest drain on the forest resource. It is increasing very rapidly as roads are extended and transportation facilities become available and is highly destructive and inefficient. Tools are so primitive and poor that often large trees are cut and only the branches used. Of every twenty tons of wood cut, barely one ton reaches the market as charcoal. The kilns, of which there are perhaps 10,000, are of a crude mud construction and yield about eight percent. Each pays the landowner about 3000 rials a year and represents the permanent destruction of four to five hectares of forest.

Yet living conditions for the workers are poor, the price of charcoal, at 1200 rials a ton, is high, and the quality is low. The woodcutters try to increase their means by grazing a flock of goats on the cut-over area around the kiln and throughout the forest. They even attempt to increase the forage by girdling and burning the base of trees too large to cut. No forest can bear up against the combined force of cutting, grazing, girdling and fire. Nor can it be recreated in any reasonable length of time.

The Forest Bongah as it is now organized, staffed and equipped, cannot cope with this situation and has, therefore, not carried out an effective forest policy. Particularly, the forest guards in charge of field work are too often underpaid, poorly trained, and poorly equipped. Furthermore, the present over-emphasis upon controls to the neglect of education and industry has brought about opposition to the Forest Bongah and distrust of its activities.

CONSEQUENCES OF FOREST MISUSE

The Caspian forests are being destroyed at a rate of about 45,000 hectares a year in exchange for an expensive supply of low-grade fuel which could better be had from the oil-fields with which Iran is so abundantly endowed. While Iran looks desperately for wood products and foreign exchange, while the Middle East waits and Europe pays exorbitant prices for quality oak, walnut and beech, the Caspian forests are burning, rotting and washing away.

These forests are of tremendous potential. They can yield all the products needed by Iran and supply great quantities of foreign exchange. The folly of allowing them to be destroyed without any comparable benefits is all too evident.

Moreover, as the watershed cover which protects the head-waters of streams crossing a fertile and productive agricultural area is destroyed, the problems of flood control, siltation, erosion and drainage become more acute. A progressive degradation of the land results which no amount of effort aimed solely at the improvement of agricultural methods can stop. Eroded hillsides and silt-laden streams are becoming common.

In the Caspian provinces irrigated rice-lands are extensive, but they are limited by the amount of mid-summer water. Proper management of the watersheds is essential to maintain an even flow of clear water. Silt-laden floods alternating with dry streambeds can ruin this agriculture as surely as they have in other parts of the world. Sodden, malaria-infested swamps-lands are increasing.

In certain places the forest actually disappears. More often, an extremely valuable forest is converted to a degraded cover of useless shrubs, vines, weeds and deformed, rotting trees whose value for any purpose is almost nil and whose recovery to productive form requires decades of complete withdrawal from all exploitation.

THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Very special circumstances have made the forest problem of Iran an extremely acute one which allows no delay. Having rightly judged this fact, Iran has accepted offers of technical aid from the Forestry Division of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, and from the Technical Cooperation Administration of the United States government.

The basic policy by which such a program can help to solve the forest problem recognizes that these Caspian forests are a natural resource of concern to all the people of Iran. Their destruction may become certain unless public opinion is aroused, unless certain controls are applied, and unless the forests are industrialized concomitantly with other parts of the national economy. Administration, education and industry are each indispensable.

Therefore only aid should be offered that is part of an acceptable, overall program whose objectives are clearly understood to be the conservation and scientific management of the Caspian forests for the benefit of the people of Iran. Progressively it must be taken over, operated and continued by Iran alone.

Questions of forest law and forest service organization are the responsibility of the Iranian government. Foreign aid can offer advice, but it cannot fairly make legal reforms. It must not become involved in law enforce-

ment, nor in meeting current expenses. On the other hand, to supply capital equipment to the Forest Bongah represents a legitimate outlay.

One condition indispensable to the success of a foreign aid program is that a change of emphasis must come about without which the activities of the Forest Bongah are futile and impossible. Controls by themselves have been proved useless, and alone they will only create hostility.

The activities of research, education and service to the public must be built up to the point where controls are accompanied by full understanding and willing acceptance on the part of the people who are the object of these controls. A sense of trusteeship must develop in every forest owner, forest worker and Forest Bongah employee. Education is fully as important as control. Education must precede, accompany and follow up every control in every instance, at all levels of the population and at all times. Furthermore, education must make use of every tool, including radio, motion pictures, field trips, lectures, newspaper and magazine articles and special exhibits.

Efficient industrial development is also indispensable. The forest must be worth protecting in the eyes of an informed Iranian people, and it must make a full contribution to national welfare. Aid in this respect must fully guarantee that the industry will be efficient; that it will operate to the benefit of all the people; and that it will be managed according to the principles of sustained and maximum yield, so that the industry will become an instrument of national welfare and not of destruction of national resources.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF FORESTS

Forest guards and rangers in any country work under difficult conditions because they are often isolated and must often enforce regulations which local people consider a trespass upon their rights. A forest guard or ranger must know his work and be of sterling character. He must also be well housed and equipped and paid. Self-esteem is part of a man's equipment to make himself respected, and to this end physical surroundings are important for all but a very few people.

The claim of the Forest Bongah that it cannot carry out its duties without a complete re-building of housing facilities is just. But if foreign aid is forthcoming, the maximum contribution of local labor and materials should be made by the Forest Bongah. Four hundred fifty-two buildings are needed, in addition to two hundred sixty transportation units and other equipment. Also the Forest Bongah should be asked to raise the salaries of the field personnel by fifty percent. Income from increased sale of forest products can meet this expense.

A very great difficulty which impedes the Forest Bongah is the lack of maps. In order to supply accurate maps as quickly as possible, an aerial survey should be made using the best techniques. It is reasonable that other agencies besides the Forest Bongah should contribute to this project. The Army, for example, has already offered to do the flying. To supply technical aid and equipment for such a project is certainly a worthwhile expenditure.

In the face of age-old rights to graze herds in woodlands, the Forest Bongah has been helpless. Theoretically it can fence off reserves and has in a few cases done so. But the grazing problem must be met head-on with enough equipment to make an impression. From cut-over areas, in particular, grazing should be excluded until such a time as reproduction is high enough and dense enough to ensure the perpetuation of the forest. The period would probably be about twenty years.

Adjacent to villages dependent upon the forest for fuel and grazing, special village reserves should be made that will assure a permanent supply of forage and fuel safe from outside exploitation. Strips along highways crossing forest areas should be withdrawn from use and fenced. Recognizing the need of such reserves, the Forest Bongah has successfully established a few and has agreed to supply the labor and posts for fencing many more. But the wire, staples and tools must be imported with scarce foreign exchange. To supply such exchange is a very helpful and worthwhile use of foreign aid.

These proposals are not the best silvicultural answers to the problems of grazing and local

fuelwood. But in Iran ideal solutions are not yet practical. The forest is already too heavily encumbered.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The greatest single factor that impedes the management of the Caspian forest is the lack of any regular and profitable outlet for forest products. Landowners, who hold about sixty-five percent, have little incentive either to manage their forests or even to settle the titles to their lands, upon which they pay no taxes and from which they receive little income.

The people of Iran have decreed through the elected representatives that these lands shall be privately owned. A forestry program must therefore consider the point of view of the private landowner. It must answer the question as to how he can be given the incentive, the means and the knowledge to manage his forest land.

The Forest Bongah now has a contract for managing the Royal Domain forest on a fifty-fifty basis. It is, therefore, the only private forest which receives any kind of management. Presumably as markets develop and as the Forest Bongah acquires equipment, trained personnel and experience, management will improve, and similar contracts will be offered to private landowners.

As one drives across the Elburz Mountains or along the Caspian coast, one sees the smoke of charcoal kilns rising from every hillside and valley. These kilns have caught the imagination of the Iranian public as has no other forestry problem. Many Iranians are demanding that the production and use of charcoal be prohibited and that the use of kerosene be enforced by law.

No doubt the National Oil Company should make every effort to supply the country with petroleum products at a low price. But given the traditions and economic status of Iran, much charcoal will be bought for many years to come. People must not be violently deprived of their source of fuel. They probably do not burn charcoal entirely from choice.

Nor must woodcutters be deprived of their livelihood. No imagination is required to perceive that they ply their trade because they

must and not because they so choose. Only forest industry can absorb the men who now make charcoal. But the change must not be too sudden.

The facts of forest management offer another good reason why charcoal-making should not be stopped too suddenly. Hardwood forests inevitably produce quantities of cull wood suitable only for fuel. The Caspian forests especially are replete with such material. Charcoal can be a boon or a curse, and it is the business of foresters to determine which.

The industry can be greatly improved by better tools, better kilns, and better cutting practices. Portable metal kilns are being tried, but Iran may have some difficulties with them. They involve expense which operators are not prepared to meet, and they do not work well or last long with wood of high moisture content. On the other hand, brick is a material with which every Iranian peasant is familiar. Brick kilns are easy to construct, they work well with wet wood, they last longer and cost less than metal ones. Research in the habits of the kiln operators is nearly as important as research in kiln construction. But ideally, of course, the charcoal-making should be a part of a logging industry, making use of slash, culms and slabs.

A forest products industry is of prime necessity. Without it, forest administration will not receive support and forest education will fall upon deaf ears. A minimum of three units should be set up in order to spread the outlet for logs over a large area. The units should be large enough to be efficient and to turn out products salable upon an international competitive market. They should be integrated to include a sawmill, dry-kiln, treating plant and wood distillation units.

Such an industry is the legitimate object of a loan, and one could probably be had. An agency of the Iranian government such as the Seven Year Plan should be designated as the operating agency. Presumably once their success has been demonstrated, private capital will expand the industry.

FORESTRY EDUCATION

This field is less controversial than others and one in which foreign aid can be very

effective. A Forest Bongah without competent employees and public support is as futile as a forest industry without management would be destructive. Education should be planned to influence every level of the population and should be continuous.

The Forest Bongah has great need to train employees and give them a sense of pride in their work. To this purpose, it should operate a training and research center in the forest for men whose work is in the forest. Their needs, point of view and problems should be most important. Foreign aid could well undertake the guidance for such a project.

In Iran it is the urban population, particularly of the capital, which is articulate and which determines policies. This population must be reached and influenced if forestry is to receive support. Many subjects are clamoring for attention and forestry must make itself heard.

At the Karaj Agricultural College, a part of the University of Tehran, a course in forestry is required of all undergraduates. A well-rounded general course in agricultural science with some work in forestry is more suited to the present needs of Iran than a separate forestry school. Field work must be added in order to give the students a special interest in forestry. As part of an over-all plan to strengthen the college, the forest nursery is being expanded and a wood technological laboratory is being built and equipped as a cooperative enterprise of the College, the Seven Year Plan, the F.A.O. and the Technical Cooperation Administration.

Specialized graduate study is now available through the fellowships offered by F.A.O. This agency has also provided three foresters as part of the United Nations Mission in Iran, and a certain amount of equipment. Other fellowships may be available from the T.C.A.

Still, the mass of the Iranian people, the peasants and villagers have not been reached. To interest and influence them there must be undertaken a special program of the type which in some places is known as extension work and which has had great success. Vocational agriculture teachers are the agents to carry it out and they should receive thorough training in

forestry as it relates to the problems of rural life.

* * * *

The speed and skill with which Iran can enforce a forest policy will have a profound effect upon her welfare. In few countries have

foresters had such a clear opportunity to prove their worth. Only give them the means, and with the burning faith within them, they will not fail. The stage is set and the climax is approaching—the moment of crisis, swift change and new directions.

BOOK REVIEWS

Persian Prose Since 1946

Miloš Borecký

THE LAST TIME that the Iranians, themselves, reviewed their modern literary efforts was on the occasion of the Congress of Writers, held at Darband near Tehran in the summer of 1946. The lectures on poetry and prose, delivered there by Professor Hikmat and Khanlari, respectively, together with examples of poetry and prose and appearing under the title, *The First Congress of Iranian Writers* (1),* give a fine picture of the state of Persian literature as it was five years after Reza Shah's abdication. Henry D. G. Law's and Professor A. J. Arberry's "Persian Writers" (2) reflects the same development in English translations. Since then the ever increasing importance of prose in the literature of Iran is evidenced by the appearance in 1951 of the first anthologies concerned solely with modern Persian prose. Two volumes, inspired by Professor Sa'id Nafisi (b. 1895/6), openly

propose to provide the younger generation with good examples of modern style, since in the programs of the middle and high schools the study of their mother tongue is limited only to the old classics. The volume of non-fiction prose, however, includes some of Nafisi's fiction and was brought out by Iraj Afshar as *Contemporary Persian Prose* (3).

I

Since 1946, Sa'id Nafisi's principal contribution has been *The Moon of Nakhshab* (4) which only contains popular biographies of prominent Iranian leaders of the first century after the Arab conquest but which are dressed up in the manner of historical novels to capture an audience. The number of editions, however, through which some of Nafisi's books have run is a good indication that he still maintains his prominent place in modern Persian prose.

1. *Nukustin kongre-i nivisandagān-i Īrān*, Tehran, 1947.
2. "Persian Writers," *Life and Letters*, LXIII, #148 (Dec. 1949).
3. Iraj Afshār, *Nathr-i fārsī-yi mu'ājir*, Tehran, 1951.
4. Sa'id Nafisi, *Māh-i Nakhshab*, Tehran, 1949/50.
5. Sa'id Nafisi, *Farangis*, (4th edition), Tehran, 1948/49.
6. Sa'id Nafisi, *Sitāragān-i siyāh*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1949/50.
7. Sa'id Nafisi, *Shāhkārhā-yi nathr-i fārsī-yi mu'ājir*, Tehran, 1951.
8. Muhammad 'Ali Jamālzāda, *Yakī būd yakī nabūd*, (4th edition), Tehran.
9. Muhammād 'Ali Jamālzāda, *Qultashan-i dīvān*, Tehran.
10. Muhammād 'Ali Jamālzāda, *Sahrā-yi mahshar*, Tehran.
11. Muhammād 'Ali Jamālzāda, *Rāh-i ab nāma*, Tehran.
12. Muhammād 'Ali Jamālzāda, *Hazārbisha*, Tehran, 1947/48.
13. Sādiq Hidāyat, *Hājjī Āgā*, (2nd edition). Tehran, 1952.
14. Sādiq Hidāyat, *Dard-i dil-i Mīrzā Yādu-l-lāh*, Tehran, 1950.
15. Sādiq Hidāyat, *Si qatra khūn*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1951.
16. Sādiq Hidāyat, *Sag-i vilgard*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1951.
17. Sādiq Hidāyat, *Sāya-i raushan*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1952.
- 17a. Sādiq Hidāyat, *Bāf-i kūr*, (4th edition), Tehran, 1952.
- 17b. Mahdī Ḥamidī, *Daryā-yi gauhar*, Tehran, 1951.

♦ MILOŠ BORECKÝ, reference librarian in the Near East section of the Library of Congress, formerly was counsellor of the Orientalia division of the National and University Library in Praha, 1931-1947. This review has been made available through the courtesy of the American Council of Learned Societies and is part of a full study which also includes poetry and drama.

* Numbers refer to numbers in the accompanying list of books.

18. 'Ali Dashti, *Ayyām-i mahbas*, (3rd edition), Tehran, 1948.
19. 'Ali Dashti, *Fitna*, (3rd edition), Tehran, 1948.
20. 'Ali Dashti, *Sāya*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1949/50.
21. Muhammad Mas'ud, *Tafrihāt-i shab*, (6th edition), Tehran.
22. Muhammad Mas'ud, *Ashraf-i makhlūqāt*, Tehran, 1948.
23. Muhammad Mas'ud, *Gulhā-i ki dar jahannum mīrāyad*, Tehran.
24. 'Ali Akbar Kasmā'i, *Jahannum darra*, Tehran, 1947.
25. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Humā*, (3rd edition), Tehran.
26. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Parīchihr*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1949/50.
27. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Zibā*, Tehran, 1948.
28. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Mahmūd dāqrā vākil kūnid*, Tehran, 1952.
29. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Āina*, (6th edition), Tehran, 1951.
30. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Sāghar*, Tehran, 1952.
31. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Āhang*, Tehran, 1952.
32. Muhammad Hijāzī, *Andīsha*, Tehran, 1952.
33. Fakhrū-d-din Shādman, *Taskhīr-i tamaddun-i firangi*, Tehran, 1948.
34. Fakhrū-d-din Shādman, *Tārīki u rūshānā'i*, Tehran, 1950/51.
35. Buzurg 'Alavi, *Nāmahā va dāstānhā-yi dīgar*, Tehran, 1951/52.
36. Buzurg 'Alavi, *Panjāh u si nafar*.
37. Shādiq Chūbāk, *Khaima-i shabbāzī*, Tehran, 1945.
38. Shādiq Chūbāk, *Antar-i ki lütiyash murda bud*, Tehran, 1949.
39. Jalāl Āl-i Ahmad, *Az ranj-i ki mibārim*, Tehran, 1947.
40. Jalāl Āl-i Ahmad, *Sīdār*, Tehran, 1948/49.
41. Jalāl Āl-i Ahmad, *Zan-i ziyādāt*, Tehran, 1952.
42. Shirāzpūr Partau, *Dāstānhā*, Tehran, 1950/51.
43. Shirāzpūr Partau, *Kām-i shīr*, Tehran, 1946.
44. Shirāzpūr Partau, *Haft chihra*, Tehran, 1950/51.
45. Nizām Vafā, *Gudhashṭahā*, Tehran, 1951.
46. Nizām Vafā, *Pirūzī-yi*, Tehran, 1951.
47. Faridūn Tavallali, *Āt-tafāṣil*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1952.
48. Faridūn Tavallali, *Kārvān*, Tehran, 1952.
49. Husayn Masrūr, *Dah nafar Qizibāsh*, 2 vols., Tehran, 1949-1950.
50. Muhammad Bāqir Khusravī, *Shams u Tughrā*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1950/51.
51. Muhammad Bāqir Khusravī, *Mārī-yi Venisi*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1950/51.
52. Muhammad Bāqir Khusravī, *Tughril u Humā*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1950/51.
53. Rahimzāda Şəfəvī, *Dāstān-i Sahrānu*, 3 vols., (2nd edition), Tehran, 1948/49.
54. Nāsimū-d-din Shāh Husayni, *Şarāra-i khāmūsh shuda*, Tehran, 1949.
55. Nāsimū-d-din Shāh Husayni, *Nay-i zard va chand dāstān-i dīgar*, Tehran, 1951.
56. Muhammad Husayn Ədamīyyat, *Dilirān-i Tangistān*, (4th edition), Tehran, 1948.
57. 'Ali Jalāli, *Shahbā-yi Bābil*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1948.
58. Ibrāhim Mudarrisi, *Panja-i khünin*, Tehran.
59. Ibrāhim Mudarrisi, *'Arūs-i Maddā'in*, Tehran.
60. Ibrāhim Mudarrisi, *Paik-i ajal*.
61. Ibrāhim Mudarrisi, *Dukhtar-i Qaqdāz*, (2nd edition), Tehran.
62. Ibrāhim Mudarrisi, *Ishq-i shūm*.
63. Luṭfu-l-lāh Tarraqqī, *Shahbā-yi Baghdād*, 2 vols., Tehran, 1952.
64. Luṭfu-l-lāh Tarraqqī, *Ishqbāzīhā-yi Nāsimū-d-din shāh*, (5th edition).
65. Luṭfu-l-lāh Tarraqqī, *Ma'sūma*.
66. 'Ali Kasmā'i, *Zibā-yi hasūd*, 2 vols., Tehran, 1952.
67. Javād Fādil, *Lārijān: 'Ishq u khün*, Tehran, 1950.
68. Javād Fādil, *Dukhtar-i yatim*, (5th edition), Tehran, 1952.
69. Javād Fādil, *'Ishq u ashk*, Tehran, 1948.
70. Javād Fādil, *Taqdim be-tū*, Tehran, 1951.
71. Javād Fādil, *Sargudhash-i Badrī*, Tehran, 1951.
72. Javād Fādil, *Yagāna*, Tehran, 1952.
73. Javād Fādil, *Dukhtar-i hamsāya*, Tehran, 1952.
74. Nāsim Najmī, *Dāstānhā-yi ta'rīkhī*, Tehran, 1948.
75. Bihādhīn (Muhammad I'timādzāda), *Dukhtar-i ra'iyyat*, Tehran, 1951.
76. Bihādhīn (Muhammad I'timādzāda), *Parākanda*, Tehran, 1944/45.
77. Bihādhīn (Muhammad I'timādzāda), *Be-sū-yi mardum*, Tehran, 1948.
78. 'Abdu-l-lāh Bahrāmi, *Bīchāragān*, Tehran, 1946/47.
79. 'Abdu-l-Husayn Maikada, *Māriyētā*, Tehran, 1946/47.
80. Jihāngir Tafaḍḍuli, *Hāyda*, (3rd edition), 1952.

81. Nuṣratu-l-lāh Kāsimī, *Si nāma*, Tehran, 1949.
82. Rāsi ('Imād 'Asṣār), *Bāsharafhā*, 2 vols., Tehran, 1946-47.
83. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Maimandinizhād, *Az khātirāt-i gudhashta*, Tehran, 1952.
84. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Maimandinizhād, *Gardish-i ayyām*, (2nd edition), Tehran, 1949/50.
85. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Maimandinizhād, *Umid u ārzū*, Tehran, 1947/48.
86. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Maimandinizhād, *Ashkhā*, Tehran, 1949.
87. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Maimandinizhād, *Afsāna ast yā haqīqat?!*, Tehran, 1950.
88. Abū-l-Qāsim Partav-i A'zam, *Mard-i ki rafiq-i 'Aṣrā'il*, Tehran.
89. Abū-l-Qāsim Partav-i A'zam, *Kāj-i Kaj*, Tehran, 1946.
90. Abū-l-Qāsim Partav-i A'zam, *Sāda*, Tehran.
91. Parviz Dāriyūsh, *Yād-i bidār*, Tehran, 1951.
92. Abū-l-Qāsim Partav-i A'zam, *Ādamhā-yi mā*, Tehran, 1948.
93. Abū-l-Qāsim Partav-i A'zam, *Bābak*, Tehran, 1946.
94. Ḥusaynqulī Kātibī, *Shigūfahā-yi adab*, Tabriz, 1947/48.
95. Sharif ('Abbās Yāmīnī), *Du kadkhudā*, Tehran, 1951.
96. Nāṣir Naẓmī, *Ranj*, Tehran, 1951/52.
97. Muḥammad 'Alī Afrāshṭa & Muḥammad Amin Muhammadi, *Maktab-i nau*, Tehran, 1952.
98. Ahmād Ṭabāṭabā'i, *Khudāyān az band rasta*, Tehran, 1951.
99. Muṣṭafā Alāmūti, *Dāstānhā-yi wāqi'i*, 2 vols., (2nd edition), Tehran, 1950.
100. Faḍlū-l-lāh Muhtadī Subḥī, *Afsānahā*, 2 vols., Tehran, 1944-47.
101. Faḍlū-l-lāh Muhtadī Subḥī, *Afsānahā-yi kuhun*, Tehran, 1949/50.
102. Faḍlū-l-lāh Muhtadī Subḥī, *Dīz̄h-i hūshrubā*, Tehran, 1951.
103. Faḍlū-l-lāh Muhtadī Subḥī, *Divān-i Balkh*, Tehran, 1952.
104. Husayn Kūhi-yi Kirmānī, *Chahārdah afsāna az afsānahā-yi rūstā'i-yi Īrān*, Tehran, 1936.
105. Husayn Kūhi-yi Kirmānī, *Chahār afsāna az afsānahā-yi rūstā'i-yi Īrān*, Tehran, 1941.
106. Faḍlū-l-lāh Muhtadī Subḥī, *Hājjī Mullā Zulf 'Alī*, Tehran, 1947/48.

His *Farangis* (5), a love story in letters, is in its fourth edition and *The Black Stars* (6), a collection of short stories and sketches, is in its second. In the latter, a western translator would find such characteristic pieces as *A Pair of Shoes*, a mockery against the veiling of women, *The Beard*, a humorous description of the change from the old to modern customs, and *The Golden Skirt*, a miniature of peasant life.

Nafisi, in the introduction to his anthology, *Masterpieces of Contemporary Persian Prose* (7), developed extensively his highly personal view on Persian dialects and advanced his theories on corresponding styles in European literature and classical Persian poetry. Following a general history of Persian prose, he gave only the names of modern writers, classifying them under the headings of fiction, erudition, politics and translations. Only four authors are included: Talibof and Dihkhuda as innovators and Muḥammad 'Alī Jamalzada and Sadiq Hidayat as their most prominent followers. Talibof died some time ago and Dihkhuda abandoned fiction for erudition. Jamalzada created the modern Persian short story in 1919/20 with his *Once Upon a Time* (8), now extant in four editions. The first and best of these six short stories, *Persian is Sugar*,

defies translation as its humor is based on contrasting the Arabo-Persian of a shaykh with the Europeanized tongue of a modernist.

Jamalzada's most mature novel, *The Shepherd of the Chancellery* (9), reminisces about his youth in the little street in Tehran where he was born and describes the family life and associations there. On this idyllic backdrop, the moral tragedy of Hajj Shaykh Murtada is portrayed. Deputy of the first *Majlis* (the first *Majlis* has become legendary in probity for the present day Iranian), this wholesale dealer in tea and sugar is not deterred when a despotic magistrate tries to have him assassinated. Hajj Murtada weathers the storm of a demonstrative but short flight of his wife and is not taken in by the stratagem of a fake khan who wanted to marry his compromised daughter to Hajji's son. Losing his good name, he dies of grief during the first world war when he earns all the scorn of his fellow citizens as a hoarder of sugar rather than his silent partner who had been the real instigator of the plot. The villain who styled himself, khan, upon his arrival in Tehran and invented his fictitious but supposedly inherited title, "The Shepherd of the Chancellery of the Holy Shrine at Meshed," became rich at the end of the war, profited by accepting paying pupils in a board-

ing school which he ostensibly had founded for poor orphans, and died quietly in his sleep of apoplexy, following a feast he had given for ministers and other notables in his recently constructed sumptuous home. But for some exaggerated and disgusting traits in the description of this feast, satire, humor, social criticism and condescending love for feeble human beings are well weighed throughout the book, and the discontent with the lighter lot of the unjust only strengthens the elegiac tuning of the novel. The picture of Tehran and its inhabitants in the first twenty years of this century is vivid and appealing.

The fantasy, *The Plain of Resurrection* (10), written before but published after *The Shepherd*, requires, on the part of the reader, not only a good knowledge of Shiism but patience, too, though Jamalzada seems to be in good humor throughout. The happiest moment on the way to the weighing place of deeds comes when the narrator hears Persian for the first time and sees an opium smoker. At the scales, a westerner would happily recognize Omar Khayyam, one of whose quatrains serves as a pretext for a sentimental story of a fallen maid. In the end, the narrator is pleased with Satan who speaks to him like a slightly modernized sufi, finds him a pretty corner of the earth where he makes him a new Robinson (rather than Adam, as he likes to toil), and satisfies him by granting him the precious gift of mortality again, after a Biblical dream had saved him from the temptation of asking for an Eve.

Jamalzada's *The Book of the Water Channel* (11) is a purely humoristic and satirical counterpart of *The Shepherd* and is constructed on much the same lines as that novel. It is the story of the inhabitants of a dead-end street in Tehran who meet to agree on the repairing of their stopped-up water channel. After some comic situations, the repairs are completed and the inhabitants are satirized more and more sharply as they refuse to pay their shares. A harsh criticism of the national character closes the book which would certainly provide an anthologist with many well written pages. Jamalzada's last publication, *The Work-box* (12), is a modernization of the old "Beggar's

cups" and "Baskets," as its curiosities are derived from western and eastern sources.

The greater part of the literary activity of Sadiq Hidayat (1903-51) falls prior to the Congress of Writers. His last novel, *Hajji Aqa* (13), first published in 1946/47, is a caricature of an Iranian "noveau riche," who invents a title, *laqab*, for his dead father when his own commercial successes have opened the doors of higher society. Rapacious and avaricious without compassion for his wives (too numerous for his age), he disinherits his elder son who was spoiled by education in Europe and imparts highly cynical advice to his younger son whom he wants to have become a "strong individual." Admirer of Shah Reza and Hitler, Hajji Aqa flees to Isfahan before the Allies' occupation of Tehran, but, finding after his return that the newly introduced democracy consists of the same intrigues he thrived on during the whole of his life, he plans his candidacy for the *Majlis*. In a dream of narcosis during a surgical operation, Hajji sees himself a doorkeeper of the celestial palace of one of his deceased wives and, upon awakening, he admits to himself that in this world he has been nothing more than the doorkeeper of his wives. The tragic moments in Hajji's family life are left without development and Hidayat largely elaborated two scenes of Hajji's transactions with various people, one under the old regime and the other under the new.

From the artistic point of view better things can certainly be found among Hidayat's short stories. *The Legalizer*, later published under the title, *The Complaint of Mirza Yadullah* (14), first appeared in his collection of short stories, *Three Drops of Blood* (15). In *The Legalizer*, one of Hidayat's best achievements, the mirza had thrice said to his wife the divorcing formula so that he was obliged to look for a man who would marry and divorce this wife in order that he could remarry her. The man in question married but then refused to divorce this wife. After many years of vagabond life, the poor mirza tells his story by accident to this man who in the meantime had divorced the old wife but the knowledge comes too late to make Mirza Yadullah happy. Other short stories from *Three Drops of Blood* are *The Man who killed his Passion* which is a psychological

study of a young middle school teacher who believed he had found a guide on the sufi path in his older colleague but killed himself after a night with a strumpet when he discovered his supposed guide was a mean hypocrite, and *Asking Absolution* which is the confession of a woman who out of jealousy murdered one of her husband's other wives and her children but is finally consoled by a group of pilgrims who cynically declare that similar crimes had brought them to Kerbela. Other collections of Hidayat's short stories are *A Vagrant Dog* (16), in which the best is *Cul-de-sac*, already translated in "Persian Writers," and *The Light Shadow* (17), all of them published more than once. These contain diverse stories such as *The Woman who lost her Husband* which is an excellent study of country life.

These examples which could be easily multiplied show Hidayat's social criticism though it seldom goes beyond a discrete and preferably a picturesque presentation of facts. For the extreme, he resorted to caricature rather than to preaching.

In the same books, one can distinguish another type of story preoccupied with abnormal psychology, mystery and macabre motifs. *The Blind Owl* (17a), Hidayat's novel most appreciated by Iranian readers, belongs to this category.

II

Dr. Mahdi Hamidi's anthology, *The Sea of Pearls* (17b), introduces a greater number of authors than does Nafisi's anthology, though not all of them fall within the scope of this review.

Among these is 'Ali Dashti, a politician, whose most appreciated book, *The Days of Imprisonment* (18), is full of sociological reflections and describes his various arrests, imprisonments and exiles. The first appearance of Dashti's *Fitna* (19), a book of love stories analyzing the psychology of married women in the Europeanized classes of Tehran, created quite a stir. The locale of some of his stories is Paris and his essays of various types, collected under the title, *The Shadow* (20), had the success of two editions in 1949.

The journalist Muhammad Mas'ud was assassinated in 1948 but three of his important novels exist in new editions. His first successful

book, *Amusements of the Night* (21), introduces a group of comrades, originally students, some of whom are serving in the government administration and others who had been obliged to give up their studies because of lack of means of support. Their life stories are related as episodes on the occasion of their visits to various places of amusement and the general theme of these stories is the bad consequence of young men lacking money for women, though the novel ends with a condemnation of the school system which does not prepare young men for life. Mas'ud's *The Noblest of Creatures* (22) repeats the method and the theme of the *Amusements* with more stress on the evil influence of woman as such. Each of these novels reflect especially the reaction of the intellectual lower middle class against the conditions of modernized life, but they contain more invective than art. In *The Flowers That Grow in Hell* (23), the first part of a more extensive composition, Mas'ud presents in the first chapter a highly pathetic criticism of Shah Reza's Iran through the image of one of Hell's Valleys (the same metaphor was later used by 'Ali Akbar Kasma'i for his highly pessimistic and much discussed criticisms of contemporary Iran in *The Hell's Valley* (24). In subsequent chapters the narrator describes his childhood up to the outbreak of World War I, and this picture of life in provincial Iran is most fascinating.

Muhammad Hijazi is renowned for his three novels, entitled, after their heroines, *Huma* (25), *Parichihr* (26), and *Ziba* (27). The first two, originally published in the late 1920's, resolve psychological problems of love by means of adventure. The novel, *Ziba*, the final third part of which has not yet appeared, is a story ostensibly taking place prior to the end of the Qajar regime. Told by Ziba's lover to his lawyer, it is the story of Husayn, who as a boy was fascinated by the respect earned by the leader of prayer in his small native town. Becoming a student of theology in Tehran, he is not protected by his entirely outward and formal religion from seduction by Ziba, then mistress of an elderly high official in the Ministry of Interior. Launched into an administrative career by Ziba, Husayn makes great progress by means of the most incredible and un-

scrupulous intrigues, whose logic cannot easily be followed by a western reader. Suspended on account of bribery, he succeeds in mastering the situation, becomes leader of a rather fantastic revolutionary group, and does it all by means, still less credible and more unscrupulous. All the time the two lovers are held together by their need for each other in their evil pursuits, e.g., Ziba wants to steal the jewels of a provincial governor whom she joins for a time, and by a devilish jealousy aroused every time either would improve through a purer love. This latter and longer part of the novel contains many a well-written page, is full of interesting details characteristic of life in late Qajarian times, and as a whole can be considered a truly Persian work. Its final artistic worth, nevertheless, will probably depend not only on the conclusion but also on a revision of the parts already published, a revision which could make the narrative less prolix and allow the characters to appear more clearly.

In the same skeptical vein regarding politics as the second part of *Ziba* is Hijazi's comedy *Make Mr. Mahmud a Deputy* (28), first given in 1949 and staged again on the occasion of the elections in 1952. Another successful side of Hijazi's literary activity is found in his short essays, often enriched by the narration of personal experiences. From his *Mirror* (29) one could easily select some twenty characteristic stories and a few essays of more general scope. Poorer would be the harvest of his two recent books, similar in kind and entitled, *The Cup* (30) and *The Melody* (31). *The Thought* (32), published by the Ministry of Education, is a collection of examples of his style for college students.

Dr. Fakhru-d-din Shadman shocked Iranians with his temperamentally written essay on *The Mastering of Western Civilization* (33) which showed the many shortcomings of his compatriots in this respect. Readers, however, were more satisfied with his presentation of the same ideas in the novel, *The Darkness and Light* (34), though Shadman abandoned most epic motives for interminable discussions. Though a westerner probably would prefer the essay, he would find the novel contained several effective descriptions such as the gardener's visit to a country *imamzada*.

The best short story writer after Jamalzada and Hidayat is Buzurg 'Alavi and many of his best are in his third collection, *The Letters and Other Stories* (35). Among these should be mentioned: *The Gilanian*, the story of an escorted political prisoner's tragic attempt to escape; *The Renting of a House*, an account of a poor family who are killed by their house falling in upon them just at the moment when their situation becomes unbearable; *Dizashub*, a tale of a father who starved in order to educate his daughter so she might become a midwife for their village but who was disappointed when she preferred the easy life of Tehran; and *Five Minutes after Twelve*, a satirical but exact picture of Iranian bureaucracy. *The Fifty-Three* (36) is an account of his imprisonment under Shah Reza written strictly from the communist point of view.

Sadiq Chubak raised much hope with the psychological and interesting stories of his *Puppetshow* (37) but the three new short stories, assembled under the title of the second, *The Monkey Whose Master had Died* (38), are disappointing because of their crude naturalism. Quite of another style is the added play, *The Rubber Ball*, a witty satire of Shah Reza's despotism.

From Our Sufferings (39) is the title of Jalal Al-i Ahmad's second book of short stories, all of which are concerned with victims of political persecution. In his third, *Sitar* (40), the themes are more varied. Taking its title from the first story, *Sitar* depicts religious fanaticism by relating how a perfumer's apprentice breaks the newly purchased instrument of a musician who wants to enter the courtyard of a mosque with it. Other stories were: *The Scruple* which treats with irony the difficulties of Muslim ritualism; *The Sun on the Edge of the Roof* which stresses the bad influence that the fasting month of Ramadan has on family life; and *The Rose Lacquer* which humorously depicts the seductiveness of manicuring on a poor woman. *The Desire of Power* shows best Al-i Ahmad's talent for psychopathological study which he further developed in his next book, *The Superfluous Woman* (41). The title story, dealing with a repudiated young woman, and the first story of the book, which traces the development of hypochondria through recently introduced

medical insurance, could be chosen as characteristic.

The two-volume *Short Stories* (42) of Dr. Shirazpur Partau are appreciated by Iranians for the variety of their themes but display little skill and much vagueness whether they are about the past or the present. Partau's novel, *The Lion's Mouth* (43), rambles badly and his other book, *Seven Figures* (44), contains biographies from Jesus to Dhabih Bihruz.

Nizam Vafa (b. 1888), in his younger years, was exclusively devoted to poetry and even now the miscellaneous prose pieces containing recollections and reflections in his *Things Past* (45) are often concluded in verse. Vafa's didactic proclivities are likewise strongly evident in the one hundred two scenes of his *Victory of the Heart* (46), which he believes to be a kind of screen play. Faridun Tavallali, in his two books, *Definitions* (47), and *Caravan* (48), uses prose only to introduce his political poetry which appears in the form of quotations for ironic explanations of title words in the style of the classical lexicographers.

III

The picture of Persian prose of the present period would be incomplete if the list of authors were restricted only to those included in the anthologies. On the other hand, it must be conceded that in general the literary level is considerably lower the farther one gets from Professor Nafisi's severe selection.

The poet Husayn Masrur (b. 1890/91) had undisputed success with his historical novel, *The Ten Qizilbashes* (49), probably because of his fervent Shi'a patriotism and the several happy descriptions of Qazvin on the decline of Shah Tahmasp I's reign. This novel better amalgamates the hero's life with historical events and other instructive material than does Khusravi's trilogy, *Shams and Tughra* (50), *Mary of Venice* (51), and *Tughril and Huma* (52), all recently re-published. Notwithstanding all the trilogy's naive defects, Khusravi excels in his narrative style and with his ghazal erotics has something of the grace of the old romancers. However, the inner life of Masrur's hero and his friends remains undeveloped, a failing inherited from Rahimzada

Safavi's *Story of Shahrbanu* (53) where the reader is overwhelmed by studies of antiquities.

Nasiru-d-din Shah Husayni romanticizes the life story of the last Zand Shah Lutf 'Ali by means of the old theme of falling in love in school, but the more his *Extinguished Sparks* (54) approaches its tragic end the more it resembles a simple chronicle of facts. One can certainly enjoy Shah Husayni's plain style far more in his *Yellow Flute and Other Stories* (55) where he tells popular love legends collected from various provinces. In some instances the plot should appeal to a general reader and not just to one interested in folklore.

A mere popularization of recent history is Muhammad Husayn Adamiyat's novel, *The Braves of Tangistan* (56), which defends the spontaneity of the anti-British movement during World War I.

To other writers history serves as a pretext for amusing their readers with thrilling adventures, atrocities and lasciviousness. 'Ali Jalali's almost laughable *Babylonian Nights* (epoch of Xerxes) (57) reminds one very much of detective story movies of the worst taste. Ibrahim Mudarrisi's narration is best shown in his *Bloody Claw* (58), which, without reaching the level of a serious pathological study, is a biographical novel on the life of 'Abbas the Great's grandson Safi. Mudarrisi's attempts at biographies of Yazdagird III, *The Bride of Ctesiphon* (59), and of Jalalu-d-din Mankobirti, *The Messenger of Death* (60), are almost without any plan. *The Daughter of the Caucasus* (61) is the story of a secret political agent of the "Democrats" who causes, by her flirting, the death of two young Iranian officers who joined the Azerbaijani separatist movement without inner conviction. *The Sinister Love* (62) spares the reader history but not criminal motivations.

Another historical novelist, Lutfu-l-lah Taraqqi, in his *Nights of Baghdad* (63), involves the partisans of the Barmacides in such crimes that one can hardly help sympathizing with Harun al-Rashid. *The Loves of Nasiru-d-din Shah* (64), unlawful loves of two of his favorites, could have happened in the harem of any oriental despot but were more credible placed in more remote times. Perhaps the most bearable of Taraqqi's novels is *Masuma* (65)

which is the story of the daughter-in-law of a Qajar noble who saves herself from Turkman captivity by flirting with the son of her custodian and killing him at the moment when she needs him no longer. 'Ali Kasma'i, another historical novelist, in his *The Jealous Beauty* (66), which is not too badly written, has burdened the harem of Shah Tahmasp I with this repulsive character. The historical novel, Javad Fadil's *Larijan: Love and Blood* (67), takes place during the revolt against Muhammad 'Ali Shah in 1909, but, except for some pictures of country life, does not differ from the fairly long series of the same author's sentimental novels, *An Orphan Girl* (68), *Love and Tears* (69), *Dedicated to you* (70), *Badri's Adventure* (71), and *The Only One* (72), all of which are full of sensational crimes, imprisonments of wrongly suspected persons, seductions, illegitimate motherhoods, and dangers of prostitution. Fadil's last novel, *The Neighbor's Daughter* (73), is again in his highly sentimental style and one may wonder whether this author, so much read by the feminine sex, is popular because of the conventionalism of much of society. On the whole, the novels cited in this section show the average level of Iranian illustrated weeklies.

To return to popularized history there is Nasir Najmi's *Historical Short Stories* (74). His examples of Iranian heroism in various epochs reproduce the sources with spirit and much national enthusiasm but without any deep artistic development.

Bihadhin (Muhammad I'timadzada) intended, in his *Tenant's Daughter* (75), to give a social picture rather than a historical novel. The heroine, educated with the children of a rich family in Rasht in order later to become their servant, remains untouched either by the 'Ali Kuchik movement, though her father adhered to it, or by the temporary communist regime, until the son of the family seduces her under the pretext that her father had fallen into the hands of the government forces and that he would not help him otherwise. The almost patriarchal family life with the gradual separating of the future servant from the children of the house is depicted well and with characteristic details, though the plot and its solution are less convincing. Also in his two books of

short stories, *Scattered Stories* (76) and *Towards People* (77), Bihadhin has shown more talent in introducing interesting themes than in treating them.

'Abdu-l-lah Bahrami, in his novel *The Poor* (78), chose for his hero a weak character who lost his government position in connection with the constitutional revolution of 1906 and then agreed to serve as agent for the police. Later a minister of justice appoints him judge but a change in the ministry sends him to prison for malpractices committed on behalf of the minister. Freed from prison, he becomes secretary to the new governor of Astrakhan but the governor's sudden death forces the hero to become a correspondent of a merchant of the Tehran bazaars. He is imprisoned again when the merchant becomes bankrupt and upon release he learns to beg in the streets and spends the alms in an opium tavern. When his wife dies, he commits suicide rather than compromise his daughter who has found employment in the American hospital. The novel gives a wealth of information on Iranian life, but the author's chronology is somewhat uncertain and his style rather monotonous.

'Abdu-l-Husayn Maikada's novel *Marietta* (79) has been warmly received by Iranian readers, probably because of their inveterate fondness of moral discussions. The way in which the author displays his knowledge of European literature and history would hardly be found attractive to westerners, even if the love story, itself, were better constructed. Jihangir Tafadduli's *Hayda* (80) is very near to Dashti's love stories, but its eroticism is more physiological, both in discussions and descriptions. In Kasimi's *Three Letters* (81), the lover analyzes his feelings with a highly romantic philosophy. Rasi ('Imad 'Assar), in his *Honest Men* (82), follows the path of a Tehran girl from seduction to prostitution, aiming more at sensation than at literary merit, and Dr. Muhammad Husayn Maimandinizhad, in his *Remembrances of the Past* (83), presents the lover's psychopathological crisis without sufficient preparation to make it probable. The latter author's *Passing Days* (84) reports in detail the life of a poor middle class boy in a provincial town and in the sequel, *Hope and Desire* (85), one misses any matur-

ing of the character during his higher studies in and near Tehran. In *The Tears* (86), Maimandinizhad presents by means of short stories the theory that individual crimes and sins are products of society, and his book, *Fairy Story or Truth* (87), is mostly filled with short stories adapted from the French and each provided with a short introduction to explain its moral lesson.

In the novel, *The Man Who Became 'Azra'il's Comrade* (88), Abu-l-Qasim Partav-i A'zam failed in his attempt to combine mysterious elements with the decay of a landlord's family and a naturalistic description of the demoralization of a village by city influences. Far better is his novel, *The Crooked Pine-tree* (89), in which an exemplary *mulla* of Meshed, demoralized by a late love, is inspired, at the moment when he wanted to commit a theft in the shrine of Imam Rida, by a vision to fell the pine-tree in his garden, under which he finds a treasure. The novel is not badly written and its picture of life in the most holy city of Iran is not devoid of interest. Partav-i A'zam's booklet *The Simpleton* (90), as a pamphlet against Sadiq Hidayat* and making a travesty of his and his friends' style, is purely local but his twelve sketches, *Our People* (92), nearly all deserve attention and wittily reproduce various aspects of Iranian life. In his tragedy, *Babak* (93), the characters give history lessons to each other, whereas the action proceeds by means of treachery, concentrated in the hands of the hero's wife.

Other lesser writers are Husaynquli Katibi, whose lyrical prose and sentimental short stories published under the title, *The Flowers of Literature* (94), seem to have been written as examples of style for young people, and Sharif ('Abbas Yamini), whose novel, *Two Village Mayors* (95), also tells children how an exemplary boy saved money to buy school books and finally was appointed mayor of his village to replace the old illiterate one.

* After Hidayat's death, Parviz Dariyush, an anthologist of poetry, tried to trace the emerging, vacillating and spreading of remembrances in the minds of individuals and groups brought about by the news of their friend's death. His *Waking Remembrance* (91), an interesting psychological study, failed, however, to shape the theme in good literary form.

Among the many other authors in Iran, only a few may be mentioned. Nasir Nazmi in his book *The Suffering* (96) has turned to realism and perhaps the best sketch in the book is one entitled *In the Lower City*. Although better known as a realistic poet, Muhammad 'Ali Afrashta, together with Muhammad Amin Muhammadi, has published a book of anecdotes, full of party spirit, under the title *The New School* (97). Ahmad Tabataba'i in his *The Liberated Gods* (98) has sketched a transparent political allegory without any endeavor to fill it with epic life. *True Stories* (99), by Mustafa Alamuti, and based on reports of court trials, had the success of a second edition although the stories do not display much narrative skill.

In any survey of contemporary Persian literature one should not overlook Fadlu-l-lah Muhtadi Subhi, the teller of fairy tales for the Tehran broadcasting station. He is collecting and publishing folklore material, *Fairy Tales* (100), *Old Fairy Tales* (101), *The Castle, Deprived of Reason* (102), and *The Tribunal of Balkh* (103). But unlike Kuhí Kirmani in his *Fourteen Fairy Tales from Iranian Country Fairy Tales* (104) and *Four Fairy Tales from Iran Country Fairy Tales* (105), Subhi is recasting the stories in the literary language. Subhi also has a novel, *Hajji Mulla Zulf 'Ali* (106), which poignantly, for present day developments in Iran, contrasts the growth of two country boys. One, Zulf 'Ali, becomes successor to an old style *mulla* who married his sister and brought them both to Tehran. The other, his comrade Sayfu-l-lah, first receives enlightenment from a sufi shaykh in Kerbela and, better still, on his way back from Kerbela he is further enlightened when he falls in with a progressive but firmly orthodox compatriot. Except for some lengthy polemics against the Bahais, the novel is interesting and well written.

On the whole, Persian prose of the last six years, even with the new editions of previous books, cannot boast of many mature works. Having wavered between formalist juggling and mystical dreams for centuries, Persian writers are developing today a surprising keenness of observation. Miniaturists by tradition, they will need time for the development of

successful compositions of a larger scope. Although systematic and regular literary criticism, which would help both authors and readers, is still almost lacking in Iran, the new editions of the last years show that a local standard is becoming established, and the best new contributions promise a sound develop-

ment towards national realism. From the various popular themes it is quite evident that modern Persian prose reflects the nostalgia in Iran for the serenity of the past but everywhere it demonstrates the problems stemming from the rapid evolution of social forms throughout the country.

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GENERAL

The foreign policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question, by Sir Charles Webster. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1951. xii + 914 pages. \$12.50.

Reviewed by J. C. Hurewitz

As the subtitle indicates, Sir Charles Webster focuses with equal intensity on two major issues of foreign policy which confronted England in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century: the Liberal Movement or the democratization of government in Western Europe; and the Eastern Question or the sharpening rivalry in Europe resulting from the progressive decay of the Ottoman Empire. The present review is restricted to the treatment of the Eastern Question.

Viscount Palmerston, whose vibrant personality attracted as many to his banner as his direct and trenchant language repelled, has been the subject of three full-length biographies, for he was not merely a controversial figure but one of Britain's ablest foreign secretaries. A sizable number of historians have investigated the European repercussions of the Eastern Question in the 1830's, which consisted essentially of Mehmed 'Ali's attempts to set himself up as an independent monarch in an expanded Egypt that would have embraced most, if not all, of the Ottoman Empire in Asia. Opportunities no longer existed, it

might have been presumed, for substantial original research on Palmerston's role in handling the Eastern Question. Yet such is palpably not the case. Sir Charles has presented Palmerston in fresh and full perspective in this fateful decade.

The secret of the author's success lies in his use of Palmerston's private papers which for the period covered, we are told, numbered "about twenty thousand pieces, mostly private correspondence with Ambassadors, Ministers and Cabinet colleagues." This massive material was studied alongside the pertinent records in the Foreign Office archives and supplemented by scrutiny of parallel sources in the Staatsarchiv at Vienna and in the Quai d'Orsay at Paris. Little wonder that the process of assembling and evaluating the documents consumed more than a half-dozen years. Unfortunately the outbreak of war in 1939 necessitated suspension of work on the book. The chief casualty of the enforced interruption was style, which bears testimony to the fact that the source materials had grown cold.

The significance of Webster's analysis for students of Middle Eastern diplomatic history can hardly be overstated. Britain had no clearly formulated policy toward the Ottoman Empire as late as the fall of 1830, when Palmerston entered upon his duties in the Foreign Office for the first time. By the summer of 1841, when Palmerston left the Foreign Office after his second term for a five-year stretch in the Opposition, few doubts prevailed as to

where Britain stood on the Eastern Question. The indefatigable Viscount had committed his government to a policy of preserving the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, had made these purposes the responsibility of the European concert, had secured the closing of the Turkish Straits and had been the prime mover in the taming of the shrewd Mehmed 'Ali. Subsequent British policy on the Eastern Question grew out of Palmerston's principles, which survived essentially unchanged for a full generation.

Webster traces with consummate technical skill the intricate details of Palmerston's education in Ottoman affairs, the evolution of his program for the Egyptian settlement of 1841 and the steps by which he successively overcame domestic and European opposition. The end product is devoid of the nationalistic overtones of Temperley's *England and the Near East* and far more mature and comprehensive than Puryear's works. In dealing with the policies of the other European powers, the author, where he was unable to examine the original documents himself, put to good use with full attribution the available competent studies, particularly Moseley's brief but indispensable *Russian diplomacy and the opening of the Eastern Question in 1838-39*.

Precisely because of the absence of comparable surveys of the internal Ottoman and Egyptian phases of the question, this aspect of the subject suffers by contrast. Admittedly, Sir Charles is chiefly concerned with Palmerston's efforts. Still, it cannot seriously be questioned that the Ottoman and Egyptian backgrounds are no less germane than those of the major European states to an inclusive evaluation of the British Foreign Secretary's contribution to the 1841 settlement. For this reason the author might have taken greater care to check such Middle East background data as he has introduced into his narrative. Thus, the reference to the Ottoman Sultan as "the descendant of the Prophet" and the statement that "If Mehemet ['Ali] became independent, [Sultan] Mahmud would no longer be sovereign of the Holy Cities on which to some extent his whole claim to rule the Ottoman Empire depended" reveal inadequate appreciation of the role of the Caliphate in Ottoman history. Certainly the explanation

for the origins of the capitulatory regime is less simple than merely a device to enable European nationals "to trade in a country where the infidel could not be put on an equal footing with the true believer." Moreover, the transliteration of Turkish names, not always consistent and almost always imprecise, is bound to irritate the punctilious reader.

Nevertheless, these are minor criticisms of a major contribution to our understanding of the Eastern Question, a contribution that is destined to become a classic.

♦ J. C. HUREWITZ, a specialist on Middle Eastern history and government, is the author of the forthcoming book, *Middle East dilemmas: Background for United States Policy*.

Mustaqbal al-'alam al-'arabi [The future of the Arab world]. Beirut: Dar Al-Kitab, 1952. 273 pages.

Reviewed by Yusuf Haikal

Many Arab scholars are devoting a great deal of time and effort in an attempt to reconcile differing viewpoints as to the best ways of achieving a better way of life for the people of the Middle East. The subject is being earnestly dealt with in writings and discussions, a recent example of which was a conference held at the American University of Beirut on March 31st through April 4th, 1952. The theme of this conference was "The future of the Arab world" in its various aspects — literature, thought, economics, and politics.

Professor Anis Al-Maqdisi, a prominent scholar of Arabic literature, spoke on "The present and the future of Arabic literature." He first outlined the characteristics of Arabic literature in the past, and then, pointing out that modern Arabic literature is quite different, he described the new trends which can be divided into two principal classes. In the first the writer is objectively concerned with subjects of national, social, and spiritual importance, while in the second type, the author is more interested in the technical style of his writing, which must be new.

The first type aims at inducing the Arabs to emulate in the present their achievements in the past by recalling to mind their former grandeur and accomplishments in all fields.

Independence of foreign control and Arab unity are twin themes of this school of writing. Of special importance is the prominence given to social studies. Arabic books dealing with all kinds of social problems are now being published. Such books offer remedies and aim at achieving reforms in this field. A third category is the book with the spiritual theme. Here, however, most present-day writers show an awareness of scientific values as well as the metaphysical.

The second type of modern literature consists of attempts to evolve new styles of writing. A characteristic is a tendency of appealing to the mind rather than to the emotions, and of achieving unity in the presentation of the subject matter. The principal characteristic, however, is the freedom of form manifested, combined with efforts at renovating the language and creating new forms of expression.

"The future of thought in the Arab world" was dealt with by Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Duri, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of Baghdad. He stated that modern Arabic philosophy has its roots in the eighteenth century when the impact of the West upon the East threatened the old values of the Arabs and set in motion a re-evaluation of such values and a reasoned defense of them. During this period Arab thought was comparing the Arab legacy to Western civilization and starting to improve Arab society on the basis of both Islamic and Western culture.

Dr. Al-Duri observed two main avenues of Arabic thought. One was concerned with reaffirming the concept, practices, and teachings of Islam, while the other, although of indigenous Arab origin, was influenced by Western ideas such as the concept of nationalism. The Islamic revivalist movement resulted in the formation of such societies as the Young Men's Muslim Association (1927), and the Muslim Brotherhood (1928), while the other school of thought led to the "Arab Awakening" during World War I. As for the future, Dr. Al-Duri believes that while Western ideas will continue to influence the thinking of Arabs, Islamic concepts and the Arab legacy will take foremost place in shaping their mental outlook on life.

Dr. Albert Badr, in discussing "The economic future of the Arab world," did so on

the basis of the present political conditions prevailing in the Arab states. He considered four aspects of his subject—natural conditions, potentialities, obstacles to be encountered, and ways and means of overcoming those obstacles.

The speaker pointed out that while the Arab states are large in area, most of it is desert. One of the points made by Dr. Badr was that water to irrigate these desert lands is essential but that the skilled technicians and capital for irrigation projects are lacking.

The speaker listed ways of overcoming obstacles to economic development: the creation of internal stability and good government, the clarification of foreign policies on international issues, the abolishment of tariff barriers between Arab states, the raising of labor standards, and the redistribution of land, wisely and justly.

Although Mr. Khalil Thabit, one of the Senators of Egypt and the editor and one of the proprietors of the newspaper, *Mugattam*, spoke on one of the most important subjects, "The political future of the Arab world," his paper seemed hastily done. He treated several matters that have little connection with the subject and his material was not well organized. His main contention was that the Arab countries are heading toward full cooperation which, one day, will lead to a kind of federation of the Arab states. Although he stated that the Arab League had made a good start toward achieving this goal, he otherwise assigned to it no future role.

It is futile, in the opinion of this reviewer, to hope for an economically sound or politically stable future for the Arab world without first re-establishing Arab unity. All the prerequisites of unity—race, language, history, economic interests, tradition, even danger from without—are present. Many Arab thinkers and leaders feel the urgent necessity of achieving this and have proposed that a good start could be made if a kind of federation between two states, or more, could be effected. Thus a federation between Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq might be a first step. Our American friends could encourage the formation of such a federation just as they have helped European countries who do not even possess such common elements and interests. Self-interest even should lead the United States to offer moral

and material aid to the Middle Eastern countries in their efforts to achieve economic and political unity.

♦ YUSUF HAikal is the author of the book, *Nahw al-wahda al-arabiya* [Toward Arab unity].

World without end: the Middle East, by Emil Lengyel. New York: John Day, 1953. 364 pages. \$3.75.

Reviewed by Georgiana G. Stevens

In an attempt to survey the Middle East for the general reader in some 360 pages Dr. Lengyel has had to deal in generalities. Thus the geographic panorama, "the poorhouse of the world" as described by the author, offers, for the most part, the barest facts on the prevalence of deserts and the shortage of natural resources, only random statistics about land holdings and cultivation, and obvious characteristics of village and bazaar life.

Current trends deserve broader treatment than is given them. Although the author rightly notes that nationalism has replaced religion as the primary basis of loyalty in the Muslim states, he does not elaborate on this point sufficiently to make its real significance apparent to the reader. Similarly, in discussing water distribution and land reclamation Dr. Lengyel states flatly that, "If anywhere in the world, the river authority system is justified in the Middle East." Yet he does not explain that even the Clapp report, which he credits with providing the impetus to Middle Eastern development schemes, warned that the area is not ready for large-scale TVA's.

Dr. Lengyel is not unaware, however, of the social and political factors which have inhibited Middle Eastern development and modernization. In his historical survey, which is the best part of the book, he shows clearly that Arab and Turkish nationalism have emerged against odds, that imperialism has left serious scars, and that independence has accentuated the disequilibrium and instability of the new Arab states. He recognizes that "reform is in the air," but appears to discount the efforts of present would-be Atatürks in Syria and Egypt. Instead, he presents some curious distortions of recent history. He remarks that the leaders of Middle Eastern reform movements "have

not yet dared to show themselves, their thoughts are incubating in the obscurity of private conversations. They have received no encouragement from the British and are receiving the cold shoulder from America."

From this it appears that Dr. Lengyel has neglected the Arab press and that he is unacquainted with the extremely articulate class of educated reform leaders in all the Arab states. His frequent references to "the pashas," and his inference that they are still in effective control reveals little understanding of the ferment to which he refers almost casually as he surveys recent events in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Equally trying is the light and almost contemptuous way in which he treats such reform measures as have already been undertaken by the new group of Arab leaders in these countries.

By contrast, Dr. Lengyel accepts at face value the Zionist line that Arab objections to Israel are based on fear of competition and comparison with a modern, Western oriented state in their midst. He believes, apparently, that the Arabs are and intend to remain "feudal" and thus repeats familiar cliches about the possibility of an Israeli "bridge" between East and West. Nowhere does he throw any light on the real reasons for Israel's isolation in the area. The superficiality of his treatment of this matter is illustrated by his summary of the Arab refugee problem in one sentence: "Israel was criticized on the refugee issue, but she pleaded that the Arab countries made effective aid to the homeless people impossible by not concluding peace." Such casual understatement fails to do justice even to the Israeli position on this burning issue.

It is unfortunate that a writer with a reputation for popularizing political material should have undertaken to survey so complex an area with so little comprehension of the real attitudes and intentions of most of the peoples involved. Dr. Lengyel's penchant for cliches permits him to label Dr. Mossadeq as "utterly unscrupulous." He remarks of the Shaykh of Qatar, apropos of oil income, "He never had it so good." The climate of the area is "hot as blazes." Russia is watching it with "gnashing teeth." None of this belongs in a book designed for serious attention.

Some errors of fact throw the book further out of focus. Syria is not adjacent to Iran, nor is the value of the Syrian pound equal to \$2.80. The name of Transjordan was not changed to Jordan before the partition of Palestine, as Lengyel implies. Finally such misleading and mischievous statements as, "In the Middle East communism and nationalism move hand in hand," do not make this book one to be recommended for the uninformed layman.

GEORGINA G. STEVENS, a journalist who has lived and worked in the area, has made a special study of the Arab refugee problem.

CYPRUS

A history of Cyprus: the Ottoman province, the British colony, 1571-1948, by George Hill. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. 640 pages. \$13.50.

Reviewed by G. G. Arnakis

The fourth and last volume of the late Sir George Hill's *History of Cyprus* falls, quite naturally, into two parts, the first of which deals with the three centuries during which the island was an Ottoman province while Part Two is a fairly unbiased treatment of the British administration.

In Part One the author uses all the available sources of information in discussing such matters as government, relations with the West, especially Venice's efforts to recover her lost possession, and the condition of the Cypriote people under Turkish rule. It appears that the Turks were not sure what to do with the large, Greek-inhabited, and exposed island. The lord high admiral of the Ottoman fleet, the grand vizir, dragomans, and bishops were given a free hand as administrators at various times from 1571 to 1821, with the sultan exercising a supreme, if distant, authority. As a result, the people suffered from perennial misrule. To each regime Sir George Hill devotes ample space, following closely the chronicles and the other historical documents which come sporadically from the obscure sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but which are more available for the following two centuries. At

times the narrative is overburdened with trivial detail, while at other times it struggles over inevitable gaps. For the most part it is political in character, with occasional glimpses of the social life of the people.

The history of the island between 1856 and 1878 offers the broadest interest. When, during this period, the Ottoman Empire was confronted with the dilemma of disintegration or reform, the crisis had its repercussions on the neglected and exposed province of Cyprus. Greek nationalist agitation was making itself felt here to an increasing degree. Even before 1878, the articulate portion of the Greek Cypriotes welcomed the idea of a British occupation as an initial step toward the union with Greece. Part One ends with an extremely well-written chapter on the Church of Cyprus under the Turks.

The chapters constituting Part Two are shorter and somewhat sketchy. Abandoning the chronological order followed in Part One, the author divides the subject matter into a number of topics — the international status of the island, the constitution, taxation, and the tribute — which he discusses from 1878 to the present. The author does not agree with the official British point of view in several matters, but his most outspoken criticism concerns the tribute "which does the British Government, it must be confessed, little credit," although, he says, the blame lies with the Imperial Treasury, rather than with the high commissioners, the governors, or the Colonial Office.

From the intricate and controversial topic of the tribute, the author passes to the thorny problem of the *Enosis* (the demand for union with Greece). Sir Harry Luke avers in the Preface that in this chapter "we have the first detailed, scholarly, objective, and documented account of this political movement that has been written or even attempted." Although it is difficult for anyone to be unbiased in an issue involving the patriotism of 360,000 Cypriote Greeks, the national aspirations of the Greek people, and the imperial policy of Great Britain, this reviewer will not challenge the foregoing statement other than to note a tendency on the part of the author to underestimate the extent of the *Enosis* movement. He expresses doubt as to the broad popular

support given to the *Enosis* — a doubt that is unwarranted in view of the results of the plebiscite of January 15, 1950. The narrative stops in the middle of August 1948 when the island was in a state of unrest as a result of the agitation for *Enosis*. The book closes, somewhat anticlimactically with a chapter devoted to "the Church under the British" and two very brief chapters entitled "Antiquities" and "Strategic Considerations."

The book is well documented; at the end of each of most of the sixteen chapters there are long notes presenting official texts or interesting material on side issues. A few misprints of Greek words scattered here and there in the footnotes, and a somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent transliteration of Turkish and Greek names or terms are minor defects, which in no way can diminish the value of the work. This last volume is in every respect worthy of the other three, and the entire set constitutes a monumental scholarly work of the type that, even under the best of circumstances, appears once in a generation.

♦G. G. ARNAKIS, a former teacher of Middle Eastern history at the University of Kansas City, is now engaged in research on early Ottoman history under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies.

IRAN

Diplomatic history of Persia, 1917-1923: Anglo-Russian power politics, by Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi. New York: Russell F. Moore, 1952. 331 pages. \$5.00.

Reviewed by Cornelius Van H. Engert

The present work deals with five extremely confused years, beginning with the Soviet revolution and ending with the arrival of the Millspaugh Mission. The main events described in the book are the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 and its rejection by the Majlis in 1921, the advent of the Soviet regime in Russia and its effect on Iran, the Soviet invasions of the provinces of Ghilan and Azerbaijan in 1920, and the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921. The accounts of the Communist Congress of Eastern Peoples at Baku in 1920, and

of the Soviet administration in Ghilan under Kuchik Khan are particularly interesting, because the general reader has heard very little about either.

The most striking, and perhaps the most disconcerting, aspect of the whole period is that on almost every page of this book one can find statements which could quite literally be applied to situations which have during the past two years made Iran so unenviably conspicuous in the eyes of the world. Its dangerous proximity to Russia, its weakness, and the ambitions of Russia in the direction of the Persian Gulf and India made it inevitable that its destiny should be inextricably linked with Great Britain's policy throughout the nineteenth century — not unlike American policy today — of helping Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan maintain their political independence and territorial integrity.

A potentially aggressive Russia had led the Iranians to look toward Britain for sympathy and advice. This attitude, however, changed completely almost overnight when the Czarist Government collapsed in 1918 and the Bolshevik regime assured Tehran that it had no longer anything to fear from Russia, and that henceforth the Iranian people must fight "rapacious imperialist" England as their most dangerous enemy. This kind of propaganda was so successful that when the British Government signed a treaty with Iran to ensure its internal stability and external security, it was too late. A wave of indignation — assiduously fanned by Soviet intrigue — swept over the country finally killing the treaty and, ironically enough, paving the way for the Treaty of 1921 with Soviet Russia. (Article VI of this Treaty giving Russia the right to intervene in Iran under certain circumstances, may yet rise to plague future Iranian governments.) Communist influence increased and, spreading rapidly after 1920, culminated in the establishment of a Soviet administration in Ghilan and a Soviet-inspired revolution in Azerbaijan. The air of unreality of this whole abnormal period is heightened by the fact that in the end North Iran was probably saved largely by Moscow's reluctance to alarm the British unduly and thus endanger certain negotiations in London which the Soviets con-

sidered more important at that moment. Altogether one is left with the impression that the British — as so often on other occasions — handled a good case rather badly, that they made many mistakes, and that they moved too slowly to meet rapidly changing situations and consequently missed many opportunities.

Dr. Fatemi has, perhaps, chosen too ambitious a title when he calls his book a diplomatic history of Persia. It raises expectations which are bound to be unfulfilled, for although the use and analysis of primary source material is essential to a writing of diplomatic history, the information in this work is based almost exclusively on secondary sources. It may be that primary source material is not yet available for so recent a period or that the author was unable to consult it. Even so, one misses among the secondary works consulted a number of books that would have thrown additional light on admittedly obscure events. Incidentally, the author must have a very high opinion of *The Times* of London (he consistently and erroneously calls it *The London Times*) for there are over sixty references to that paper, and much of the narrative is made up of copious quotations or paraphrases from its editorials and special articles.

As this book is the work of an Iranian scholar it would have gained much if the author had given us more of a personal interpretation of recent Iranian history and psychology. Although the author is reasonably factual and impartial, there is little analysis of underlying forces and crosscurrents, but as the present reviewer happened to be stationed at the American Legation in Tehran during two of the years covered by the book, he realizes the difficulties of dealing with this period comprehensively and with any degree of accuracy.

One is often bewildered by contradictory quotations and unnecessary repetition, while such important subjects as the *coup d'état* of 1921, the widespread German intrigues in South Iran during World War I, and the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are hardly touched upon at all. Closer editing would also have eliminated a number of spelling errors and inconsistencies — capitol for capital, Kashgais and Ghashghaees, Moslem and Musulman etc. The author very sensibly

calls the country both Persia and Iran, but it would have been preferable perhaps to have done it less frequently in the same sentence or paragraph. An index, maps, and a bibliography would certainly have added to the value of the book.

◆ CORNELIUS VAN H. ENGERT, former U.S. Minister to Afghanistan and Ethiopia, has twice served in a diplomatic capacity in Iran.

NORTH AFRICA

Histoire du Maroc, by Henri Terrasse. Paris: Plon, 1952. 239 pages. 570 fr.

Histoire du Maroc, by Henri Cambon. Paris: Hachette, 1952. 384 pages.

Reviewed by Ahmed Balafrej

The first part of Mr. Terrasse's work gives an interesting geographical description of Morocco but his conclusion that Morocco is on the whole an isolated country may be questioned. The well-known geographer, Célérier, quoted by Charles-André Julien in his *Histoire de l'Afrique du nord* stated, "Despite the obstacles which oppose free movement, such as the Atlantic Ocean, the Riff mountains, the Atlas mountains and the Sahara, this Morocco did not remain in wild isolation — a theory on which it became so classical to insist. In the 18th and 19th centuries it was only the will of the Sultans that closed the borders of Morocco, which remained wide open during the rule of the Almohades and the Merinides. Morocco has always been pulled about by the influences of Europe, Mediterranean Africa, and Equatorial Africa."

Turning to the people of Morocco, the author presents a wealth of detail concerning the genealogical origins of the Berber tribes, whom he considers to be the first inhabitants of Morocco and an autonomous branch of the white race. He attributes certain good qualities to them and quite a few defects. He particularly attributes to them a race consciousness — a view which surprises anyone who knows the Berbers.

The aboriginal inhabitants of Morocco, the Berbers, have most probably come from the

East. Their language has a strong affinity with that of the Semites, especially with Arabic. It has become difficult to detect any differences, other than that of language, between Arabs and Berbers in Morocco. Charles-André Julien affirms that nothing is more mendacious than to believe—as is often done—that the difference between Arab-speaking and Berber-speaking peoples tallies with any ethnic difference between Arabs and Berbers.

The second part of the book deals with Moroccan history from ancient times to the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912. The great epochs of the Almoravides, Almohades, and Merinides are dealt with hastily and with only vague allusions to cultural developments, and the influence of this culture upon western Europe. As for the Sherifian dynasties, the Saadistes and the Alawites, the author would label their resolute defense of their territory (on the west and north shores against Portuguese and Spanish invaders, and in the east against the Turks) as merely xenophobia! One wonders how a Frenchman would take it if an 'authoritative' history of France was written with the spirit that emanates from this book.

The diplomatic history of the second half of the 19th century and the incidences of the French occupation of Algeria are merely slurred over by the author. It is fortunate that the diplomatic archives and the sources of Moroccan history have not been destroyed so that the facts can still be ascertained.

The third part of the book entitled, "The chief problems of Morocco," is merely a commentary on the preceding parts and aims at the justification of French colonial policy.

If one were to accept the negative approach of Mr. Terrasse, the history of Morocco is nothing more than a series of failures, and Islam and Arabic culture have been but negligible factors in its history. However, similar conceptions of the history of North Africa, minimizing the role of the Arabs and Islam, have already been presented with greater skill by Gauthier and Louis Bertrand.

L'Histoire du Maroc by Henri Cambon is a history of the diplomatic intrigues which ended in the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco. The author, himself, is a career

diplomat and belongs to an illustrious family of diplomats.

The history of Morocco before the French conquest of Algeria comprises about sixty pages. "An opposition to the foreigner, as inspired by the love of independence, and the intermittent struggles which were provoked by a strong spirit of individuality—thus we may summarize the history of Morocco," says the author. The struggle of Abdelkader [Abdul Qadir] against the French in Algeria, and events in Morocco are correlated.

With the establishment of France in Algeria the era of the Moroccan crisis began. France refused to reach any understanding with the Moroccan government concerning the dispute over the border line and did not refrain from fomenting disturbances within Morocco while, at the same time, complaining of these disorders. Before anything else, France insisted on the maintenance of the *status quo* in Morocco. Whenever the sultans manifested a desire for reform or called in foreign technicians to help in modernizing the country, France maneuvered in all the chanceries of Europe in order to stop it and tried to justify its interference in Morocco by alleging the incapacity of the Sherifian government. This situation remained unchanged until France concluded the Entente Cordiale with Great Britain in 1904 and the French Government then sent instructions to its minister in Morocco stating that "he [the sultan] cannot any longer maintain the *status quo* and therefore a program should be presented to him and he must be forced to sign it."

The more recent history of Morocco, as presented by the author, is in line with the official French point of view and contains certain errors which, it is to be hoped, were not committed intentionally. Thus the presentation of the Manifesto of the Istiqlal Party (January 11, 1944) is mentioned as occurring under the proconsulship of Mr. Eric Labonne (1946-47). The mere act of presenting this manifesto resulted in the arrest of the Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party. It is not true that he was arrested for alleged relations with the Germans, as is stated by the author.

Another correction is necessary. The author alleges that the Berber tribes, from the Middle

Atlas to the Riff, marched against Rabat and Fez in order to impose on the sultan the point of view of the French Residency which demanded him to condemn the Istiqlal. Is the author naive enough to think that he can lead us to believe that entire tribes could have organized any kind of a movement in a country which lives permanently under martial law? This could not have been done unless the governing authority itself instigated it. Charles André Julien in his excellent book, *L'Afrique du nord en marche*, (1952) affirms the pressure of the Residency against the sultan. "Meanwhile," says Julien, "the civil controllers requisitioned the horsemen of the tribes under different pretexts and sent them to Fez and Rabat. Certain senior officials, of moderate tendencies, objected to this unprecedented strategy, the consequences of which might be serious. But they were forced to obey orders. The tribes went and camped beneath the walls of the two cities. It was this mobilization, entirely engineered by the Administration, as is acknowledged by the controllers who were involved, which General Juin defined as 'a veritable assault of all the countryside of Morocco in order to make clear the real tendencies of opinion of the noble Moroccan people.'"

Mr. Cambon's book is interesting despite its errors and imperfections. It is to be regretted, however, that the author did not consult other than official sources for his account of recent events in Morocco. This lack of objectivity is not in line with the high standard set by French scholars in other fields of historical research.

♦ AHMED BALAFREJ is Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party of Morocco.

Portrait of Tangier, by Rom Landau. London: Robert Hale, 1952. 239 pages. 21s.

Reviewed by Graham H. Stuart

Because of his detailed, firsthand knowledge of this complex, international city, Rom Landau might well have called his work, "An Intimate Portrait of Tangier." Thus the Tangier of the Moors, the Tangier of the foreign interests, the Tangier of the money changers, and the Tangier which is the only successful example of an international zonal administra-

tion, is painted with finesse and a deep understanding.

Mr. Landau informs us that originally he had no intention of writing a book on Tangier but that when neither the French nor Spanish authorities would permit him to visit their zones, he turned to a study of Tangier. This reviewer, for one, is glad that he did, for no such broad, objective, well-rounded presentation of the life of Tangier has ever before been offered.

In dealing with Tangier's early history the author pays particular attention to the period when the city was under the control of the English, from 1661 to 1684. Although King Charles regarded Tangier as the brightest jewel in his crown, financial and religious difficulties were such that when he was threatened by the powerful and aggressive Sultan Mouley Ismail, he gave orders to Lord Dartmouth to blow up the mole and abandon the city. It is, perhaps, the only instance in English colonial history when a valuable outpost was relinquished voluntarily.

The diplomatic maneuvering which led up to the establishment of the statute making Tangier an international area is outlined very hastily. Thus, the very interesting convention of 1914 is barely mentioned although it would have established a more truly international administration than was later set up in 1924. The author, however, gives an excellent picture of the present international government which he studied objectively on the spot. He rightly points out that the administrators and the police are continuously subject to French pressure while the *mendoub*, who is supposed to represent the sultan, is a mere puppet of the French. Since the French practically control the Berber and Spanish members of the Assembly, they control, with their own representatives, thirteen out of twenty-four votes. It is easy to see how, by a little politicking with the Belgian, Italian or Portuguese representatives, they can, and do, dominate the Assembly. The Russians who insisted upon representation in 1945 have never named their three members.

The Committee of Control nominally is the one independent body, since the French have only one vote there. Nevertheless, Mr. Landau shows how the Belgian President of the Com-

mittee, urged by his French colleague, ordered the police to eject Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian nationalist leader, from Tangier without even consulting the American, British, or Spanish members, a flagrant violation of the rules which require a vote of all members on important action taken.

The greater part of the book is devoted to what the author calls the "Tangier Scene" and it is in this section that he is most effective. His descriptions of the Old Town and the modern one form a sort of impressionistic Baedeker. He is particularly impressed with the American library which, as he says, is one of the few places in Tangier "where Moors and foreigners are accepted on a footing of equality and all are catered . . . [to] with equally comprehensive generosity."

As is to be expected, the author devotes space to the money market and the free exchange situation which has attracted a vast influx of capital in the past two decades. He asserts that today Tangier possesses the most expensive building sites in the entire world but, he adds, and the reviewer agrees with him heartily, the boom has taken away much of the former charm of Tangier.

The descriptions of the foreign communities are especially penetrating and the Americans—except for reporters who sometimes sacrifice accuracy for headline values—receive the highest praise. He was particularly impressed by American civic spirit, e.g. the recently established American school. He regrets the steady deterioration of the British position and resents the overbearing attitude of the French. The Spanish, who are represented by the largest colony and who have the best claims historically and geographically to Tangier, are jealous of the dominant French position and for that reason are willing to accept a more truly international administration.

As might be expected, Rom Landau is sympathetic to the nationalist aspirations of the Moors; nevertheless, he is objective and at times helpfully critical. He has given a fair and unbiased presentation of this unique international city which may play a very important role in the North Africa of the future.

◊ GRAHAM H. STUART is the author of the book, *The international city of Tangier*.

Les Juifs d'Afrique du nord, by André Chouraqui. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952. 398 pages. 1,200 frs.

Reviewed by Jacques Adès

The lack of a serious, general study of Maghrib Judaism has often been deplored. Mr. Chouraqui's book on the subject, therefore, is most welcome, for the author is exceptionally well qualified for the task he has undertaken. His knowledge of Arabic and Hebrew has enabled him to study material usually neglected by European scholars; thus, in retracing the history of Maghrib Judaism, he has made use of numerous, little-known sources in those languages. In a first work published in 1950, *The juridical condition of the Moroccan Jew*, Mr. Chouraqui had given proof of a capacity for juridical analysis which he turns to account in his present work. His study of the demography of the region, based upon recent statistics, has also given him a firm basis upon which to stand. Mr. Chouraqui has also had the opportunity to participate in North African Jewish community life during the course of a series of extended trips throughout the area under the aegis of the Alliance Israelite Universelle of which he is Permanent Delegate.

The author first recounts the part played by Jews in the history of North Africa and then turns to their present position and to their possible future role in the area.

Maghrib Jews constitute the largest Jewish population living in Muslim countries (160,000 in Algeria, 105,000 in Tunisia, 255,000 in Morocco), even though they comprise only a tiny part—1.75% in Algeria, 3.73% in Tunisia, and 2.50% in Morocco—of the total population of the region. When they have come into contact with the French a "loosing of repressed energy," and "extroversion of the Jew" has taken place. This meeting has transformed the Jew in many cases but it has also resulted in a "condition rendered unbearable by the very proximity of liberation." The impact of the West upon the Maghrib Jew has also meant the abandonment by the Jewish people of certain of their religious and ancestral characteristics. In Algeria, for instance, where this process has been going on longest, the Algerian Jew has acquired his

place in French society only at the price of a complete adoption of Western ways. But he has been able to do this and it has meant liberation for him. This movement, this "march toward the Occident," forms the main theme of the book and the author's study of the status of the Jewish populations of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco is pursued in order to present a picture of this tendency toward complete identification with the West.

An assimilation of Western ways is, however, more difficult for the Muslim masses who have remained more deeply attached to their customs and characteristics. This brings the author to the conclusion that the Jews of North Africa could be led by their past and by their present position between the French and Muslim elements to act as catalysts, as mediators, in the eventual emancipation of the Muslim masses.

The author's description of the penury and misery of the Moroccan *mellahs* and the Tunis *Hara* may lack the vividness of that of Jerome or Jean Tharaud, but his proposals for remedying these situations are sound and feasible as can be testified by the work of the Alliance, the Organization Reconstruction Travail (O.R.T.), and the Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants (O.S.E.) in Morocco.

His chapter on sorcery suggests mystical tendencies on his own part, particularly as he claims to have owed his life as a child to one of these *Hakham*s. This combination of the author's scholarly training and his tendency toward mysticism gives birth at times to bizarre passages where flights of almost mystical lyricism are followed by arid statistics.

The book contains useful maps showing the geographical disposition of Jewish centers in North Africa. The appended statistics are recent and reliable, a rich and varied bibliography enables the reader to assess the material consulted by the author and finally—and this is a recent innovation in French books—an index enhances the value of the work.

♦ JACQUES ADÈS has been a resident of North Africa and is a student of its affairs.

Industrialisation de l'Afrique du nord, by C. Celier, L. Chevalier, R. Clandon, et al. Paris: Armand Colin for Bibliothèque Gén-

érale de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études, 1952. 320 pages. 1,100 francs.

Reviewed by Andrew M. Kamarcik

In 1949-50 a series of conferences on the industrialization of French North Africa were held by a study group of independent experts and government officials. This book is a compilation of the individual papers prepared by the participants and exhibits, therefore, the usual unevenness of such conference proceedings.

A short introduction by Gaston Leduc, the leader of the group, presents an able analysis of the major developments in the industrialization of North Africa. There is no doubt that he sees the problems clearly and honestly; he does not manifest any easy optimism on the outcome of the race between the present rapid population growth and the development of North Africa's resources.

The group attempted to explore the major aspects of their subject: the political and administrative setting, the human and demographic problems, the financial problems, the progress of industrialization, and public investment plans. In most cases the participants have commented on their subjects rather than analyzed them. The chapter on transportation largely concentrates on pursuing that old will-o'-the wisp, the North-South Mediterranean-Niger railroad as well as proposing an East-West Saharan railroad. Neither can conceivably have any economic justification and probably very little military justification for other than amateur strategists. Chapter VIII on the industrialization of North Africa within the framework of the defense policy of the French Union makes the unbelievable statement that Roberts Airfield in Liberia cost America nearly a billion dollars. The rest of the chapter maintains the same light-hearted disregard for decimal points. It states, for example, that the present hydroelectric development plans in Rhodesia will result in the immigration of several million British people!

On the whole, however, the quality of the papers presented is quite high. The two chapters by Jacques Lucius on the recent economic evolution of Morocco and on government plans for the modernization of equipment and its

financing, deserve special mention. The chapter by Paul Mauchaussé on the enterprising role played by the state in developing the mineral industry in French Morocco is also outstanding.

The book makes clear that the pattern of industrialization in North Africa in most respects is a familiar one: there is the usual difficulty that the basic services — transport, power, water — have in keeping up with growth in the rest of the economy, the usual bottleneck of the scarcity of local skilled labor and the resulting need for expansion in education, the lag of urban services, particularly housing, in keeping up with the growth in the cities, the "detribalization" of the urban workers, and the slowness in reintegrating them socially and culturally into an urban society. However, rapid industrialization is still so new in North Africa that the real problems are still to come but come they will when the children reared in this environment begin to come of age.

A major point of special interest is the reason behind the spurt in economic activity in North Africa since the war. (There are, incidentally, no reliable statistics available to illustrate this development. One must rely on such factors as the tripling of electric power consumption to demonstrate the fact of rapid development.) A brief answer would be that there has been a major change in the climate of opinion since the conclusion of World War II. Before the war North Africa was regarded mainly as a market for French goods and French industry was hostile to any attempt to set up competitors there. The war, however, demonstrated to the government the necessity of an industrial base in North Africa, especially in wartime. A preliminary attempt was made as early as 1940-41 by General Weygand. After the war political and social conditions in North Africa reinforced this orientation and a substantial program of public investment was undertaken to provide the basic services (the "infrastructure") necessary if any development was to take place. The state also took an active role, particularly in Morocco, in encouraging the expansion of private economic activity. At the same time many French industrialists came to similar conclusions as to the desirability of spreading their investment

risks and, therefore, of establishing branch plants in North Africa. This latter decision was reinforced by the lower tax and social security charges in these territories. As a result, it can be said that the major part of industrialization that has occurred in North Africa since the war has been due to the establishment of branches there by French firms.

Informative and interesting maps, illustrating among other things, the concentration of industrial projects in a few places, add to the value of the book. One of these maps by Jacques Bertin includes a clever chart giving a brief, clear classification of the major North African products according to their local, national, and world importance. To conclude, this book is a useful guide and handbook on the industrialization of North Africa. It is only to be deplored that its preparation dates back to 1950 and that no more recent data or analyses are provided.

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PALESTINE

Israel, the establishment of a state, by Harry Sacher. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson (New York: British Book Centre), 1952. xii + 332 pages. \$5.00.

Reviewed by George Kirk

Harry Sacher is a distinguished, veteran Zionist, born, educated, and still resident in England, but evidently without any complications about 'dual loyalties' since all his loyalty is owed to Israel. The publisher tells us on the jacket that "the author has had access to hitherto unpublished material . . . and he has drawn upon Hebrew sources which have never before been translated." Only occasionally, however, are these unpublished sources directly quoted and recognizable — elsewhere we are dependent on the author's narrative.

Since the author is a barrister-at-law there is no lack of forceful pleading about his book which is a better-written and decidedly more candid account of the Palestine War than M.

Pearlman's, *The army of Israel*. The candor is particularly welcome concerning Israel's armament smuggling in open defiance of the first United Nations truce, and her responsibility for the breaking of the second truce in October 1948: "The Israelis were determined to breach the Egyptian front, and acquire a passage through to the Negev under their own control. The question who started the offensive is rather academic . . . A fair appraisement is that the Egyptians by blundering managed to shoulder most of the blame." The candor breaks down, however, in the narrative of the armistice negotiations with the Kingdom of the Jordan in March 1949. Mr. Sacher is so busy deriding "Mr. Bevin's sterile and ridiculous . . . splutterings of bellicosity" that he has no space (nor has any previous Zionist authority) to mention the secret meeting at Shuna at which Israel's envoys imposed upon King Abdallah the withdrawal of the Arab Legion for an average depth of some five kilometers along the whole central Palestine front, with the threat of not recognizing the Arab Legion's taking over that front from the withdrawing Iraqi forces and of resuming hostilities, which the Arab Legion was in no position to face. This *Diktat* was no doubt strategically essential to Israel. However, it deprived some twenty Arab villages of their lands and added considerably to Jordan's still unsolved problem of the "economic refugees" who are not rationed by UNRWA because they are not displaced persons, and to whom Israel unquestionably owes compensation.

There are three references to the killing by Arab Legionaries of fourteen Jews in a convoy at Bait Nabala near Lydda in mid-December, 1947, a fortnight after the U.N. General Assembly's partition resolution had plunged Palestine into deepening anarchy. The only detail which Mr. Sacher provides in this triple reference is that "nobody was punished." The account recently given to the present reviewer by the British officer then in charge of the Arab Legion detachment at Bait Nabala is that his men were in the act of taking over from a Trans-Jordan Frontier Force detachment the garrisoning of this important stores depot when a large Jewish convoy was signalled coming along the road which bisected

the camp. Jewish terrorist attacks were so frequent at this time that the Legionaries were naturally ordered to action stations, but the convoy passed through without incident until one of the Jewish occupants of the last vehicle threw a hand grenade. The Legionaries replied with fire, and all the casualties belonged to the last vehicle. Two of its occupants who were still living received medical attention from the Legion doctor, and a large sum of money in the abandoned vehicle was returned to the Zionist authorities.

Mr. Sacher's account of the political antecedents of the Palestine War must also be treated with circumspection. When quoting Hugh Dalton's statement to the British Labour Party's annual conference in May, 1945, concerning Jewish immigration into Palestine, he omits a proviso made by Dalton which was to be important when Labour took office two months later: "This is not a matter for which the British Government alone should take responsibility . . . It is indispensable that it should be backed and supported by the American and Soviet Governments as well as by the British Government." Again, Mr. Sacher categorically tells us that "the Biltmore programme had never been officially adopted by the Zionist movement." As a matter of fact, it had been overwhelmingly adopted by the Action Committee of the Zionist General Council on 10 November 1942 — it being impossible on account of the war to convene a higher Zionist authority — and readopted by the Zionist Congress held in London in August, 1945. The record of the World Zionist Congress held at Basle in December, 1946, shows how reluctant the intransigents led by Rabbi Silver still were to negotiate for anything less than the whole of mandatory Palestine; and Mr. Sacher's own narrative of the Palestine War contains some nostalgic references to what might have been, but for strategical and tactical errors: "The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan would have fallen to the Jewish army," "had [Ramallah] fallen, the Triangle would have gone, Jerusalem would have gone, and Hebron would have gone . . . A heavy price was paid for political expediency."

♦ GEORGE KIRK is the author of *A short history of the Middle East from the rise of Islam to modern times*, and *The Middle East in the war* (1952).

SUDAN

Sudan story, by John Hyslop. London: Naldrett Press, 1952. 136 pages. 7s. 6d.

The Sudan: a record of achievement, by J. S. R. Duncan. Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1952. 283 pages. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by Saad Ed Din Fawzi

These two books deal with the same theme which is, to quote Hyslop, "the struggle of these people [the Sudanese] and the help they received from Britain and some of Britain's ablest sons." Hyslop's book is a chatty, gossipy, journalistic survey of the type best enjoyed on a long train journey, while Duncan, more scholarly and penetrating, is writing more for the serious student of Sudanese affairs.

The interest of both authors is largely in the second part of the task they set themselves; 'the struggle of the Sudanese people' is relegated by Hyslop to the last two chapters of his book and is dealt with by Duncan chiefly in the last third of his work. As the two authors are seeking to write a record of achievement they are, therefore, only occasionally critical of the story they are telling. This is particularly true of Hyslop's book but is in conformity with the spirit in which it is written. Duncan attempts to criticize now and then, but the criticism is mild and is directed, with one exception (the Sidky-Bevin Protocol), to minor issues.

Since both authors are telling a story rather than discussing problems the exposition is essentially descriptive rather than analytical, and therein lies the main weakness of both books. Thus, in the field of communications the dramatic story of the spanning of the desert is told very vividly by Hyslop and is outlined by Duncan. Yet neither author mentions the fact that for some twenty years very little advance has been made in railway communications and that this is one of the chief bottlenecks in present development plans. Again, the Gezira cotton scheme is presented in both books in deservedly glowing terms; no attempt, however, is made to present the difficulties of an economy dependent on one cash crop. The growth of trade unionism in the postwar years is mentioned; deserved praise is also accorded

to the progressive Trade Union laws which have been promulgated in the last few years. But again no attempt is made in either book to describe the impact of labor laws, mainly imported from Britain, and different from anything known in the Middle East, on a young oriental movement like that of the Sudanese Workers.

It is true that much has been achieved in the Sudan by the predominantly British administration. But the achievement in almost every sphere of life has been modelled on British patterns. An analysis of the impact of various British patterns on Sudanese life and society would have been valuable. To describe educational advance, for instance, in terms of a steady increase in the number of children and students admitted to schools is one thing; to analyze the effect of an educational system geared to British certificates and degrees on a predominantly Muslim and Arab country is more important, and much more illuminating. A discussion of the effects of the meeting between East and West in the Sudan would have been especially useful in a discussion of the Southern Sudan, where the African tribal life is a third factor in the situation.

One of the important subjects which Duncan tackled is the political scene in the Sudan in the last decade or so. Until recently the sectarian differences between the two foremost Sudanese religious leaders, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (the son of the Mahdi who drove the Egyptians out of the Sudan 60 years ago), and Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, (the traditional religious leader of the Khatmia sect), were superimposed on the political differences between the pro-independence and the pro-Egyptian parties. Duncan, in dealing with Sudanese party politics stressed the sectarian division which formerly split the country from top to bottom, and which, until recently, complicated the political situation to a large extent. This is contemporary history and the writer faced the difficulty that subsequent events might require a change of emphasis in its interpretation.

Since the publication of Duncan's book two such important events have taken place. The first is the formation of a coalition of Sudanese parties and their agreement on two funda-

mental objectives for the Sudan: immediate self-government and self-determination within three years. The second is the coming into power in Egypt of General Nagib's Government and the consequent change of the Egyptian point of view toward the Sudan. The Egyptians no longer claim sovereignty over the Sudan, and are ready to see the Sudan determine its own future in a free neutral atmosphere. Both religious leaders have also given their blessing to the united stand of the Sudanese parties. These developments have made it possible for Egypt and Britain to conclude an agreement on the Sudan which gives the Sudan full self-government and ensures for its people a free choice as to their future status.

These events have changed drastically the political situation in the Sudan. They also tend to throw a different light on preceding events. Duncan would no doubt write his fourth chapter differently if he were writing now, and not in November, 1952 as he did. He would, perhaps, have toned down his emphasis on the Sudanese propensity to disintegrate. He might also have assessed differently the impact of religious schism on party politics. And finally he might have interpreted somewhat differently the attitude of the average Sudanese to his Egyptian neighbor.

For some time it has been impossible to recommend modern up-to-date books about the Sudan. Therefore, in spite of their limitations, these two books meet a felt need — the layman will welcome the appearance of Hyslop's book, while Duncan's work will be readily received by the serious student.

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TURKEY

Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 [Political parties in Turkey, 1859-1952], by Tarık Z. Tunaya. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952. 799 pages. TL 15.

Reviewed by Kerim K. Key

There is a paucity of published information on the origins, organization, membership, and

development of Turkish political parties. Most of the information is scattered in out-of-print books and monographs, inaccessible publications, incomplete newspaper files, and unpublished documents. The few works that do exist are generally poorly documented, highly partisan, or give contradictory information. The need for a scientific, objective, and comprehensive work on Turkish political parties has at last, however, been met by this valuable contribution of Dr. Tunaya of the Law Faculty, University of Istanbul.

The author points out in the Preface that archival materials are accessible only to the year 1908. Thus, for later periods, books, memoirs, manuscripts, newspaper files, and other records were consulted. One of the author's most important sources of firsthand information consists of interviews with some of the leaders of the Young Turk and early Kemalist periods, who are still alive. As many as 134 well-known Turkish scholars, eminent statesmen, journalists, and other personalities were among those consulted in order to make this work as complete as possible.

An introduction of 78 pages gives a survey of political parties and theories from ancient times to the present, including a five-page description of the organization of the book, which is divided into four major parts, each section being preceded by descriptions of the historical and political scene of the period under discussion.

Part One deals with Turkish political societies, clubs, groups, and parties from the beginning of the nineteenth century to 1908. This is an important period in Turkish history and includes the *Tanzimat* of 1839, the Constitution of 1876, and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. In addition to information on the Young Turk movement, there is some reference to the revolutionary societies of the Albanian, Arab, Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Kurdish, and other non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire.

Part Two covers the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918). The early part of this period from 1908 to 1913 was a time in which many political groupings and parties were in existence. However, the Committee of Union and Progress emerged as the sole party during the period 1913 to 1918. There is also some

interesting information on the period from 1918 to 1920 in this section. Part Three is concerned with the struggle for independence and the Turkish nationalist movement (1919-1922). It includes valuable information for a period of Turkish history on which little serious work has appeared. Part Four deals with developments in the Republic from 1923 to 1952. In a nine-page conclusion the author summarizes the development of political parties in Turkey. He points out that past efforts to organize political parties failed because conditions were not ripe for democracy. However, the multi-party system, which is essential for the safeguarding of civil liberties, is now firmly established in Turkey.

Unlike most books which appear in the Middle East, this work is well organized and fully documented. A useful section is one list-

ing 118 newspapers and periodicals published by the Young Turks, and a table of 133 political societies and parties. Also to be mentioned is a table showing the results of the 1950 national elections and a most useful selected bibliography on political parties.

While the first three parts of this work will be of great value to the student of Turkish history, the last part will, no doubt, be of even wider interest since it deals with recent political events. Dr. Tunaya's work, written in clear, direct Turkish, is one of the most important additions to the ever-growing list of scholarly publications appearing in Turkey in the last few years.

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS

General

* *Athiopiens engel sind schwarz*, by Belo Skarnicel. Vienna: Ullstein, 1951. 282 pages. 75.50 schillings. Travels through Ethiopia and the Sudan.

Die beduinen: die beduinenstämme in nord, und mittelarabien und im Irak, by Max F. von Oppenheim. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1952. 171 pages. Volume III.

* *Bericht über eine reise nach Syrien und Jordanien*, by Alfons M. Schneider. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1952.

Bibliography and reading guide to Arabia, by Gamal-Eddine (James) Heyworth-Dunne. Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, 1952. 16 pages. \$1.00. Lists 146 works in all languages.

* *Flackernder halbmond hintergrund der Islamischen unruhe*, by Friedrich-Wilhelm Fernau. Zürich: Eugene Rentsch, 1953. 319 pages. Presents the economic, political, religious, and social background of current events in the Arab states, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.

Land tenure in Islam, 630 A.D.-1951 A.D., by Gamal-Eddine (James) Heyworth-Dunne. 49 pages. \$2.00. Presents the background to the land reform problem in the area.

The Middle East, 1953. London: Europa, 1953. 430 pages. \$11.50. The third edition contains information on 12 countries; political, industrial, financial, and cultural organizations, and a Who's Who on the Middle East.

Pakhtunistan: the Khyber pass as the focus of the new state of Pakhtunistan. London: Embassy of Afghanistan, 1952. 153 pages.

* *Das rechtswesen der heutigen beduinen*, by Erwin Gräf. Walldorf, Hessen: Orientkunde, 1952. 198 pages.

Rural reconstruction in action: experience in the Near and Middle East, by Harold B. Allen. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953. 204 pages. \$3.50. Describes successful pilot projects in the fields of health, agriculture, education, recreation, and home economics. The author states that "the complete text constitutes a series of lessons which I trust will prove useful to those who are interested in the development of retarded areas of the world."

The United States and India and Pakistan, by W. Norman Brown. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. 308 pages. \$4.50. This latest volume in The American Foreign Policy Library supplies background information on India and Pakistan for the edification of Americans, devotes 40 pages to foreign relations, and offers suggestions as to U.S. foreign policy toward the area.

The Arab states: their industrial potential and the proposed Pan-Arabian International Highway, by W. F. Moore. Beirut: W. F. Moore, 1952. 30 pages. LL 5. A soundly conceived proposal for the establishment of an International Authority which would construct and operate an arterial highway on a toll basis.

* *What the Arabs think*, by William R. Polk and W. J. Butler. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1952. 63 pages. 35¢. No. 96. An excellent summary of the modern history and culture of the Arabs. Suitable for use in secondary schools and study groups.

The world and the west, by Arnold J. Toynbee. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1953. 99 pages. The Reith Lectures for 1952 delivered as a series of radio talks, includes a chapter on Islam and the West, and India and the West.

World without end: the Middle East, by Emil Lengyel. New York: John Day, 1953. 374 pages. \$5.00. A superficial survey of the area.

Afghanistan

Report of the mission to Afghanistan. Paris: U.N.E.S.C.O., 1952. 87 pages. \$1.00.

Algeria

L'Algérie, terre de lumière, by Charles Kanin. Paris: Editions Alsatia, 1952. The author, a former Governor of Tchad, describes the history and geography of Algeria.

Egypt

* *Egypt, Britain and the Sudan*, by Rashed el-Barawy. Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, 1952. 19 pages. 15¢.

Egypt: the cooperative movement, by Gamal-Ed-dine (James) Heyworth-Dunne. Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, 1952. 66 pages. \$2.50.

* *Egypt, what of the church?*, by Geoffrey Allen. London: Edinburgh House Press, 1952. 24 pages. 1 s. Discusses the position of the Christian churches before the advent to power of General Nagib.

Select bibliography on modern Egypt, by Gamal-Ed-dine (James) Heyworth-Dunne. Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, 1952. 41 pages. \$1.50. Includes books and pamphlets in English, French, and Arabic published through 1950 with special emphasis on material published in Egypt.

Eritrea and Ethiopia

* *Eritrea on the eve*, by E. Sylvia Pankhurst. Woodford Green, England: Published by the author, 1952. 72 pages. 7/6. Details the dismantling of Italian and Allied installations in Eritrea during 1952.

Final report of the United Nations commissioner in Eritrea. New York: United Nations, 1952. 89 pages. \$1.00. General Assembly Official Records: Seventh Session, Supplement No. 15.

Gulf States

* *Welcome to Bahrain: a complete illustrated guide for tourists and travellers*, by James H. D. Belgrave. London: Luzac, 1953. 154 pages. 6s. A pamphlet containing background material on Arab history and customs in general, and much useful information on Bahrain, including 3 maps.

India

Mahatma Gandhi, by Haridas T. Muzumdar. New York: Scribner, 1952. \$2.00.

Social survey of Kolhapur City: Volume II, Industry, trade and labor, by N. V. Sovani. Poona: Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics, 1951. x+346 pages. Rs. 12.

Social survey of Kolhapur City: Volume III, Family living and social life, by N. V. Sovani. Poona: Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics, 1952. xiv+330 pages. Rs. 12.

Iran

* *Frührot im Iran*, by Bernhardt Schulze-Holthus. Esslingen, Germany: Bechtle, 1952. 357 pages. Adventures of an agent in the German Secret Service in Iran.

* *Iran 1951-1952*, by Wolfgang Lentz. Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinkel, 1952. 48 pages. DM 3.60. Describes the economic and political aspects of the oil question.

* *Iran in früh-islamischer zeit*, by Berthold Spuler. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1952. 688 pages. DM 56.

Landlord and peasant in Persia, by A. K. S. Lambton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. Describes land tenure systems in Iran in modern times.

Persian grammar, by Ann K. S. Lambton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. 256 pages. \$10.00. Intended primarily to meet the needs of the student of present-day Persian.

Israel

Israel, by Norman Bentwich. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953. 224 pages. \$3.75.

* *Israel economic survey: January-June 1952*, by C. Tadmor. Jerusalem, Israel: Jerish Agency for Palestine, 1952. 87 pages. 400 pruta.

* *Israel: Jewish population and immigration*, by Norman Lawrence. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952. 58 pages. 30¢. A Bureau of the Census report analyzing the rate of absorption of immigrants into Israel, characteristics of Jewish immigrants, and of the Jewish population, and the geographic distribution of the Jewish population.

Learning laughter, by Stephen Spender. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (New York: Harcourt Brace), 1952. 15s. The author reports on his visit to Israel where he surveyed the work of the Youth Aliya Organization.

Libya

* *A general economic appraisal of Libya; 22 September 1952*. New York: United Nations, 1952. 55 pages. 60¢. Document St/TAA/K/Libya/1. Sales No. 1952 II H.2.

- * *Ein staat werd geboren: Libië*, by L. Adam. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1952. 41 pages.
- * *Le piogge della Libia con particolare riguardo per le zone di avvaloramento*, by Amilcare Fantoli. Rome: Ufficio Studi Ministero Stesso, 1952. 528 pages.

Morocco

- * *Morocco under the protectorate: forty years of French administration*. New York: Istiqlal Party of Morocco, 1953. 64 pages.

North Africa

Africa a cronometro, by Egisto Carradi. Milan: Garzanti, 1952. 250 pages. L.1000.
The lost trail of the Sahara, by R. Frison-Roche. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. 262 pages. \$2.95. A novel, translated by Paul Bowles, of a camel caravan expedition into a remote region of the Sahara desert.

Pakistan

Pakistan: the birth of a new Muslim state, by Gamal-Eddine (James) Heyworth-Dunne. Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, 1952. 174 pages. \$5.00. A good survey giving historical and religious factors contributing to the establishment of Pakistan and a description of its government, religious groups, geography, political parties, social life etc.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, by K. S. Twitchell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. 231 pages. \$5.00. Second edition brought up-to-date by an additional chapter of 34 pages.

Sudan

British policy in the Sudan, 1882-1902, by Mekki Shibeika. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Syria

- * *Second statement on achievements of Syria's government of the new regime during the last three months, March-June 1952*. Damascus: Directorate General of Information, 1952. 97 pages.

Tangier

- * *L'Angleterre en Méditerranée*, by Jean Tonnelé. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1952. 22 pages. Deals with the internationalization of Tangier.

Transcaucasia

Caucasian battlefields, by W. E. D. Allen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. 552 pages. \$13.50. An account of military campaigns in the Caucasus from the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-9 to the events of the Civil War in the Northern Caucasus and Dagistan, 1918-22, based largely on Russian sources.

Studies in Caucasian history, by V. Minorsky. London: Valentine Mitchell (Taylor's Foreign Press), 1953. 196 pages. 35s. (Title changed from *Studies in the Islamic history of the Caucasus*, as listed in the Winter, 1953 issue.)

Linguistics

Arabisches wörterbuch für die schriftsprache der gegenwart, by Hans Wehr. Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1952. 497 pages.

- * *Wörterbuch der Ägyptischen sprache*, by Adolf Erman and Hermann Grapow. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag), 1951. DM 22. 3rd volume.

Literature

Moorish poetry: a translation of 'The Pennants' of Ibn Sa'id, by A. J. Arberry. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. 218 pages. \$4.25.

Religion

Le dimanche musulman, by G. M. Dabat. Paris: Plon, 1952. 450 fr.

- * *Glaube und welt des Islam*, by Ernst Diez. Stuttgart: Spemann, 1952. 197 pages. DM 5.60.

- * *Mohammed*, by Josef Magnus Wehner. Munich: P. Müller, 1952. 489 pages. A novel.

A second supplementary handlist of Muhammadan manuscripts, compiled by A. J. Arberry. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. 90 pages. \$6.00. Describes nearly 500 Arabic and Persian works in the libraries of the University and Colleges of Cambridge.

Readers' Commentary

The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.

Sir:

I was interested to read D. S. Franck's review of H. V. Cooke's book, *Challenge and response in the Middle East*, in your Autumn, 1952, number. I believe that many readers of the book would agree with the views expressed by your reviewer, but I was most disappointed to find that she did not give much consideration to the conclusions reached by Dr. Cooke. Some of these would seem to me to be of the most doubtful validity, and such as to give a dangerously erroneous impression to readers who do not know much about the Middle East. May I ask your indulgence to consider two of these conclusions at some length?

The conclusions are summarised on p. 328 of Dr. Cooke's book. The first of them is given in fuller form on p. 308, as follows: "The shockingly low living standard which prevailed in the Ottoman and Persian empires in 1918 were the product of centuries of decadence and neglect of the common people's needs both by the governmental authorities and by the upper classes in general. Yet it is now abundantly clear, from the analyses just completed, that in five of the ten countries considered (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Iran) the standard of life has undergone a further marked decline during the period 1919-50!"

There can be little question that conditions in Egypt have, in many respects, deteriorated since 1919. Prior to that date Egypt had been partially or fully independent of Turkish neglect for almost a century, and from 1882 had experienced a period of rule under British supervision which was, whatever its shortcomings, superior to that of any other part of

the area. The present position has to be reviewed against that background. The basic reason for the subsequent deterioration has been, of course, that a rapidly increasing population has outrun increases in productive capacity. Nowhere else in the Middle East is there such population pressure. The cost of living has risen, real wages have fallen, birth, death and disease rates remain amongst the world's highest, and, as Dr. Cooke says, "about 90% of the population belong to the groups chronically afflicted by poverty, illiteracy and disease."

The rest of the region, however, is and was in different case. Conditions in the Turkish Empire in 1914 were very different from those in Egypt: here were shrunken populations at the mercy of periodic famines, epidemics and beduin raids; a contracted, localised economy; subsistence agriculture; and an overtaxed and unprotected peasantry "barely subsisting under conditions of most extreme poverty" (to quote a passage from Millspaugh used by Dr. Cooke). It would seem that a "further marked decline" from such a level could only result in extinction, but far from being extinct the peasants of most Middle East countries are today more numerous and secure, and are farming vastly more land than ever before in modern times, whilst (I would claim) the economic and social condition of most of them has improved and is improving.

What evidence is brought forward by Dr. Cooke to support his thesis? The growth of the population of all the Middle East countries is noted, and the inference is that as there are more mouths to feed the standard of living must have fallen unless production has risen

in the same ratio. Dr. Cooke believes that in the countries mentioned, and during the period 1919-50, it has not. But he fails to convince, partly because the evidence he produces seems insufficient, and partly because he neglects some facts and factors which tend in the other direction. Certainly not all authorities would agree with him. To quote the U.N.'s *Review of economic conditions in the Middle East* (1951), for instance: "Until the outbreak of the Second World War, however, it appears that, taking the region as a whole, production was increasing faster than population and that investment was being made on a sufficient scale to maintain or accelerate the rate of economic growth," (p. 31), and, "In . . . Syria . . . the increase in agricultural and industrial production over the past thirty years has been distinctly greater than the growth in the population. . . . During the [Second World] war and post-war years, the output of Syrian agriculture more than kept pace with the growth in population, and there was also an expansion in industry." (p. 13-14).

Dr. Cooke quotes several groups of figures showing that the purchasing power of wages has fallen and that wage increases have been insufficient to compensate for this fall — both before and especially during and since the Second World War. (e.g., Lebanon, p. 130-31, Syria, p. 146). Such figures are apparently taken by the author, not only to demonstrate the perfectly sound contention that the situation of wage-earners and of the urban middle classes has become more difficult, but as decisive evidence that the standards of living of the people as a whole have fallen. Wage earners and urban Middle East classes, however, form a relatively small section of the population. The agriculturalists of the Middle East — the great mass of the population — have felt the disadvantages of inflation less, and they have been able to sell their products at higher prices. Nowhere in the book, as far as can be seen, is there appreciation of this and dependent factors. Of the utmost importance, for example, is the fact that thousands of Arab farmers who were crushed by debt in the 1930's were able to free themselves out of their wartime profits, whilst an enormous amount of post-war development was made

possible in the same way. Ploughs, trucks, pumps, newly terraced land — these, as well as the lower purchasing power of wages, are the fruits of the wartime expenditures of allied armies and agencies. Incidentally, no figures for these expenditures are given in Dr. Cooke's book. A further point is that although the purchasing power of wages has fallen, the opportunities before wage-earners are much greater today than ever before — the full range of employment in an active and complex economy is open to them.

There are gaps in Dr. Cooke's summaries of the economic activities of the countries under discussion which should be filled if true estimates of standards, trends and possibilities are to be made. In the Lebanese and Syrian chapters, for example, there are a number of topics which deserve mention or fuller treatment, amongst them the following: the great expansion of cultivation in Syria in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (an expansion of almost a million and a half acres between 1934 and 1949 alone); the Syrian cotton boom (1951 growers' earnings at least £S. 118 million. Some 67 ginneries, 9 spinning and weaving mills operating. About £S. 60 million invested in industry, most of it textile, between 1945 and the end of 1948); the expansion of the Lebanese fruit-growing industry (500,000 cases of apples produced in 1951, 5 million young trees imported); the widespread effects of the new oil developments (TAPline isn't mentioned in Dr. Cooke's book. Lebanon alone will gain £L. 8.5 million per annum from royalties if present agreements are ratified. The new 30" line from Kirkuk terminates at Banias in Syria. Lebanese entrepreneurs, transport agents and workers are taking full advantage of developments in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.); the Lebanese tourist trade, and especially the function of the mountain villages in providing summer resorts for the inhabitants of other Middle Eastern countries (1951 was a poor year, but some 20,000 foreigners are estimated to have spent £S. 60 million); the Lebanese hashish trade, illicit but profitable (estimates of its value in recent years range as high as £L. 100 million per annum); and, where development projects are concerned, the near-conclusion of the Upper Orontes irriga-

tion scheme which is transforming the country between Homs and Hama, and the progress of the Khabour irrigation scheme in the Jezireh.

It is not proposed to pursue this discussion of Dr. Cooke's first conclusion any further. The truth is, of course, that, even if intangibles like the economic value of security are left out of consideration, a comparison between living standards in 1919 and in 1951 cannot be couched in any one simple statement. Populations have risen, and the rise has affected every social group: there are more poor people now than there ever were, but there are more rich and more of the middle classes. Certain groups have suffered from trends during and since the Second World War, others have benefited. Many people have been able to climb the social ladder in recent years. The trading sector has been particularly active. What the total or average result is — a lower or higher general standard — one cannot tell in the absence of detailed statistics; Dr. Cooke believes it to be lower, I believe it to be higher at least in Syria, Lebanon, and probably Iraq as well as in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and in Jordan until 1939 (or 1948) as Dr. Cooke also believes.

Dr. Cooke's seventh conclusion is that "The Hashemite state of Jordan is a suitable locale for a model program along Point Four lines. This should be conducted on an adequate scale to produce readily visible improvement in the general living standards of the country. . ." (p. 329). On page 120 he says that "Conditions in Jordan, at the time of writing, are probably more propitious for planned improvements in living standards than those of any other country of the Middle East." Although Dr. Cooke summarises difficulties facing Jordan today (p. 105-6) one is inclined to question whether he adequately underlines the critical nature of her problems. The country has never been self-sufficient. It has in the past been kept going in considerable measure by British subsidies, particularly to the Arab Legion (which Dr. Cooke barely mentions) and by the employment offered by this army,

the country's only major employer of labour.* Today her imports exceed by eleven times the value of her almost negligible exports. She is cut off from the country which formerly bought up to 98% of her exports — today the only trade with Israel is carried on by smugglers. She is burdened with 470,000 refugees (Dr. Cooke's figures are for 1949) and by the 120,000 "economic refugees" whose lands and livelihoods have been cut off by the frontier with Israel.

Most students of the problem would wholeheartedly endorse Dr. Cooke's wish to see large amounts of aid poured into the country, and indeed good beginnings have been made by British loans of £ 2.5 million since 1949, American aid under the Mutual Security Act of \$ 4.6 million in 1951 and over \$ 3 million in 1952. Development schemes are under way, and the Yarmuk scheme, which should provide a livelihood for thousands of people, has been approved by the Jordan government and will, it is hoped, be financed in part by UNRWA. It is doubtful, however, whether cooperation between the Jordanian Government and Western agencies is proving as easy and effective as Dr. Cooke hoped, and most observers would question if conditions in Jordan are more propitious for planned improvements in living standards than those in any other Middle Eastern country. It would seem in fact, that such aid can initially do little more than to prevent retrogression, secondly to ameliorate problems and assist in development; whilst a permanent solution of Jordan's difficulties would involve at the very least a real peace with Israel (as Dr. Cooke says) and a redistribution of refugees.

It would be possible to extend this consideration of Dr. Cooke's work further. It is probably as well that some such criticism should go on record. For that reason I was glad to read your review and offer this supplement to it.

Yours faithfully,
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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

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Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East generally since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

For list of abbreviations, see page 277.

GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

5566 DE GAURY, GERALD. "Between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Jl '52) 259-268. A survey of the present state of affairs in Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein and Qatar by a writer who has spent many years in the area.

5567 SCOFIELD, JOHN. "Hashemite Jordan, Arab heartland." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 102 (D '52) 941-56.

5568 SKRINE, CLARMONT. "Impressions of Israel and Jordan." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap '52) 129-34. A travel talk on Jerusalem and Petra.

5569 SERRADJI, MOHAMED BENHADJI. "L'été aux Azails." I.B.L.A. (Tunis) 15 (1952) 283-99. A sojourn in Tlemcen.

5570 VESEY-FITZGERALD, DESMOND. "From Hasa to Oman by car." *Geog. Rev.* 41 (O '51) 544-60. Description of track conditions for motor travel between Dhahran and Muscat along the edge of the Persian Gulf. Map.

5571 WHITTLESEY, DERWENT. "Lands athwart the Nile." *World Politics* (Prince-

ton) 5 (Ja '53) 214-41. A study of the diversities of the Upper Nile regions.

5572 WRIGLEY, GLADYS M. "Turkey." *Focus* 3 (Ja '53) 1-5. Background data and geographic interpretation of Turkey and its place in the world today.

See also: 5645

HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

5573 ARMEN, HERANT K. "The historian and historiography." *Armenian Rev.* 5 (S '52) 42-62. Interesting reflections on the two principal Armenian participants in the Battle of Avarayr (451 A.D.) which lead to the Persians' granting the Armenians the right to religious freedom.

5574 ARNAKIS, G. GEORGIADES. "The Greek church of Constantinople and the Ottoman empire." *J. Mod. Hist.* 24 (S '52) 235-50. Studies the background and assumptions influencing the Ottoman attitude toward the Greek church and reviews the extent and circumstances under which the principle of religious tolerance was violated.

5575 AYALON, D. "Le régiment Bahriya dans l'armée mamelouke." *Rev. d'Études Islamiques* (1951) 133-41. Reappraisal of

this power that made itself felt during the 7th and 8th centuries A.H.

5576 AYALON, D. "The Wafidia in the Mamluk kingdom." *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad) 25 (O '51) 89-104. The influx of refugees from Mongol territory.

5577 DAHAN, SAMI. "Ibn al-'Adim's *Bughyat at-talab*," (in Arabic) *Annales Arch. de Syrie* (Damascus) no. 2 (1951) 207-25. An important source on Aleppo's historical structures. Biography of the author; edition of a section on the city's walls and gates, trenches, and fortresses.

5578 FINK, H. S. "Mawdūd I of Mosul, precursor of Saladin." *Muslim World* 43 (Ja '53) 18-27. This able soldier did much to promote Moslem unity in the holy war against the Crusaders. He was assassinated at the height of his career, responsibility for this crime being usually attributed to his ally Tughdakin.

5579 FISHER, SYDNEY N. "Ottoman feudalism and its influence upon the Balkans." *Historian* 15 (autumn '52) 3-22. Sketches in interesting detail the military aspects of the rise and decline of Ottoman feudalism and its significance for the history of the empire and the expansion of the Turks into southeastern Europe.

5580 GOITEIN, S. D. "Jerusalem in the Arab period." (in Hebrew) *Yerushalayim* (Jerusalem) 4 (1952) 82-103. Traces on the basis of Arab sources the history of the various eras, the way of life, culture, and economy of the city.

5581 HADDAD, GEORGE. "Damascus in the writings of classical and Arab authors." (in Arabic) *Annales Arch. de Syrie* (Damascus) no. 2 (1951) 157-74. Curious interpretations of the name of the city were in vogue. Moslem authors connect many biblical figures with the city.

5582 HOURANI, GEORGE F. "Did Roman commercial competition ruin South Arabia?" *J. Nr. East. Stud.* 11 (O '52) 291-5. The traditional view that it did is attacked by the author on the grounds of chronology (South Arabian trade was still flourishing a century after the Roman expansion) and the contraction of the entire Mediterranean economy in the 3rd century A.D. which reduced the demand for oriental goods.

5583 LEWIS, BERNARD. "The sources for the history of the Syrian Assassins." *Speculum* 37 (O '52) 475-89. Summarizes the work done to date and evaluates the sources—Isma'ili, western, other non-Moslem, and general Arabic—that will have to be utilized in writing the history of the Assassins.

5584 MASSIGNON, L. "Le futuwwa ou 'pacte d'honneur artisanal' entre travailleurs musulmans au Moyen Âge." *La Nouvelle Klio* (Brussels) 4 (O '52) 171-98.

5585 MAXOUDIAN, NOUBAR. "Early Armenia as an empire: the career of Tigranes III. 96-55 B.C." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap '52) 156-63. A brief account of a high point in Armenian political history.

5586 MINORSKY, V. "Les études historiques sur la Perse depuis 1935, III." *Acta Orient.* (Copenhagen) 21, no. 2 (1951) 108-24. A communication to the 19th Orientalist Congress (1948).

5587 MITWALLY, M. "History of the relations between the Egyptian oases of the Libyan desert and the Nile Valley." *Bulletin de l'Inst. Fouad I du Desert* no. 1 (Ja '52) 114-31. A study of the uses of these oases and their relationship to trade routes from the earliest times.

5588 MOSCATI, SABATINO. "Il testamento di Abū Ḥāsim." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 27, no. 1-4 (1952) 28-46. Explains how the Abbasids shifted from the Shi'ites after the success of the conspiracy.

5589 PELLAT, C. "Gāhīz à Bagdād et à Sāmarrā." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 27, no. 1-4 (1952) 47-67. He was a publicist for al-Ma'mūn. Changes in the political situation altered the views he expounded.

5590 PRAWER, J. "The settlement of the Latins in Jerusalem." *Speculum* no. 27 (O '52) 490-503. An extremely interesting account of the "planned" settlement of Jerusalem after the conquest of the city by the Crusaders. A new population was introduced along with international traders in an attempt to enrich the rulers. Geography defeated these efforts and Jerusalem remained the capital of the kingdom only for sentimental reasons.

See also: 5691

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Modern)

5591 "Persia, the keystone." *Round Table* 169 (D '52) 28-40. Reviews the history of Britain's relations with Persia since 1946 and explains some of the factors that led to a grave deterioration of these relations in 1951.

5592 "Soviet imperialism." *Round Table* 169 (D '52) 15-27. An examination of Soviet policy in Central Asia.

5593 K., G. E. "Crisis in Egypt and Persia." *World Today* 8 (S '52) 366-74. The author virtually writes off Persia which "like the receding galaxies of which the astronomers tell us seems to be swiftly passing beyond the visible horizon of the West." Egypt offers hope if her rulers "concentrate soberly on essentials and eschew the temptation of the spectacular." America and Britain should acquiesce in the trend of the times to prevent serious consequences.

5594 K., I. "The Syrian social nationalist movement: 1947-1949." *Syrian Rev. of Arab World Aff.* 1 (O '52) 5-17.

5595 L., G. "Dittatura militare anche nel Libano?" *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan) 16 (S 27 '52) 1003-4. A short review of the overturn of the al-Khūrī government.

5596 L., G. "L'Iran dopo la rottura con Londra." *Relazioni Internazionali* 16 (O '25 '52) 1110. The Iranian problem as seen in Washington, London, and Moscow.

5597 R., R. "La politica estera dell'Arabia Saudiana." *Relazioni Internazionali* 17 (Ja 24 '53) 72. The role of ARAMCO in the development of railroads, monetary policies, etc.

5598 AMEER 'ALI, SYED WARIS. "Islamic and western impacts." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap '52) 118-28. An interesting and scholarly refutation of a statement in the London *Times*, which characterized Islam as intolerant.

5599 AMIN, A. M. "Arabische gedanken zur deutschen aussenpolitik." *Aussenpolitik* (Stuttgart) 2 (S '51) 426-9. India and Egypt were among the first nations to resume diplomatic relations with (West) Germany, which they regard as an ally.

5600 ATYEAO, HENRY C. "Egyptian nationalism." *Current Hist.* 23 (N '52) 312-5. The security of the country can be assured only by cooperation between Egypt and the West. Britain's willingness to compromise and Nagib's moderation justify optimism.

5601 BOSSHARD, WALTER. "Iraq, rich and restless." *Swiss Rev. of World Aff.* 2 (D '52) 13-6. Written before the November disturbances, but indicative of these events.

5602 BRITT, GEORGE. "Lebanon's popular revolution." *Middle East J.* 7 (winter '53) 1-17. An exposé of the corruptness of the al-Khūrī regime and the steps leading to its fall in September 1952.

5603 CASE, PAUL EDWARD. "Boom time in Kuwait." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 102 (D '52) 683-802. Enthusiastic description of a radical transformation in this Arab kingdom's way of life that has been made possible by its oil revenues. Illust.

5604 CRESTA, M. "Die staatswerbung Libyens." *Aussenpolitik* 2 (Mr '51) 110-7. Libya declined markedly under British occupation. Italy and West Germany should cooperate in economic activity in Libya.

5605 CUMMING, DUNCAN CAMERON. "The disposal of Eritrea." *Middle East J.* 7 (winter '53) 18-32. The events which led to the handing of Eritrea over to Ethiopia.

5606 DE JOUVENEL, BERTRAND. "The North African dilemma." *Colonial Rev.* 7 (D '52) 241-2. France's difficulties in Morocco and Tunis.

5607 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Les Tunisiens devant la culture occidentale." *I.B.L.A.* (Tunis) 15, no. 3 (1952) 237-64. Contrasting the western and eastern spirit as revealed in the culture of the country. The reaction of Tunisian youth to the conflict.

5608 DILDINE, W. G. "Iran today." *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi) 4 (Mr '51) 20-39. Iran is characterized by a backward economy and insufficient public schools.

5609 DOGROL, O. R. "Turkish foreign policy since the revolution." *Pakistan Horizon* 4 (Je '51) 61-7. A review of Turkish foreign policy since 1919, with particular reference to the U.S.S.R.

5610 FITZSIMONS, M. A. "Britain and the Middle East." *Rev. of Politics* (Notre Dame, Indiana) 13 (Ja '51) 21-38. The British position is one of strategic retreat with the use of the Arab League as a rear guard action.

5611 GROTH, H. M. "Det nye brennpunkt." *Internasjonal Politikk* (Oslo) 4, no. 4 (1951) 118-21. There is mutual distrust between the U.K. and the U.S.A. with regard to their Middle East policies. The former is jealous and the U.S. does not want to be identified with its imperialism. Turkey and Israel understand regional defense but the Arab League members are neutralists.

5612 GUTH, O. A. "Persia and oil." *Australian Outlook* (Sydney) 5 (Je '51) 77-89. An exposition of the Anglo-Iranian conflict showing the political evolution since 1939.

5613 HALPERN, MANFRED. "The implications of communism for Islam." *Muslim World* 43 (Ja '53) 28-41. Communism may well continue to gain strength if conditions remain desperate. However, discontented Moslems are more likely to affiliate with one of the neo-Islamic totalitarian movements, such as the Moslem Brethren, than with the Communist Party.

5614 HERALD, GEORGE W. "The bey of Tunis: alchemist, astrologist, Francophobe." *United Nations World* (New York) 6 (D '52) 16-9. Workers are unionized and are anti-colonial in their views. Their leaders have the support of the American C.I.O. and the A.F.L.

5615 HOURANI, ALBERT. "The decline of the west in the Middle East, I." *Internat. Aff.* 29 (Ja '53) 22-42. A penetrating psychological analysis of the anti-British sentiment prevalent in the Arab world which has stemmed, almost inevitably, from the relations between the "powerful" and the "powerless."

5616 JUST, A. W. "Iran zwischen den mächten." *Aussenpolitik* 1 (S '50) 202-8. Iran remains in unstable equilibrium between the rival ambitions of the two world powers.

5617 KARDOSH, F. "Parties and politics in Syria." *India Quart.* 7 (Ja-Mr '51) 29-35. The history of political parties in Syria is bound up with the Arab liberation movement.

5618 KEENS, L. T. "Glimpses of the interior of the Aden protectorate." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap '52) 143-6. Emphasizes the role of the R.A.F., particularly in the Hadhramaut.

5619 KHULUSI, S. A. "An account of Nadir Shah in an eighteenth century Arabic manuscript." *Islamic Cult.* (Hyderabad) 25 (O '51) 146-54. 'Abdullah al-Suwaydi's *al-Nafhah al-Miskiyah fi al-Rihlah al-Makkiyah*.

5620 LANDAU, JACOB M. "Abu Naddara, an Egyptian Jewish nationalist." *J. of Jewish Stud.* (London) 3, no. 1 (1952) 30-44. James Ṣanū' was connected with Afghani and Abduh. He used the colloquial in journalism. He fought the Khedive and the British. He died in exile in France.

5621 LEHRMAN, HAL. "The Arabs, Israel, and Near East defense." *Commentary* (New York) 14 (D '52) 563-74. Reviews the tangled history of the efforts to set up a Near East defense system and the issues now dividing Israel and the Arab states. Recommends to the State Department a solution that combines firmness with moderation, makes no unreasonable demands on either side, and saves face all around.

5622 LENTZ, WOLFGANG. "Sondervollmachten für Mossaddegh." *Z. für Geo-Politik* (Heidelberg) 23 (N '52) 680-97. A study of the forces in Iran that play upon Mossaddegh.

5623 LEWIS, N. N. "Syria and the British consulates in the nineteenth century." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap '52) 147-55. Gleanings from 19th cent. documents in the British consulate at Beirut.

5624 LUETHY, HERBERT. "Cross-tides of North African revolt." *Commentary* 14 (N '52) 433-49. This lengthy, first-hand report on Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia is more than hit-and-run journalism. It contains a detailed and penetrating analysis of a dangerous and complex situation from a mildly pro-French position. The author views nationalism as a "psychosis" of our times that has benefitted none of the newly concocted nations of the 20th century, nor is it likely to do so in the case of North Africa. "Carthage must not be destroyed," he concludes.

5625 MONTAGNE, R. "En marge de la crise marocaine." *Etudes* (Paris) 269 (Je '51) 305-30. Lyautey tried to get the young elite to support France, but since his death they have been the soul of the *Istiqlāl*. The problem can be solved only by the birth of democratic institutions which will give the intellectuals a place in the social structure of the country.

5626 REED, HOWARD A. "A new force at work in democratic Turkey." *Middle East J.* 7 (winter '53) 33-44. A survey of the political awakening of the Turkish villager and the effects of the new roads and new machinery upon him and upon the Turkish economy.

5627 SAUNDERS, R. M. "The Middle East." *External Aff.* (Ottawa) 4 (N '52) 362-70. Oil in the Middle East has added a new and vital element to the importance of the area, but in every country the people are aflame with nationalism. They are ready for "social revolution and economic transformation."

5628 SCHECHTMAN, JOSEPH B. "Compulsory transfer of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria." *J. of Cent. European Aff.* (Boulder, Colorado) 12 (Jl '52) 154-69. A survey of the actual movement of people and the agreements between Bulgaria and Turkey on this subject from 1923 to the present, showing how the present movements contravene the provisions of the various treaties.

5629 SCHMIDT, H. D. "The Nazi party in Palestine and the Levant 1932-9." *Internat. Aff.* 28 (O '52) 460-9. Demonstration of how a totalitarian power could exert pressure on an ethnic group living thousands of miles away by exploiting language ties and social instincts.

5630 TAKY DEEN, SA'ID. "Inside story of Lebanon's coup d'état." *Syrian Rev. of Arab World Aff.* 1 (O '52) 1-4.

See also: 5566, 5572, 5647, 5650, 5715, 5716, 5723

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

5631 "The Arabian American Oil Company in 1951." *Petroleum Times* 56 (O 3 '52) 835-7. Production increased by 10,000,000 tons.

5632 "Kirkuk to Paris: a market for mid-east gas?" *Oil Forum* 7 (Ja '53) 22-6.

5633 "The Levant: oil corridor." *Petroleum Press Service* (London) 20 (F '53) 51-4. The problem of the transit of oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia across the oil-less countries of Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon is again raised by negotiations with those countries.

5634 "Reclaiming an Aden wilderness." *New Commonwealth* (London) 24 (N 24 '52) 536-8. A report on the Abyan scheme in the Western Aden Protectorate. Suggests the institution of systematic research there in order to apply the lessons learned to other arid areas. Map.

5635 "Third river almost trebles Iraq production." *Oil Forum* 7 (Ja '53) 21, 31.

5636 "U.S. Federal Trade Commission alleges an international oil cartel." *Petroleum Times* 56 (O 3 '52) 839-47. Extracts from a 374-page report giving details of ownership of Middle East oil companies, marketing arrangements, etc.

5637 CLAXTON, PHILIP. "Soil erosion and its conservation." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Jl-O '52) 269-79. Description of a system, "the still water pocket," developed on the Punjab-Baluchistan frontier, for stemming floods and diverting the flood water for irrigation at little cost. The author believes that the principle could be profitably applied to the Tigris-Euphrates and other rivers in the Middle East. Diagrams.

5638 FEINER, LEON. "The Aswan Dam development project." *Middle East J.* 6 (autumn '52) 464-7. A description of what the dam will mean in the building of fertilizer plants, steel mills, and power stations.

5639 FRANCK, PETER G. "Economic nationalism in the Middle East." *Middle East J.* 6 (autumn '52) 429-54. Discusses the problems of nationalization of industry, foreign investment, trade and tariffs in and among the Middle Eastern states.

5640 GAITSKELL, ARTHUR. "The Sudan Gezira scheme." *African Aff.* (London) 51 (O '52) 306-13. The scheme is frankly collective.

5641 GAITSKELL, ARTHUR. "The Sudan Gezira scheme — investment and management and social philosophy." *Colonial Rev.* 7 (D '52) 235-7.

5642 GAVIN, R. "Economic and social conditions in Somaliland under Italian trusteeship." *Colonial Rev.* 7 (D '52) 242-4.

5643 ISSAWI, CHARLES. "A note on the conditions of economic progress in the Middle East." *J. Econ. Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago) no. 4 (D '52) 289-94. Compares the economic and social progress of the Middle East with that of several other regions of the world on the basis of 12 criteria of development such as national income, steel consumption, life expectancy, literacy, etc. A novel and illuminating approach.

5644 LENTZ, WOLFGANG. "Die verstaatlichung der ölindustrie in Iran." *Z. für Geo-Politik* (Heidelberg) 23 (O '52) 608-31. A detailed study of the oil industry in Iran from the beginning. Valuable bibliography.

5645 LEWIS, NORMAN N. "Lebanon-the mountain and its terraces." *Geog. Rev.* (New York) 43 (Ja '53) 1-14. Their influence upon the economic and agricultural life of the country.

5646 LISLE, T. ORCHARD. "Iranian oil: international body proposed." *Oil Forum* 7 (Ja '53) 27-8.

5647 MAJID KHAN, A. "Palestine, Israel, and Jordan." *India Quart.* 6 (O-D '50) 341-51. A survey of the economic and political results of recent events upon the Arabs of Transjordan.

5648 SEBASTIÁN DE ERICA, F. "Apostillas económicas al estatuto de Tanger. *Cuadernos de Política Internac.* (Madrid) 5 (Ja-Mr '51) 149-58. The economic clauses of the statute are unfavorable to Spain and should be revised.

5649 STAUFFER, THOMAS. "The Egyptian land reform law." *J. Econ. Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago) no. 4 (D '52) 295-304. Texts, official explanatory notes accompanying the law, and several incidental comments.

5650 WARRINER, DOREEN. "Land reform in Egypt and its repercussions." *Internat. Aff.* 29 (Ja '53) 1-10. The pace of social change in the Arab world has been quickened by land reform in Egypt. The significance of this development lies in the fact that Middle East nationalism, hitherto negative and sterile, may be in the process of finding its economic and social content.

See also: 5608, 5626, 5713

SOCIAL AFFAIRS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law)

5651 W., D. "Hope for the Arab refugees." *World Today* 8 (D '52) 512-21. Analysis of U.N.R.W.A.'s scheme for a power station and irrigation system based on the Yarmuk River. Hopes of success for such a project are greater in Jordan than elsewhere because the country has the largest number of refugees and a more favorable political situation.

5652 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "The personal law of the Druze community, II." *Welt des Islams* (Leiden) 2 (1952) 83-94. On the laws concerning divorce, paternity, testate succession, *waqf*. They follow Hanafi patterns to a large extent.

5653 BOUSQUET, G.-H. "Recueil de délibérations à la mosquée de Beni Isguen. *Annales de l'Inst. d'Etudes Orient.* (Algiers) 9 (1951) 18-51. Publication of a native translation into French of the decisions made until about 30 years ago.

5654 BRÉMARD, F. "La procédure législative au Maroc depuis 1912." *Rev. Juridique et Politique de l'Union Française* (Paris) 5 (Ap-Je '51).

5655 BROWNE, LAURENCE E. "The conception of the unity of God in Islam and other religions." *Islamic Cult.* (Hyderabad) 25 (Ja-O '51) 1-17.

5656 BUSSON DE JANSSENS, G. "Les wakfs dans l'Islam contemporain." *Rev. d'Etudes Islamiques* (Paris) (1951) 1-72. Survey of the present situation with regard to the administration of these properties. The section on Egypt is now almost entirely obsolete.

5657 CERVIN, VLADIMIR. "Problems in the integration of the Afghan nation." *Middle East J.* 6 (autumn '52) 400-16. The difficulties of bringing village and urban groups into an harmonious unity. Many of the social problems of the tribes are discussed.

5658 CLARY, C. PHOEBE. "Turkey today." *Internat. House Quart.* 16 (autumn '52) 214-3. Miss Clary, an American educator in Turkey, discusses the status of women in Turkey and describes the local educational system.

5659 EHRENFELS, U. R. "Ambivalent attitudes to womanhood in Islamic society." *Islamic Cult.* (Hyderabad) 25 (Ja-O '51) 73-88. Early Islam and pre-Aryan India both show these attitudes.

5660 FARAH, RAFIQ A. "The Arab church in Israel." *Muslim World* 42 (O '52) 245-8. There are many difficulties. The Israel Government considers the Arabs as a "tolerated people." Moreover the Arabs, particularly the Christians, have "degenerated" greatly. Missionaries seem unconcerned with the indigenous churches, concentrating wholly on work among the Jews.

5661 LE GENISSEL, A. "La communauté turque." *Études* 265 (Ap '50) 89-104. Ottoman traditions and the new state.

5662 HA'AFGHANI, S. S. "Tribes in Pushtunistan" (in Hebrew). *Beterem* (Tel Aviv) (N 1 '52) 41-3. In the region lying between Afghanistan and Pakistan are some 2,000,000 tribesmen who regard themselves as belonging to the "Jewish race" and call themselves *Bnai Yisrael*. Some characteristics of these people are lightly touched on here.

5663 LICHTENSTÄDTER, ILSE. "An Arab-Egyptian family." *Middle East J.* 6 (autumn '52) 379-9. A study of the social structure of an Egyptian village and its reaction to modern influences.

5664 MASSIGNON, L. "Documents sur certain waqfs des lieux saints de l'Islam." *Rev. d'Etudes Islamiques* (1951) 73-120.

5665 METZEMAIKERS, L. "Antekeningen over Turkije." *Internationale Spectator* (Gravenhage) 6 (N 12 '52) 8-12. Discusses the role of the abolition of the *shari'ah* in the modernization of Turkey and its application to present-day Egypt.

5666 PAUTY, EDMOND. "Villes spontanées et villes créées en Islam." *Annales de l'Inst. d'Etudes Orient.* (Algiers) (1951) 52-75. A study of urbanism, as compared with its course of development in the West.

5667 SĀLIM, 'ALI. "The problem of students' strikes" (in Arabic). *Thaqāfah* (Cairo) 14 (Ap 28 '52) 17-9.

5668 SAUVAGET, J. "Suggestions pour une réforme de la typographie arabe." *Rev. d'Etudes Islamiques* (1951) 127-32.

5669 SCHIMMEL, ANNEMARIE. "Some aspects of mystical prayer in Islam." 2 (1952) 112-25.

5670 SMITH, W. C. "Modern Turkey: Islamic reformation." *Islamic Cult.* 25 (Ja-O '51) 155-86. "The Turks seem creative enough to understand and to accept, creative enough to implement and to develop a new religious vision. Whether they are creative enough to produce one is the crucial question."

5671 VALIUDDIN, MIR. "Reconciliation between Ibn 'Arabi's *Wahdat al-kūjūd* and the Mujaddid's *Wahdat al-shuhūd*." *Islamic Cult.* 25 (Ja-O '51) 43-51.

5672 VITTA, E. "Gli accordi d'armistizio fra lo stato d'Israele e gli stati arabi." *Rassegna di Diritto Pubblico* 5 (Ja-F '50) 96-114. A study of the four armistice agreements. See also: 5669, 5608, 5613, 5647

SCIENCE

(General, history)

5673 BENHAMOUDA, A. "Les noms arabes des étoiles." *Annales de l'Inst. d'Études Orient.* (Algiers) (1951) 76-210. Analysis of Arabic nomenclature, Western prototypes and borrowings.

5674 ACKENHEIM, EMIL L. "Ibn Sina: the man and his work." *Middle East. Aff.* (New York) 3 (O '52) 265-71. A lucid, popular summary of the philosophical doctrines of this great Islamic scholar.

5675 GOICHON, A. M. "La personnalité d'Avicenne." *I.B.L.A.* (Tunis) 15 (1952) 265-82.

ART

(Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics, painting and music)

5676 "Last year's official exhibition of the arts." *Annales Archaeol. de Syrie* 1, no. 2 (1951) 254-61.

5677 ABDUL-HAK, SÉLIM. "Chronique des monuments historiques." *Annales Archaeol. de Syrie* 1, no. 2 (1951) 248-59. Deals with restoration work done at the Crusader Castle, Le Crac des Chevaliers, of the Bab Faradis and the Madrasa az-Zahiriya in Damascus and of the Throne Hall in the

Citadel of Aleppo (the latter a translation of an Arabic report published in the same issue, pp. 330-2). Illust.

5678 ABDUL-HAK, SÉLIM. "Chronique des Musées." *Annales Archaeol. de Syrie* 1, no. 1 (1951) 129-44. Contains a report on "La reconstitution de l'aile orientale de Kasr al-Heir al-Gharbi au Musée de Damas" (pp. 129-33), and on "Le cavalier en céramique glacisée de Rakka" (pp. 143-4).

5679 ALFÖLDI, ANDRÉ. "Études sur le trésor de Nagyszentmiklós, II." *Cahiers Archaeol.* 6 (1952) 43-53. Discusses the motif of "Ganymed's abduction by the eagle" and its spread in Islamic, Turkish, and Mongol art, folklore, and literature. Illust. with 9 plates.

5680 BARAMKI, DIMITRI. "Kufic texts." *Annual of the Dept. of Antiquities of Jordan* 1 (1951) 20-2. Ten inscriptions in 9th cent. Kufic incised in rock by passing caravans; some were found next to Thamudic inscriptions.

5681 BARNETT, R. D. "South Arabian sculptures." *Brit. Museum Quart.* 17 (N '52) 47-8. After a short survey of the early history of South Arabia, the author discusses briefly the Museum's collection of stone sculptures in the indigenous style—funerary portraits of a man and several women, heads of bull calves and full length figures and of bronzes in the Hellenistic vein. Five pieces are illustrated.

5682 DALTON, MERRELL. "Mystery of ruined Arab city of Gedi." *New Commonwealth* (London) 24 (N 24 '52) 534-5. Brief account of excavations and restorations along the East African coast some 70 miles northeast of Mombasa.

5683 GOLVIN, L. "Le reggat." *Annales de l'Inst. d'Etudes Orient.* (Algiers) (1951) 5-17. The way of life of rural carpet weavers.

5684 HADDĀD, NIQŪLĀ. "On Oriental music." (in Arabic) *Risālah* (Cairo) 20 (Ap 28 '52) 466-8.

5685 HASKINS, JOHN F. "Northern origins of 'Sasanian' metal work, I." *Artibus Asiae* 15 (1952) 241-67. A critical study of Sasanian silver work based on weapons, especially swords. Illust.

5686 KIRKBRIDGE, A. S. "Recent finds of Arabic gold coins." *Annual of the Dept. of Antiquities of Jordan* 1 (1951) 17-9. Short discussion of two troves, one of Umayyad and Abbasid coins (between 79 and 171 A.H.), the other of coins of the Fatimids al-Mu'izz, al-'Aziz, and al-Hakim (between 364 and 1007 A.H.); also of a gold coin of the last Abbasid al-Musta'sim, dated Baghdad 640. All were found in Jordan.

5687 LLOYD, SETON AND BRICE, WILLIAM. "Harran." *Anatolian Studies* 1 (1951) 77-111. An exploration and excavation report containing a survey of the topography and literary references to the town, followed by studies of the citadel, its southeast gateway and a Basilican church. Appendix: "Note on the stele of Aṣağı Yarimeca" by C. J. Gadd. Illust.

5688 MA'ĀDH, KHĀLID. "The burial grounds of kings and sultans in Damascus" (in Arabic). *Annales Archaeol. de Syrie* 1, no. 2 (1951) 235 ff. Historical and architectural data.

5689 NORRIS, H. T. "A journey in northern Hisma." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap '52) 135-42. Archeological reconnaissance of the region along the borders of southern Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

5690 PICARD-SCHMITTER, M. T. "Scènes d'apothéose sur des soieries provenant de Ray." *Artibus Asiae* 14, no. 4 (1951) 306-41. An iconographic study centered around four Persian silks with the "Ganymed" motif. Illust.

5691 RICE, D. S. "Medieval Harrān. Studies on its topography and monuments, I." *Anatolian Studies* 2 (1952) 36-84. Contains a translation of Ibn Shaddād's account of Harrān, with a detailed commentary, historical observations on the citadel, and an analysis of a fragmentary inscription on its southwest tower (attributed here to al-Malik an-Nāṣir, ca. 715/1315); a very detailed account of the newly excavated southeast gateway of the citadel, its architecture, decoration and iconography, a list of the minor finds; and a historical sketch of the Numairid dynasty, 380-512/990-1118.

5692 RICE, D. S. "Studies in Islamic metal work." *B.S.O.S.* (London) 14, no. 3 (1952) 564-78. An historical, epigraphic, and aesthetic analysis of a silver inlaid brass bowl in the Benaki Collection of Athens which is attributed to the emir Sungur al-A'sar during his tenure of office in Damascus 683-95/1284-95. This is followed by a critical study of the seven known blazons of Mamluk ladies.

5693 SCHROEDER, ERIC. "The wild deer mathnavi." *J. of Aesthetics and Arts Criticism* 11, no. 2 (D '52) 118-34. Translation and interpretation of the meaning of allusions in a poem by Hafiz. The explanations, however, are often as difficult to understand as the poem itself.

5694 VAN BEEK, G. W. "Recovering the ancient civilization of Arabia." *Biblical Archaeologist* (New Haven) 15 (F '52) 2-18. The Qataban expedition (Wadi Beihan) under W. Phillips and W. F. Albright.

5695 VAN BERCHEM, MARGUERITE. "Uncovering a lost city of the Sahara: excavating Sedrata . . . in Southern Algeria." *Illust. London News* 222 (Ja 31 '53) 165-7. Report

on two expeditions to the Ibadite capital of the 10th to 13th centuries. Aerial photographs of the site, architectural view and details of the rich plaster decorations. Illust.

See also: 5577

LANGUAGE

5696 LESLAU, WOLF. "Notes on the Kambatta of southern Ethiopia." *Africa* (London) 22 (O '52) 348-59. Kambatta belongs to the Sidamo dialects which are important for understanding the various Semitic languages of Ethiopia.

5697 PENZI, HERBERT. "Die substantiv des Paschtu nach afghanischen grammatischen." *Z.D.M.G.* (Wiesbaden) 102, no. 1 (1952) 52-61.

5698 SAMAN, G. "Les études de la langue turque." *Arch. Orient.* (Prague) 19 (N '51) 108-13.

See also: 5673

LITERATURE

5699 BLOCH, ALFRED. "Der künstlerische wert der altarabischen verskunst." *Acta Orientalia* (Copenhagen) 21, no. 3 (1951) 207-28.

5700 DAYF, SHAWQI. "Ibn Hāni' the younger." (in Arabic) *Thaqāfah* (Cairo) 14 (Ap 28 '52) 13-6. On the Egyptian poet who flourished in the 6th cent. A.H. under the Fatimids.

5701 DAYF, SHAWQI. "Ibn al-Kayzānī" (in Arabic). *Thaqāfah* 14 (Mr 31 and Ap 7 '52) 9-12, 12-5. On a Sufi poet of the late Fatimid period.

5702 DUNLOP, D. M. "Al-Fārābī's aphorisms of the statesman." *Iraq* (London) 14 (autumn '52) 93-117. Translation of a Bodleian ms.

5703 HASAN, HADI. "The unique *diwan* of Humayun Badshah." *Islamic Culture* 25 (Ja-O '51) 212-76. Analysis of the Persian writings of a royal poet of the 16th century.

5704 AL-KHATĪB, AHMAD MUŞTAFA. "Omar Khayyam" (in Arabic). *Risālah* (Cairo) 20 (Mr 12, 24 '52) 296-7; 328-331.

5705 MUID KHAN, M. A. "Some aspects of the Arabic writings of the philosopher Ibn Sina." *Islamic Culture* 25 (Ja-O '51) 27-43. Devoted chiefly to his Arabic poetry.

5706 AN-NĀŞIRI, 'ABD AL-QADIR RASHĪD. "From recent Sudanese poetry" (in Arabic). *Risālah* 20 (Ap 28 '52) 473-7.

5707 ROSENTHAL, E. J. "The place of politics in the philosophy of Ibn Bajja." *Islamic Culture* 25 (Ja-O '51) 187-211. Analysis of *K. tadbir al-mutawakkil*, published by Asin Palacios in 1946.

5708 ROSENTHAL, FRANZ. "Ash-Shaykh al-Yūnānī and the Arabic Plotinus source." *Orientalia* (Rome) 21, no. 4 (1952) 461-92.

Light is thrown on the enigmatic figure mentioned by Shahrestani.

5709 ROSSI, E. "Osservazioni preliminari per une edizione critica del *kitāb-i Dede Qorqut*." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 27, no. 1-4 (1952) 67-73. The edition has appeared (1952) since this paper was read at the Orientalist congress last year.

5710 SHAFAQ, S. R. "Patriotic poetry in modern Iran." *Middle East J.* 6 (autumn '52) 417-28. A review of the poetry reflecting political developments in Iran during the 19th and 20th centuries.

5711 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. "The aesthetic foundation of Arabic literature." *Comparative Literature* 4 (fall '52) 723-40. Analyzes skilfully and with pertinent references the role of imagination and the relation of content and form in Arabic literature; points to classical prototypes and European parallels from the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Baroque.

5712 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. E. "Avicenna's *Risāla fi'l-Išq* and courtly love." *J. Nr. East. Stud.* 11 (O '52) 233-8. Discussion of a theory that Arabic literature fostered the growth of the concept of courtly love.

See also: 5619, 5714

BIBLIOGRAPHY

5713 BOCHENSKI, FELIKS. "Post-war economic writings on the Middle East." *Middle East J.* 7 (winter '53) 100-6. An analysis of the contents and value of thirty odd books on economic development in the Middle East since 1943.

5714 RATZABY, Y. "The literature of the Yemenite Jews" (in Hebrew). *Kirjath Sepher* (Jerusalem) 28 (Ag '52) 255-78. A bibliographic study.

5715 SHAYYAL, GAMAL AL-DIN. "A sketch of Arabic historical works published in Egypt and the Near East during the last five years (1945-1950)." *Proc. Royal Soc. of Hist. Stud.* (Cairo) 1 (1952) 143-74. Alphabetically arranged according to author, with an English translation of the Arabic titles and occasional comments.

5716 ZIADEH, NICOLA A. "Recent Arabic literature on Arabism." *Middle East J.* 6 (autumn '52) 468-73. Lists and discusses the merits of 18 Arabic works on nationalism.

See also: 5586, 5644

BIOGRAPHY

5717 "Faris Nimir Pasha." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap '52) 167-9. An obituary notice of the founder of the Egyptian periodicals *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Muqattam*, which had

wide circulation in the Arab world during the last decade of the 19th and first two decades of the 20th centuries.

5718 "Mohammed Neguib." *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan) 16 (S 20 '52) 980. A brief, but excellent character sketch of the new ruler of Egypt.

5719 BABINGER, F. "Johannes Hendrik Kramers (1891-1951)." *Z.D.M.G.* (Wiesbaden) 102, no. 1 (1952) 10-3.

5720 CHAMBERS, EDMUND. "North African pioneer." *Muslim World* 43 (Ja '53) 7-14. The life and works of the noted scholar and missionary Percy Smith, 1876-1932.

5721 DAQŪQĪ, HUSAYN 'ALĪ. "Al-Hasan al-Basrī (in Arabic)." *Risālah* (Cairo) 30 (Mr 24 '52) 332-5.

5722 FARRELL, W. J. "In memoriam." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Jl-O '52) 280-1. Obituary of an important Arab educational leader in Palestine, Ahmad Samīḥ b. Shaykh Rāghib al-Khālidī.

5723 LANDAU, ROM. "Moroccan profiles: a nationalist view." *Middle East J.* 7 (winter '53) 45-57. Short sketches of the Moroccan Sultan and other nationalist leaders.

5724 PICARD, CHARLES. "René Grousset (1885-1952)." *Artibus Asiae* 15, no. 3 (1952) 277-9. Obituary of the French historian whose work includes: *Civilisations de l'Orient* (1929-30), *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem*, 3 vols. (1934-6), *Vie de Gengis Khan* (1944), *Histoire de l'Arménie des Origines à 1071* (1947), *L'Empire des Steppes: Attila, Gengis-Khan, Tamerlan*.

5725 RYPKA, J. "In memoriam de l'académicien I. J. Kračkovskij." *Archiv Orient.* (Prague) 19 (N '51) 283-91.

See also: 5614

ORIENTAL STUDIES

5726 BAUSANI, A. "Les études d'iranistique et turcologie en Italie depuis 1914." *Archiv Orient.* (Prague) 19 (N '51) 85-93.

5727 HOLT, P. M. "The origin of Arabic studies in England." *al-Kulliya* (Khartoum) 1 (N '52) 20-7.

5728 MASSÉ, H. "Les études islamiques en France." *Archiv Orient.* 19 (N '51) 94-7.

5729 PETRÁČEK, K. "Les études arabes et islamiques et la sémitologie en Tchécoslovaquie." *Archiv Orient.* 19 (N '51) 98-107.

BOOK REVIEWS

5730 *Arabian Peninsula*. *Muslim World* 43 (Ja '53) 58-9. (D. S. Dodge). This is a selected, annotated list of periodicals, books, and articles in English published by the Library of Congress.

5731 *Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951*. *Muslim World* 43 (Ja '53) 59-60. (H. P. Hall). "The presentation (of the book) is from a British viewpoint and to compensate there has been added an appendix giving a summary of the Egyptian case."

5732 *Land-forms of Arabia*. *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Jl-O '52) 289. "This map is . . . drawn to indicate the various types of land surface found in the Arabian peninsula. The general effect is that of a photographed bas-relief map with geological and geographical information superimposed . . . the detail is not precise."

5733 *The Middle East: a political and economic survey*. *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 39 (Ap. '52) 177-8. (G. M. R.). A really effective handbook of the areas dealt with. Although readable, its value must be mainly as a work of reference.

5734 ABBAS, MEKKI. *The Sudan question*. *Africa* (London) 22 (O '52) 379-80. (H. MacMichael). "This book gives the best picture extant of the whole background of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute about the Sudan and of the successive stages through which it has passed;" *Middle East J.* 7 (winter '53) 115-6. (E. Atiyah). The author is undoubtedly right in arguing that Egypt's interests in the Sudan, which were strategic and commercial in the earlier stages, began to assume a new and more fundamental character after the establishment of the Condominium."

5735 ABU RIDAH, MUHAMMAD ABD AL-HADI, ed. *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafīyya*. *Rev. des Études Islamiques* (1951) 125-6. (G. Vajda).

5736 ACCADEMIA DEL MEDITERRANEO. *Atti del primo convegno internazionale di studi Mediterranei*. *Middle East J.* 7 (winter '53) 109-10. (C. G. Haines). "Vella's thesis was and still is that the Mediterranean is destined to revive as an important route of communications in consequence of the emergence of the United States as the greatest of world powers."

5737 AHMAD, MIRZA BASHIRUDDIN MAHMUD. *Ahmadiyyat*. *Muslim World* 43 (Ja '53) 49-51. (A. K. C.)

5738 AMĪN, AHMAD. *Hayāti*. *Muslim World* 43 (Ja '53) 64-5. (A. K. C.) The book is the autobiography of a noted leader of modern Egyptian letters and an important personal source book of Egyptian life and thought during the past 50 years.

5739 AMĪN, AHMAD. *As-Ša'laka wal-futuwwa fi'l-Islām*. *Risālah* 30 (Ap 14 '52) 426-8. ('Abd al-'Aziz Muḥarram).

5740 AMĪN, AHMAD. *Yawm al-Islām*. *Thaqāfah* (Cairo) 14 (Ap 14 '52) 28-30. (Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghāni Ḥasan).

5741 ANDERSON, R. C. *Naval wars in the Levant, 1550-1853*. Middle East J. 7 (winter '53) 107-8. (W. J. Morgan). "One forms a picture of futility and inability of either the Venetians or the Turks to achieve a truly decisive naval victory."

5742 BIRKELAND, H. *Sprak og religion hos jøden og arabere*. Bibl. Orientalia (Leiden) 9 (Ja '52) 32. (A. S. Kaplrad).

5743 BISBEE, ELEANOR. *The new Turks. Internat. Aff.* 28 (O '52) 515-6. (B. Lewis); *Welt des Islams* (Leiden) 2, no. 2 (1952) 146-1. (G. Jäschke).

5744 BRELVI, MAHMUD. *Muslims in Arabia and Africa*. Muslim World 43 (Ja '53) 63-4. (A. K. C.). "It might have made for a more durable work if the author . . . had not tried to combine a handbook with a study, and had not sought both to describe the ephemeral and interpret the essential."

5745 BRUCE, IAN, ed. *The nun of Lebanon: the love affair of Lady Hester Stanhope and Michael Bruce*. Middle East J. 6 (autumn '52) 476-7. (M. Khadduri).

5746 CAMPBELL, C. G. *From town and tribe*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 39 (Ap '52) 179. (A. S. T.) "The tales in this collection come mostly from Oman and southern Iraq."

5747 COATES, W. P. and ZELDA. *Soviets in Central Asia*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 39 (Ap '52) 174-5. (P. B. Henze). "This book is worth reading only as an alarming example of how Westerners can be led to 'parrot' Soviet propaganda."

5748 COOKE, HEDLEY, V. *Challenge and response in the Middle East*. Middle East J. 6 (autumn '52) 474-6. (D. S. Franck). "The trouble with catchy titles is that they lead the reader to expect too much;" *United States Quart. Book Rev.* (Washington) 8 (D '52) 396-7. "The book makes clear the immensity of the task ahead in attempting to raise the standard of living in a society whose customs are as deeply rooted as they are in the Middle East."

5749 COON, CARLETON. *Caravan*. Amer. Anthropologist 54 (Jl '52) 396-7. (Raphael Patai). "Dr Coon emphasizes the mosaic-like quality of the Middle Eastern picture . . . this quality is increasingly conveyed under headings such as 'Strength in Diversity', 'More Peoples, the Turks and Mongols,' 'Differences, Inherited and Acquired.'"

5750 COON, CARLETON. *Cave explorations in Iran in 1949*. Amer. Anthropologist 54 (O '52) 551-3. (Robert J. Braidwood). A penetrating discussion of Coon's data and his interpretation of them.

5751 CRESSWELL, K. A. C. *The Muslim architecture of Egypt, I*. Burlington Mag. 14 (S '52) 270-1. (Steven Runciman).

5752 DAGHER, J. A. *Eléments de bio-bibliographie de la littérature Arabe*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 39 (Ap '52) 180. (A. S. T.) "Except for the title-page the whole book is in Arabic. . . . It begins with two lists, one of the authorities on which the study of Arabic literary history must be based, and the other of modern works on the subject. After these each author has a section to himself, consisting of a short life, a list of his works, the early authorities, modern books dealing with him, and lastly a list of articles in Arabic periodicals about him."

5753 DE GAURY, GERALD. *Rulers of Mecca*. Muslim World 43 (Ja '53) 67. (A. Jeffery).

5754 DRAGUE, GEORGES. *Esquisse d'histoire religieuse du Maroc: frères et Zaouias*. Middle East J. 6 (autumn '52) 484-5. (F. S. Vidal). "The accumulation of simple historical facts."

5755 EAST, W. GORDON and SPATE, O. H. K., eds. *The changing map of Asia: a political geography*. Geog. Rev. 41 (O '51) 695-6. (J. O. M. Broek).

5756 ELGOOD, CYRIL. *A medical history of Persia*. Bibl. Orient. (Leiden) 9 (Mr '52) 61. (T. H. Schlichting).

5757 ERDMANN, KURT. *Orientalische teppiche aus vier Jahrhunderten*. Artibus Asiae 15, no. 3 (1952) 295. (M. S. Dimand). A critical catalog of an exhibition arranged in Hamburg; it brought together the more important pieces remaining in museums and private collections in Germany.

5758 D'ETIENNE, JEAN, VILLEME, LOUIS, and DELISLE, STEPHANE. *L'évolution sociale du Maroc*. Middle East J. 6 (autumn '52) 485-6. (R. Torrance). A collection of essays on certain "aspects of the life and customs of medium- and small-incomed urban Moroccans."

5759 FARUQI, K. A. *Islamic constitution*. Islamic Culture (Hyderabad) 25 (Ja-O '51) 283-5. (H. K. Sherwani); Muslim World 43 (Ja '53) 65-7. (Muhsin Mahdi). The frame of reference is the experiment in Pakistan. The governmental "machinery seems to be adequate and may very well succeed in Pakistan, but it is hard to know what is particularly Islamic about it."

5760 FISHER, W. B. *The Middle East*. Geog. Rev. 41 (O '51) 690-1. (H. L. Hoskins). "It is no small task to analyze and set forth the human environmental influences of a major area in terms of geology, geography, and climatology. In accomplishing this comprehensive task so successfully, Dr. Fisher is

to be congratulated on a timely and valuable contribution."

5761 FÜCK, J. *Arabiya*. Z.D.M.G. 102, no. 1 (1952) 179-86. (H. Wehr).

5762 GABRIELI, F. *Storia della letteratura araba*. Riv. degli Stud. Orient. (Rome) 27, no. 1-4 (1952) 158-61. (S. Moscati).

5763 GEJER, AGNES. *Oriental textiles in Sweden*. Artibus Asiae 15, no. 3 (1952) 285-8. (A. C. Weibel). "A most welcome addition to the literature of textile art."

5764 AL-GHAZĀLĪ, MUHAMMAD. *'Aqidat al-Muslim*. Risālah 20 (Ap 21 '52) 455-8. (Muhammad Fayād).

5765 GRAF, G. *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen literatur, III*. Bibl. Orient. (Leiden) 9 (Mr '52) 80 (W. C. Van Unnik).

5766 HANS, J. *Homo oeconomicus Islamicus*. Middle East J. 7 (winter '53) 108-9. (A. Bonne). "Contains some interesting observations on population problems . . . dwells on the effect of feudalism on oriental society."

5767 HAZARD, HARRY W. *Atlas of Islamic history*. Geog. Rev. 41 (O '51) 693. (M. E. H.). "This handy atlas will fill a large gap in the field of history. The material can be found elsewhere—scattered through hundreds of publications, often as sketchy footnotes to other topics—but here it is presented as a coherent story."

5768 HENNINGER, J. *Spuren christlichen glaubenswahrheiten im Koran*. Z.D.M.G. 102, no. 1 (1952) 159-60. (R. Paret).

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Acad., Academy	M., Morgenländischer	Russian
Aff., Affairs	Mag., Magazine	Akad., Akademii
Afr., African	Mod., Môdern	Fil., Filosofi
Amer., American	Mus., Museum	Ist., Istorii
Bull., Bulletin	Natl., National	Izvest., Izvestiya
Cent., Central	Numis., Numismatic	Lit., Literaturi
Contemp., Contemporary	Orient., Oriental	Otdel., Otdeleniye
D., Deutsch	Pal., Palestine	Ser., Seriya
Dept., Department	Philol., Philological	Sov., Sovetskoye
East., Eastern	Polit., Political	Yaz., Yazika
G., Gesellschaft	Quart., Quarterly	
Geog., Geographical	Res., Research	
Gt. Brit., Great Britain	Rev., Review	Turkish
Hist., Historical	Soc., Society	Coğ., Coğrafya
Illust., Illustrated	Stud., Studies	Fak., Fakulte
Inst., Institute	Trans., Transactions	Üniv., Üniversite
Internat., International	Z., Zeitschrift	
J., Journal		

Arabic

K., Kitâb
Maj., Majallah, Majallat

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